Chapter 3 Pursuit to the west; Giarabub; The Retreat; Siege of Tobruk

III. PURSUIT TO THE WEST

THE African campaign was now on the full tide of enterprise, and the conditions of the offensive suited the Australian temperament.

Even before the fall of Tobruk, British policy envisaged the employment of more Australian troops in Libya. An increasing amount of the operational command and area administration was to pass to Australian staffs. The relief of Headquarters, 13th (British) Corps by Headquarters, ist Australian Corps was decided upon, and was tentatively arranged to take place about mid-February.

General Blarney had decided that a second Australian Division should be made ready for early participation in the Libyan campaign. In addition to providing relief for Sixth Australian Division, it was decided to give- experience of actual operations to the maximum number of A.I.F. troops. Plans were therefore made, during January, for the movement of another Australian Division into Libya.

As events turned out, the effects of this policy were operative in the second and defensive phase of 1941 in North Africa. In the meanwhile, the offensive unrolled rapidly across Cirenaica, and Sixth Australian Division continued to carry the A.I.F. share of the operations.

While Australians were still rounding up the remnants of Tobruk's garrison, the British Armoured Division were thrusting far to the westward. By the evening of 22nd January, their forward elements were in touch with the enemy ten miles southeast of Derna.

The 19th and 17th Australian Infantry Brigades followed. The 16th remained in the Tobruk area, forming a garrison for what was to be a most valuable port, guarding prisoners and salvaging the considerable quantities of war material within the defence lines. This brigade was to have moved to occupy Mechili, but the rapidity of the Italian retreat, and the limited transport available for our pursuit were factors in the decision to leave the 16th at Tobruk. Behind the advance guard, which included "A" Squadron of Sixth Australian Division Cavalry Regiment, with British and Australian artillery, the 19th Australian Infantry Brigade moved by truck towards Derna.

Cupping the pretty white town of Derna was a lofty and steep escarpment. This escarpment was veined with wadis, chief among which was the huge Wadi Derna, curving northwards to the sea on a line which protected the town from the southwest, south and south-cast. The whole seamed edge of the plateau hereabouts had good defensive possibilities for a determined force. But apparently neither the resources nor the will for sustained resistance could now be summoned up.

By 25th January it was clear that the Italians could attempt no more than a delaying action while their main force and the white population were given a chance to withdraw further west.

Caution was necessary, however, in our approach to Derna. We had not that detailed knowledge of local defences which had helped our assaults on Bardia and Tobruk. But under the probing pressure of tanks and artillery the enemy fell back, by 25th January, to within a few miles of Derna. The 19th Australian Infantry Brigade moved from the south-east towards the escarpment edge.

On the 26th, after some sharp fighting, the 2/4th Battalion were astride the Tobruk-Derna road, with their right flank north of the aerodrome. The 2/11th Battalion, after a night march, had reached the Wadi Derna to the south-west of the town, had gained a footing on the further bank and had repulsed a counter-attack. The wadi in this sector was some 1,500 feet wide, and its sides sloped at about 60 degrees. The enemy may have thought it impassable. The 2/8th Battalion was in reserve, near the Tobruk road, some eight miles south-east of Derna.

At this stage there was some risk to the rear and left flank of 19th Australian Infantry Brigade if the enemy had a striking force inland and south of Derna. Mechili was the centre from which such an opportunity might have been exploited by the Italians. What appeared to be the advance elements of a motorised force did, in fact, attack the 2/4th Battalion. This attack, carried out with some spirit, covered a withdrawal of Italian troops from Derna in the late afternoon Of 27th January.

The covering action against the 2/4th Battalion was launched by a force reported to comprise 200 vehicles. The commander of the 2/4th Battalion realised the potential danger. To create an impression in the enemy's mind that our left flank was being reinforced, he arranged for several heavy lorries to ply along the Martuba road, raising as much dust as possible.

The 17th Australian Infantry Brigade, which had moved from the Tobruk area after the 19th, was now approaching to cover this flank and reconnoitre towards Mechili. This place was, however, evacuated by the enemy on 27th January, and the 17th Australian Infantry Brigade relieved the 2/4th Battalion in its Wadi Derna position on 3oth January.

To the north-cast, in the meanwhile, the 2/11th Battalion had gained ground steadily. The road from Tobruk, winding down to Derna from the plateau in steep grades, was commanded by a number of small defence posts, with an old rampart wall extending over the broken country on its flanks. But practically no attempt was made to hold the inner defences. The town of Derna was entered by the 2/11th Battalion on 30th January.

The campaign was now definitely one of pursuit. The two available infantry brigades of the Sixth Australian Division pushed forward, behind the armoured forces and artillery units.

