Chapter 1 First months abroad; Bardia

FIRST MONTHS ABROAD OF THE A.I.F.

ON Australia Day, 26th January, 1940, the Commonwealth flag was broken out above the Fast Hotel, Jerusalem. A comparatively small number of A.I.F. personnel saw it open to the wintry wind. They were the advance party, setting up in the Middle East the overseas base of a Force of which the first Division was now formed and organised.

A. The first of the 1940 convoys containing men of the Sixth Australian Division was then on the high seas. In carrying on the name of the old A.I.F., men were conscious of a standard and a tradition against which they would ultimately be judged. But much time had yet to elapse before they could be measured as a Force. They were shiploads of strangers, meeting for the first time on troop-decks the fellow voyagers to adventure with whom they were to form a military unity.

The adventure was then undefined. 'The war as a whole lay quiescent under the murk of a European January. The Maginot Line stood as an impregnable theory, a mansion of boredom with neutral neighbours. A disinterested onlooker might have wondered why such a seemingly unreal conflict was drawing from far-away Australia the men of the Sixth Division.

One Division with ancillary troops comprised what was initially known as the "second" A.I.F. Human variety was its keynote. Those who sailed in the early convoys of 1940 had enlisted for all sorts of reasons, and were drawn from all walks of life. They were a medley matched by the variety of ships which carried them abroad.

Some of the contingents travelled in large passenger liners in which troops were roomily accommodated. There was comfort for those who travelled as a lucky few in roomy ships; but cheerfulness was put to a strain where the accommodation had been hastily converted (that is, squeezed up) to about twice the civilian passenger scale.

With the help of ships' staffs, the troops achieved a real triumph over obstacles. They held a generally high standard of behaviour. They carried their training a stage further by learning that discipline can spell comfort and safety.

It had its leaven, that first contingent, of rank and file who had soldiered in 1914-18. Some of these, who had enlisted while the age limit was 35 years, felt it safe to put up their service ribbons of the last war when they were well out to sea and on their way to another "show." Their Digger tales gained new audiences on the foredecks of transports ploughing west and north under Indian Ocean stars. The old songs mingled with the swing-time sentiments of 1940.

With sweat and song, and the cramped routine of shipboard drill, the transports moved under tireless escort. The "grey ladies" were sometimes hull down on the horizon, sometimes racing close alongside their charges. Always they were watching, signalling orders. There was not a man of the A.I.F. who failed to appreciate the efficiency of the Navy. Those first months established a trustful regard for the Navy which was to deepen dramatically in the critical days of 1941.

On Italy's entry into the war, the convoy system faced new problems. Italian held territory bordered the Red Sea for a considerable distance and brought a sector of the Indian Ocean within the range of air attack. There were a few attempts at aerodrome attacks on Australian convoys, and anti-aircraft drill for the troops became a vivid preparation for realities. But the escort services of the Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy, and the Red Sea patrols of the Royal Air Force, were entirely effective. Many a soldier, in the last days of his voyage to the Middle East, could watch the hazy shoreline of Italian Somaliland. A challenge steamed by, within sight of the enemy. Not once during 194o did enemy action at sea prevent the arrival in the middle East of Australian troops.

And so the new A.I.F. came to Palestine. The advance party, up in Jerusalem, had had their introduction to the bitter winds of winter on the heights. Others made their debut in late spring to the plains where the scent of orange blossom cloyed the air.

A great spread of camps was coming into being in Palestine. Names with Biblical associations, names linked with the great campaigns of the last war; names-like Juhs, Sarafand and Deir Suneid-that were just Eastern cadences in the ears of a new generation. In the world's oldest battle area, the raw encampments of yet another army took shape. Australians were in Gaza again, rediscovering the shell craters of 1917. From a score of hillsides their tents faced the distant ridge of Judean hills. Not the neatly ordered white tents of the past, but irregularly spread and drably camouflaged tents. The war might still be remote, but the precautions of dispersal and concealment were taken. The black-out had come to the Holy Land.