Our engineers worked throughout the night of 30th January to repair sections of the road which had been demolished by the enemy. Traffic was able to make its congested way through Derna, and crawl up the escarpment west of the town. The 19th Australian Infantry Brigade took this route. The 17th skirted south of the Wadi Derna and made necessarily slow progress westwards over difficult, rugged country.

An arduous phase of skirmishing advances began, with problems of supply and vehicle maintenance rising to levels which might have been accepted as fantastic and insurmountable but which were, somehow, overcome by a force which now saw the conquest of all Cirenaica within reach.

West of Derna, desert landscapes shaded into more fertile country, and the Libyan colonisation settlements were reached.

By 2nd February, the 19th Australian Infantry Brigade group, in its necessarily slow advance, was losing touch with the retreating enemy. An Italian rearguard, with artillery, had to be dealt with. The 17th Australian Infantry Brigade, making a strenuous approach march on Giovanni Berta from the south, had some skirmishes on the way but found many strong posts unoccupied.

Giovanni Berta itself was not defended. Even the telephone wires were intact, and one officer, picking up a telephone receiver, heard an operator answering "Benghazi."

Settlers welcomed the entry of our troops, as a protection against marauding Libyans. From then on, the Australians were frequently met by groups of Italians waving white flags outside their farm houses. The colonisation settlements were trim, and each civic centre, with its white stucco facades and the flamboyant insignia of Fascism, was a self-conscious showpiece of Mussolini's empire. But the frugal populace were no proud imperialists. The regime had driven them hard. It had sown among the native Libyans a crop of hatred.

Some farmers, greeting the Australian troops as their transports rolled along the road, hastily corrected their familiar Fascist salute into a gesture similar to the military salute.

On 3rd February, Cirene, the ancient centre of the province and another thirty miles along the road to Benghazi, was entered by "A" Squadron of the Sixth Australian Division Cavalry without opposition. Next day our infantry were on the escarpment overlooking Barce. Resistance here had consisted chiefly of artillery fire to cover the work of Italian demolition squads on the road.

Barce was claimed to be the first Libyan town to surrender to an Australian artillery regiment. The white flag was raised after the regiment fired a few shells into the town. One officer and six men then went in and accepted Barce's surrender.

By now, our troops laboured forward with resources strained to the uttermost. The problems of supply and communication, alone, were tremendous. The signallers, in these latter days of the pursuit, had to abandon the use of the field telephone service. Wireless and motor-cycle dispatch riders were the only practical means of keeping units in touch with each other. In a hurried and determined flood, Sixth Division was pouring along the highways and side-tracks of Cirenaica.

There were signs that the Italians had begun to prepare defensive positions, but had abandoned them before completion. Roads were found to be effectively mined in one or two places, but our forces were now familiar with this type of obstacle, and casualties were very slight. A more serious barrier was the heavy rain which set in on the morning of 6th February. The over-taxed transport struggled and bogged as columns followed the highway and the by-ways of the sixty miles from Barce to Benghazi.

The Italian command was by then leaving Benghazi, with all available transport and armoured vehicles marshalled for the last phase of the retreat across Cirenaica

At 4.45 p.m. on 6th February, a small party of British and Australian troops entered the city with messages to the civil and remaining military authorities, demanding surrender.

Municipal representatives reported that evening at the headquarters of the 19th Australian Infantry Brigade at Benina aerodrome. Next morning the formal surrender of the city was taken by the Brigadier; "B" Company of the 2/4th Battalion formed a guard in front of the Municipal building during the formalities.

A little more than a month had passed since the first battle on Libyan sand. Units of the A.I.F. had covered 74o miles across Egypt and Cirenaica in six weeks, and were now 36o miles from their first battlefield at Bardia.

While Benghazi was surrendering, the climax of the campaign was taking place seventy-five miles to the south, on the road to Tripoli. The remains of Italy's Cirenaican forces were brought to bay and destroyed by the British Armoured Division. For this action the British had only twenty-six cruiser tanks and fifty light tanks in fighting trim. These were the available tanks in a striking force Of 500 vehicles which had dashed from Mechili to cut off the Italian retreat, covering 170 miles of cross-country in thirty-six hours.

The force achieved what the Italians had thought impossible. It reached the Tripoli road, south of Benghazi, in time to cut off their retreat.

The Armoured Division called for infantry pressure from the north to help them in containing and destroying the huge enemy columns. If the rain had not slowed down their progress on 6th February, a sufficient force of the 19th Australian Infantry Brigade might have been far enough forward to join in this action. As it was, the 2/11th Battalion went forward at dawn on 7th February, the commanding officer stepping up the speed of his carriers to twenty miles per hour on the main road. The battalion were thirty-five miles south of Benghazi when word came that their aid would not be necessary. The Armoured Division, with its own Support Group of motorised infantry, had completed the destruction of Bergonzoli's army.