The decision to send the Sixth Australian Division to Palestine was based on the intention to use this area merely as a training ground. When the decision was made, Italy was not in the war and France was still our active ally, with considerable forces in North Africa and Syria to stabilise the local situation. It appeared likely, at the time, that the A.I.F. would have a period of advanced training and hardening in Palestine, and then move to France in the spring of 1941

While a "truce" existed officially on the troublous Arab-Jewish front, conditions in Palestine in the first months of 1940 were unsettled. The civil war atmosphere of earlier years was largely dispelled, but sporadic violence still occurred. The A.I.F. undertook some minor security duties, and in certain areas the troops had to observe special precautions. In general, they found a population disposed to friendliness, alive to the practical advantages of co-operating with a force that had pay to spend and a hundred hungry wants to fill, and quick to accept the light-hearted informality of Australians.

Troops settled down to the normal life of a force in training. Italy's entry into the war brought new precautions - intensifying, in particular, both the active and passive air defence measures. It also brought a new crop of rumours, and new hopes of early action to men in the training camps.

In Egypt, that fateful summer brought new risks to the fore. It was then proposed to use a part of the Australian Force in the Western Desert if the Italians should invade Egypt from Libya. Such an invasion was only to be anticipated. The Italian official community in Egypt-boastful, intriguing and with considerable influence in some quarters-had made no secret of its hopes to drive the British out. The neutralizing of the French North African armies gave to this boast the weight of a real menace. With the western and southern frontiers of Libya no longer threatened, the bulk of the Italian forces could move into Libya's eastern province of Cyrenaica, and there await the order for a drive into Egypt.

The North African overland route to the Suez Canal was a tempting one to the Axis. It was shorter than the way through the Balkans and Asia Minor. It favoured the use of armoured and motorised formations in an autumn and winter campaign. It was likely to be contested only by incomplete British and Imperial Divisions whose expectations of receiving full equipment and reinforcement had been drastically deferred by the losses in France.

In mid-summer, then, a new conception of its operational role came to the A.I.F. in the Middle East. At the beginning of September, a large part of the Sixth Australian Division moved into Egypt. It was there to receive some desert training, intensify the effort to complete its equipment and prepare to take up defensive roles in the Western Desert and the Nile Delta area.

The expected Italian drive now took place. It was not seriously resisted on the frontier, and the British Western Desert Force fell back steadily towards Mersa Matruh, which had been fortified as a pivot for defensive operations. The Italian advance rolled well to the cast of Sidi Barrani, eased to a halt with a broad no-man's land of camel-bush plain and desert aridity between it and Mersa Matruh. The British dug in, patrolled, and waited. The Italian road builders went to work, between Sollum and Sidi Barrani, to pave the way for the bringing up of supplies and a further thrust to the cast.

Sixth Australian Division completed the concentration of its fighting troops in Egypt, and Australian engineers took in hand some important works for the defence of the Nile Delta area.

During this period, the administrative problems of the A.I.F. were greatly increased. Throughout the Middle East command, in fact, the difficulty of organising the means to move and fight entirely over-shadowed the strategic end. Formations were incomplete. Technical and other units essential to the fighting efficiency of divisions had not yet arrived. Some of these units, as far as the A.I.F. was concerned, now had to be created and trained in the Middle East to replace the specialists and other troops whose transports had been diverted to England. In A.I.F. history, 1940 will be regarded as a time of general improvisation, and of the most strenuous and anxious effort to bring the Force to a state of fitness for war with means which were, at times, almost heartbreakingly inadequate.

Under the circumstances, difficulty might have been expected in reconciling with military needs the explicit desire of the Australian Government and people that their troops in the Middle East should be used only as a unified force. General Blarney's representations, however, won recognition at General Headquarters for the Australian sentiment in this matter. The A.I.F. field of active operations was to range from Cyrenaica to Syria, from Greece to Giarabub; the formations variously concerned retained their Australian identity and command.