It was fitting that the pursuit across Cirenaica should end with this "battle of the tanks" in which the honours went entirely to the Armoured Division. They had formed the spearhead of the tireless drive across Libya, and had won the admiration and confidence of all our units in the campaign.

The Prime Minister, Mr. R. G. Menzies, had arrived on a visit to the A.I.F. in the Middle East. Now, accompanied by General Blarney, he saw a number of our units in Cirenaica. These were battle-scarred parades of troops in stained and torn uniforms. Numbers of them wore Italian boots, their equipment was variegated, and hats -for those who still had them -had acquired shapeless droops.

The Headquarters of 1st Australian Corps now moved into Cirenaica for a brief period. This was to carry out the arrangement made early in January for the relief of Headquarters, 13th (British) Corps. An Australian Imperial Force Headquarters was at the same time set up in Egypt, comprising heads of services with their staffs, and designed to relieve Corps of non-operational responsibilities.

On 15th February, Corps took over the command of certain forward areas, including the Cirenaica-Tripolitania coastal frontier region near El Agheila.

The 7th Armoured Division was withdrawn from this area on 18th February, and a light force was left. It included Australian infantry and artillery, some British detachments and a Free French unit. The whole could be regarded only as an outpost line.

The remainder of the A.I.F. troops then in Benghazi Province were widely and intricately disposed. Corps Headquarters were at El Abiar, and the Headquarters of the Sixth Australian Division at Baracca. Battalions were in various settlement areas, resting and performing local guard duties. Artillery, engineer and service detachments were spread among the settlements, each tackling some phase in the complex programme of security, repair and communication in the newly conquered territory.

One of the first tasks undertaken was to repair the Benghazi-Barce railway, which had been blown up in places by the retreating Italians. On 22nd February, the repairs had been completed by a field company of the Sixth Australian Division, and a train ran through.

But the western front was not all quiet, or concerned entirely with tasks of reconstruction. Enemy air activity was now more aggressive, German aircraft taking the prominent r6le. The harbour at Benghazi was a main target for bombers. Low-flying bomb and machine gun attacks were made on our forward troops and transport using the main road from Benghazi to El Agheila.

By 20th February it was known in the forward area that German troops were among the enemy forces, and our aircraft spotted some of their eight-wheeled armoured vehicles west of El Agheila. A patrol of King's Dragoon Guards, west of El Agheila, was attacked by a small armoured force. A second skirmish occurred here on 24th February. An enemy force of a few tanks, motor-cycle combinations and three guns attacked our outpost positions. "Tip and run" tactics, which had been anticipated by the Brigadier commanding our forward line, were being employed by the Germans.

It was known that Italo-German reinforcements were arriving in Tripoli. The decision to give military support to Greece had been made and it was not possible, in consequence, to leave for defensive action in Western Cirenaica more than a comparatively light force.

In preparation for the looming struggle in the Balkans, it had been decided to withdraw Sixth Australian Division from Cirenaica. The headquarters of 1st Australian Corps began its return move to Egypt on 25th February. The 17th were the last of the brigades to follow, being relieved by units of Ninth Australian Division.

A remarkable campaign of movement had come to a close. It had raised, in the A.I.F., one division of fighting troops and a number of service units to a high pitch of endurance and ingenuity. It had tested equipment drastically, revealing both the weaknesses of machines and the stubborn capacity of man to wrestle with them.

To Sixth Division had come the responsibility of giving the first demonstration in action of the quality of the new A.I.F. A recognition of that quality, as well as of the leadership he had given it, was expressed in the honouring of Major-General Mackay with a knighthood.

(Wilderness Side Show) GIARABUB

THE oasis of Giarabub, remote from the coastal areas where the main actions and rapid movements of our forces in Libya took place, was for three months the centre of minor operations. These, and their setting, differed greatly from the rest of the campaign.

Giarabub lies in Libya about 16o miles south of Sollum, and close to the Egyptian frontier. It is the religious focal point for the followers of Mohamed Ben Ali el Senussi, whose teachings were propounded here and whose asceticism has its memorial in a fine mosque containing Senussi's tomb. The oasis area was ceded by Egypt to Italy in 1925, as a means of enabling the Italian administration to exercise better control of the Senussi tribesmen.

The surrounding country is sheer desert. An escarpment rises above Giarabub on the north. On other sides the oasis area, which is thirty feet below sea level, is cupped within sand hills and eroded crags and knolls and "marsh" patches of dark, impassable sand. On the south, the Great Sand Sea extends its shimmering waves as outposts of the Sahara.