The big task of reconstituting the Sixth Australian Division was carried through after the arrival of General Blarney in the Middle East in June, 1940. A senior officer was sent home in July to explain the effects of the diversion of troops to England, and to indicate what was then required to complete the Division to fighting strength in the Middle East. The Government agreed to send the necessary troops and also to provide further equipment.

It was also decided to increase considerably the reinforcements abroad for each unit. This called into being a training depot, where the new drafts from Australia could be made ready and held for absorption into units as required. This was expanded, in January, 1941, into an A.I.F. Reinforcements Depot.

On the heels of Sixth Division's organisation came the rapid increase of A.I.F. members in the Middle East. The last quarter of 1940 was intensely active, with the movement of Sixth Division from Palestine to Egypt, the arrival of new formations from Australia, as well as reinforcement quotas for the Sixth, and later the transfer of A.I.F personnel from England to the Middle East. The latter troops had been reorganised while in England from the variety of units, reinforcements and specialist groups which had comprised their convoy on leaving Australia. Before the time came for them to join the A.I.F. in the Middle East they had achieved a degree of cohesion and efficiency which had made it undesirable to break up their organisation.

The result of these influxes was that, by Christmas 1940, the A.I.F. strength in the Middle East was three times as great as had been anticipated in June. As far as man power was concerned, the First Australian Corps was a reality.

A Corps is more than man power, however. It is also armament, vehicles, and a multitude of technical supplies-and an assured stream of replenishment for all of these. In June, the British Empire had suffered a grievous setback to plans for equipping its armies.

Practically all of the equipment of the British Expeditionary Force in France had been lost. The leeway which had then to be made up affected every theatre of war.

Australian industry had to be prepared for a heavier war production effort than had been contemplated.

Middle East resources, in the meantime, offered little or no alleviation of the A.I.F.'s supply problem. Even the construction and servicing of camps suffered from a scarcity of timber and steel. The position improved slowly, but the task was tremendous and the inertia of complacent years was not easily overcome.

If these shortcomings were the especial worry of high authority, they were also matters of which every soldier was aware. He met the effects of them in his training. He was a partner in the improvising by which the A.I.F. lived and learned in 1940.

As far as his own health and comfort were concerned, the Australian soldier could make no serious and prolonged complaint about supplies. There were, it is true, spasmodic times of drought when no Australian beer was available. The A.I.F. has taken overseas a faith in the familiar beer and tobacco brands of home. Nobody who, knows the taste of desert thirst could dismiss the plea of parched throats for cool and familiar solace. Broadly, it is true to say that the A.I.F. abroad in 1940 was served by an array of amenities more complete and more effective than those provided for any other force.

The most important of the "personal" services was undoubtedly the air mail. Maintaining a standard of regularity that was remarkably high when all the strains of war are considered, the air mail brought news from home to Australians in Palestine with an average of 14 days between the writing and receiving of a letter.

In the camps, canteens traded briskly. Comforts Fund issues brought free supplements of necessities and small luxuries. Leave buses ran from the camps to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Comforts Fund hostels-the first at Jerusalem, and others opening elsewhere later-received the sightseer, housed him cheaply and in clean comfort, and arranged tours for him. Every main camp in Palestine had its cinema. The Force had its own newspaper "A.I.F. News," and even achieved among its sporting activities a full-scale race meeting of its own. For many there were week-end hours of bathing to be had on Mediterranean beaches and a grand gala carnival on Gaza Beach.

Life had its irritations. All the amenities on earth could not have eliminated the moments of boredom and staleness known to those who trained through a Palestinian summer. Life had its ills, too. Dysentery and sand-fly fever were perhaps the commonest troubles, but they were not prevalent on scales in any way comparable to such infections in earlier campaigns. The hygiene and hospital units saw to that. For its convalescents, the medical service created a rest camp on the holiday villa site of Kafr Vitkin.

So, through a year of vicissitude, the A.I.F. grew in numerical strength, acquired some knowledge of Eastern ways, deepened its sun tan, learned to handle its weapons. Brigades marched out on five-day bivouacs, sweated through theoretical battles, marched home again with the swing of seasoned troops. By November Sixth Division were in Egypt, their minds translating divisional exercises into the "real thing of the Western Desert. New troops were filling the camps of Palestine. The A.I.F. was growing to an extent not dreamed of by the little party who had saluted the Commonwealth flag in Jerusalem on 26th January.

And then, as the long, formative year drew to a close, the call to real action came.

In their resistance and counter-offensive against the Italians, the Greeks had shown that there was poor quality in the legions of Mussolini. At Mersa Matruh, Western Desert Force carefully prepared "an exercise" to test the strength of the invaders from Libya.

The swift thrust against Sidi Barrani on 9th December was unexpectedly successful The "Army of the Nile" moved instantly to the offensive. With it, and into one of the most remarkable improvised campaigns of siege and movement, went Sixth Australian Division.

It had been decided to give this Division -the most seasoned and best equipped of A.I.F. formations- some experience of Western Desert warfare by using it to relieve the Fourth Indian Division.

The blow against Sidi Barrani had been struck before Sixth Division came up. The relief of the Indians actually took place "on the move" between Sidi Barrani and Sollum.
The first move of Australian units towards the Egyptian-Libyan battle zone began on 16th December, 1940, when one brigade group left its camp site near Alexandria.

Divisional headquarters and another brigade followed soon afterwards.

At first the precipitate Italian retreat into Libya suggested a possibility that the enemy would not attempt to defend Bardia. For a few days the third brigade of Sixth Division was, accordingly, held for sea transport from Alexandria, to be landed as an occupying force at Bardia if the enemy abandoned that town without fighting.

The prospect soon faded however, and this brigade came forward by rail and road to join the rest of Sixth Australian Division on the eve of the battle of Bardia.

A difficult and far-flung campaign impended. Away to the south, part of Sixth Division's cavalry unit had already tasted desert action against enemy patrols and supply columns near Giarabub. Now the rest of the Division, under Major General Mackay, was deploying on to the escarpment north-west of Sollum. The A.I.F. had a footing on enemy soil. Its mettle was about to be tested in the first of 1941's grim series of dramas.

I. BARDIA

THE greater part of Sixth Australian Division spent the Christmas of 1940 OD Libyan soil. There can be few less hospitable areas than the plateau of eastern Cirenaica. It shoulders up, on the Egyptian frontier line just beyond the small town of Sollum, into a stony escarpment. Practically no vegetation survives, apart from some patches of low camel bush. On its coastal edge, the plateau scams into precipitous wadis.

Inland, the wilderness spreads flatly away. Here and there ancient cave cisterns suggest a fertile past. These underground reservoirs had in some instances been restored several years ago to provide water points for nomadic tribes. Now they were half-filled with drift sand, and used by colonies of bats. They were to be restored again for various purposes, including occupation by Sixth Division Headquarters.

In this region, Western Desert Force invested the defences of Bardia, within which the troops of General Bergonzoli had retired. British armoured forces ranged far out to the west, ready to intercept any relieving column of Italians. Australian troops patrolled and probed for the enemy, testing his defences and collecting much of the information on which plans were made for the coming battle. It was a bleak period of preparation, in which most of the troops had little or no shelter from the keen winds of a Libyan winter. Rations were "hard." Water was drastically limited. But hopes and spirits were high. The A.I.F. awaited its first important battle with confident excitement.

The story of Bardia, in actual results an almost incredible achievement, is a story of a carefully planned operation, of the excellent co-ordination of all arms and services, of a resolute attack followed by active exploitation, and of the complete subjugation of a well-entrenched and well-equipped fighting force numerically greater than our own.

Certainly it has to be admitted that, with the exception of his artillery and some machine gun posts, the enemy's military quality was not such as could stand a fiercely pressed attack; yet it is more than possible that, had our first attack not been so resolute and had we not had the invaluable assistance of "I" tanks, the story of Bardia would not have been quite so triumphant.

The defences of Bardia covered an area some eleven miles long and five miles deep. Around this area was a semi-circular defence system with its base on the sea north and south of Bardia. The main defences around the perimeter consisted of minefields, an anti-tank ditch fifteen feet wide and six feet to ten feet deep, and two lines of fortified posts behind a continuous double apron fence of barbed wire. in all, there were eighty posts, forty being in the front line system, most of the remainder in a secondary line 200 to 500 yards in the rear, and a few others at greater depth still, covering what were regarded as vulnerable points.

Many of these posts, particularly on the southern sector, consisted of a circular concrete trench, forty yards in diameter, ten feet deep, and containing concrete emplacements for three machine guns and one anti-tank gun. A labyrinth of trenches with head cover had been dug inside the stronger of these posts, and from the sides of these trenches "cubbies" had been cut where the garrison of seventy men slept.

One strong "switch" defence system was built in the southern area, where the majority of the enemy guns were situated. Most of the western side of the perimeter was sited on the flat plateau of the escarpment which extended eastward for distances up to one mile within the enemy defences, and was then broken by rough wadi country to the sea coast. The cliffs along the coast rose steeply to about 6oo feet above the sea.

Before the battle, it was estimated that Bardia was garrisoned by about 25,000 men. Actually there were nearer 45,000 troops in the place.

Approximately 6,000 men occupied the perimeter system, whilst the remainder lived in deep and safe dugouts in the sides of wadis.

It was considered that the morale of this force was high enough to offer prolonged resistance after the defences had been penetrated. It was known that the Italian High Command regarded Bardia as impregnable and wished it to be held at all costs.

Some of the prisoners taken in December during Sidi Barrani operations were inclined to be "cocky." This applied to members of Blackshirt (Fascist) formations, in whom the Party's victory propaganda was still having some stimulative effect. One or two of these prisoners claimed to regard their captivity as a brief "rest" before the onrush of Graziani's forces to Egypt released them. A more subdued tone was noticed in the two or three prisoners taken by the Australians on 3oth December. It was learned from them that food stocks in Bardia were being conserved by a reduction in the daily ration.

No other enemy forces were nearer than Tobruk, some seventy-five miles westward, where the garrison was estimated to be about 16,000.

Western Desert Force controlled our operations. Its troops included Sixth Australian Division with some A.I.F. specialist groups attached from other formations, the Seventh (British) Armoured Division, a British machine gun battalion (Northumberland Fusiliers), with some British artillery and engineers.

A majority of the Corps troops who were to take part in the assault on Bardia were placed under the command of Sixth Australian Division on 21st December, 1940. It was decided to launch the attack at 5.30 a.m. on Friday, 3rd January.

Broadly, Sixth Division were to assault the perimeter defences, die Armoured Division were to make a feint against the northern sector, and also to intercept any Italian force attempting to relieve Bardia from the direction of Tobruk, the Royal Navy was to put in preliminary bombardments of Bardia, and the Royal Air Force was also to bomb sectors of the defences in addition to providing the essential air reconnaissance and protection.

Apart from our estimate of the garrison's strength, we were exceptionally well informed concerning the enemy's defences, tank, ditch, minefields, barbed wire, strong posts, machine guns and artillery. This information came from several excellent series of air photographs; captured maps; from infantry and engineer patrols; from artillery observation posts, and from tactical reconnaissance by aircraft.

In the light of this information, General Mackay and his staff developed the plan for Sixth Division's attack. It was decided to break through on the western front of the perimeter, on a frontage of approximately 1,000 yards which included Posts 47 and 45.

This area was chosen because the approach to it gave the best assembly route for troops moving by night, and also because the anti-tank ditch was least formidable here.

Another advantage was that the enemy's attention had been attracted away from his western front and towards the south. Here the 17th Australian Infantry Brigade continued vigorous patrol demonstrations, and stung the enemy to particular alertness in the southern sector.

While this preparatory deception was taking effect, parties of Australian engineers carried out their own patrols by night. They moved among the enemy minefields, and explored and measured the anti-tank ditch. Behind our own lines they built replicas of that ditch and practised the construction of crossings. The engineers were to be in the very forefront of the attack. They were not only to clear a way for the tanks, but to blow the barbed wire obstacles with Bangalore torpedoes so that the infantry could move to the assault.

The whole complex multitude of preparations and rehearsals came to the test of action after nightfall on 2nd January. Over ground powdered into dusty trails by wheels and tank tracks, the assault force moved to its assembly area. The rattle of carrier tracks and the coughing of men in the bitter night air marked this almost invisible deployment in a wilderness.

The leading unit of the assault on the western sector, the 2/1st Battalion of the 16th Australian Infantry Brigade, was in position on the white-taped starting line before 5.30 a.m. on 3rd January. The enemy's wire and forward defence lines were approximately 1,000 yards ahead - 1,000 yards of bare, level ground.

At zero hour the artillery barrage opened against the Italian positions. The black horizon came alive with shivering light from the gun flashes. Our infantrymen, in sleeveless leather jerkins over their uniforms, began to plod steadily toward the shell bursts on the Italian line.

At 5.55 a.m. the barrage lifted. The first wave of attacking infantry was 200 yards from the wire. As the engineers fired their Bangalore torpedoes to tear gaps in the wire, the infantry thrust forward. A proportion of them carried wire-cutters to complete a passage.

As they crossed the wire and moved to attack Posts 45 and 47, the engineers began feverish work on the anti-tank ditch, making crossings for the British tanks. The Italian artillery had taken up the challenge of our barrage almost at once. At first groping uncertainly for targets, it now ranged in the half light on our line of assault. Machine guns joined in.

The posts behind the wire, however, were not defended with great resolution against close attack. The 2/1st Battalion took Posts 45 and 47 with little trouble, and then wheeled to the left against other defended positions inside the wire.

Meanwhile, the 2/2nd Battalion came through, swinging to the right. This battalion was preceded by tanks whose role it was to quell opposition in the supporting posts and widen the front of the penetration. The 2/3rd Battalion then followed, with a squadron of die divisional cavalry regiment, to push directly to the cast and hold the top of the escarpment, overlooking the wadi-scoured slopes before the town of Bardia.

This was the first planned phase of the attack. Despite an occasional sharp episode of resistance as the battalions swung to attack posts on the flanks of the first assault line, the battle on the western sector moved to success with a time-table precision. Bardia had not yet fallen, but a wedge had been driven deeply into its defences.

The 16th Australian Infantry Brigade had accomplished its first task with very few casualties, and had taken at least 8,000 prisoners and captured a number of machine guns, anti-tank and field guns. Our men paid their first tribute - a very glowing tribute - to the work of the "I" tanks.

A second and different phase of the battle was now launched. On the southern sector, where the enemy had been led to expect our main attack, the 17th Australian Infantry Brigade took up the task of cracking a section of the defences. The 2/5th and 2/7th Battalions were to capture posts on the south-west of the perimeter. The 2/6th Battalion were to contain the enemy in the south and, if opportunity offered, make a limited thrust northwards.

This second phase was not so spectacular in its immediate results as the attack on the western front had been. But it broke the outer defences, brought us into a secondary "switch line," pinned down some of the enemy's best troops and yielded several thousands of prisoners on the first day.

Fronting the formidable Wadi Muatered on the south, the 2/6th Battalion had advanced, rushing the forward posts and meeting the full weight of fire from the enemy's best artillery and most determined machine gunners. Enemy strength in this sector had been anticipated, and the commander of the 17th Infantry Brigade had left to the discretion of the Commanding Officer, 2/6th Battalion, the decision as to how much should be attempted after the first demonstration here.

The centre of resistance was Post 11, a position of which the C.O. 2/6th Battalion subsequently wrote: "It could defy capture if manned by Australian troops.

It had wire, tank ditches, tunnelled communications between strong points, and a garrison reinforced to a strength of some 400 men, with numerous machine guns and accurately ranged artillery support."

This post was at one stage entered by the attackers. Concentrated enemy fire compelled a withdrawal, but Post ii remained closely and furiously engaged.

Nightfall found the western defence line so riven that our foremost patrols were in sight of Bardia town. To the south, much territory had been gained under most difficult and confused fighting conditions.

The two brigades engaged spent the night in "sorting out" and consolidating, while the 19th Australian Infantry Brigade moved up into close support.

Next day, the 16th Brigade completed with case their advance from the west. The 2/1st Battalion moved north across the Bardia-Tobruk road. The 2/3rd and 2/2nd Battalions advanced to the coast, respectively north and south of the town. The wedge had gone right through the comparatively soft spot, and now a large part of the garrison was surrendering with scarcely a struggle. They had made no attempt to destroy the water supply and harbour facilities. Thousands of prisoners were taken, including naval ratings and a few Italian civilians.

In the meantime the battalions of 17th Australian Infantry Brigade were still encountering a considerable amount of artillery fire in the south, and could see no favourable opportunity of advancing except possibly at considerable cost. No tanks were yet available to help them.

Late that evening the Brigadier of 16th Australian Infantry Brigade received an envoy from the Italian Divisional Commander of the northern sector, saying that he and 7,000 men were prepared to surrender. Embarrassed already with thousands more prisoners than he could handle, our Brigadier replied that it would be more convenient if they left it till the morning! This suggestion was accepted.

Thus the second day ended with Bardia's defences and garrison in our hands, with the exception of the strong position in the south-cast.

It was decided that this should be cleaned up by a "set-piece" attack by the 19th Australian Infantry Brigade with artillery and tank support at 9 a.m. on 5th January. This attack would press southwards, toward the enemy's rear.

Six "I" tanks were now available, and 19th Australian Infantry Brigade moved according to plan at 9 a.m., 2/11th Battalion attacking and 2/4th Battalion passing through to exploit.

With the tanks charging straight into the enemy batteries and the infantry supporting them and mopping up, enemy resistance was gradually worn down. When the batteries were silenced, 17th Brigade were able to move eastward and, by this t4squeezing" movement, the final collapse of the enemy occurred at i p.m. The whole of the "impregnable" Bardia defences were ours.

Post ii, which had defiantly flown the Italian flag earlier in the day, put up the white flag of surrender. The commander, who was wounded, led his men out. The 2/6th Battalion commander advanced and shook hands with him.

In the meantime, the 7,000 men had come in from the northern sector and were duly corralled.

In addition to the unexpected haul of prisoners, we took over 400 guns, 130 light and medium tanks, hundreds of machine guns and anti-tank guns, thousands of rifles, vast quantities of equipment, two complete field hospitals, splendidly equipped, 700 motor trucks, many motor cycles, and even a few good horses.

The A.I.F. had planned and fought its first "set-piece" battle of the Second World War. As they reorganised, marshalled prisoners and briefly rested in the sunshine of the January Sunday, the men of Sixth Division felt a new pride in their units. They also recognised to the full that they shared success with British comrades, that Bardia had been the victory of a partnership.

A British tank regiment had led many of them into battle, and had earned their admiration and confidence. British artillery had joined with the Australian field regiments in an elaborate and thoroughly effective support of the attack. British machine gunners and imperturbable British reconnaissance airmen had added their gallant skill to an Imperial occasion.

An outline of the Bardia story is perhaps fittingly rounded off by quoting from one of the documents found in the private files of General Bergonzoli ("Electric Beard"), the Italian Commander at Bardia. It is a message to General Bergonzoli from Mussolini, through Marshal Graziani, dated 22nd December, 1940:

I have given you a difficult task, but one suited to your courage and experience as an old and intrepid soldier; the task of defending the fortress of Bardia to the last. I am certain that "electric beard" and his brave soldiers will stand, at whatever cost, faithful to the last.

MUSSOLINI.

On the foot of that message, the General had made the following note:

I have replied

I am aware of the honour and I have to-day repeated to my troops your message--simple and unequivocal. In Bardia we are, and here we stay.

BERGONZOLI.

Although the General did not stay in Bardia himself, the declaration in his message to Mussolini was substantially correct. Of the garrison, 44,868 remained-killed or captured in the battle.