Across the frontier in Egypt is Siwa, a larger and more fertile oasis area, of greater antiquity.

After the Italians advanced to Sidi Barrani, it was thought possible that they would attack Siwa from Giarabub. Only a small Anglo-Egyptian outpost was at that time based on Siwa.

Much enemy activity across the frontier was noticed. Further north, beside the frontier wire running to Fort Capuzzo, the Italians had a post at Maddalena. Their lines of communication were by desert tracks, the main one going north-west to Derna.

Late in November, 1940, it was decided to relieve the British infantry detachment by a squadron of Sixth Australian Division's cavalry regiment. "B" Squadron was detailed for the task, moving to the pleasant springs and date palm groves of Siwa early in December.

On the 11th, the Squadron made the A.I.F.'s first raid against enemy lines in Libya, cutting telephone wires near the Maddalena post, and returning with information about the defences.

The British front in Egypt was now taking the offensive. On 17th December, our cavalry regiment's headquarters, with portion of Headquarters Squadron and "C" Squadron, moved to Siwa. Three days later, the regiment began to put out patrols northwest of Giarabub. The role was now changing from that of defending Siwa to cutting off Giarabub. A number of successful raids on convoys and outposts were made. On i8th December, it was reported that the enemy was evacuating Maddalena.

At Giarabub, however, his forces sat tight. At this stage they probably comprised some 1,200 Italian and 700 Libyan troops. Their artillery was limited, but well sited, and the country favoured an obstinate defence. There was a central walled fort, heavily wired. Approaches were guarded by strong posts, those facing north being particularly strong. The whole area was enclosed with a twelve foot thickness of barbed wire. Our patrols of mechanised cavalry could harass convoys entering or leaving, but were not strong enough to achieve more. Any approach to the escarpment edge on the north side drew accurate fire, the flanks were commanded by knolls and guarded by a wilderness of sand bogs, and the Great Sand Sea to the south was impassable to guns and heavy vehicles.

Action to capture Giarabub was considered when the British offensive moved into Libya. It was decided to use troops of the 18th Australian Infantry Brigade, who had just arrived from England, and were well advanced in training and equipment. Brigadier L. J. Morshead, who then commanded this brigade, made a reconnaissance of the Giarabub front immediately after the fall of Bardia. He reported to the Commander-in-Chief, British Forces in Egypt, in favour of a plan "to deny the enemy supplies and so starve them into submission." This policy was, for the time being, accepted.

So the situation rested, while the main tide of battle moved westward across coastal Libya. The cavalry regiment and the few British guns operating with it contained an enemy whose capture appeared more or less inevitable.

The siege was tightened with an occasional raid by the Long Range Desert Group. Comprising New Zealanders and some British troops, this motorised force had been created for long range raiding and reconnaissance between Italian posts in Libya. Its journeys included trans-desert raids into Tripolitania, contact with Free French in their advance to Kufra oasis, and a crossing of the Great Sand Sea. A picturesque unit of bearded men, this unit ranged far and wide, setting its course by the stars on long desert voyages.

In March, the plan for an attack on Giarabub was revived. Units of the 18th Australian Infantry Brigade filled the infantry role.

The troops allotted to the capture of Giarabub, in addition to the Sixth Australian Division Cavalry unit, were the 2/9th Battalion and "D" Company of the 2/10th Battalion, with the 2/10th Battalion mortar and anti-tank platoons and a section of the medium machine guns drawn from the 2/10th and 2/I2th Battalions as a reserve of infantry support fire power; a battery of British artillery, a company of Royal Engineers, signallers, an Indian motor transport company and two Lysander aircraft.

The Long Range Desert Group co-operated by watching the country west of Giarabub.

The commander, i8th Australian Infantry Brigade, took charge of operations, and on i8th March set up his headquarters at a gap in a rocky hill several miles east of Giarabub.

It was believed that the oasis was then held by 1,000 Italians and about 30 Libyans. (Practically all of the enemy's native troops had, by now, deserted.) Enemy posts and patrols were widely spread. It was desired to complete our operations so that Australian troops would be back at Mersa Matruh by the 25th.

On the i8th, two platoons of the 2/9th Battalion moved to reconnoitre an approach to Giarabub from the south-east. This party sighted enemy guns and vehicles at a post to the south and in rear of the proposed line of reconnaissance. They were not strong enough to attack, and the commander did not feel justified in continuing his task across completely unknown country while an enemy detachment was at large behind him. The reconnaissance was therefore abandoned.

On the 19th, the Brigadier decided to send a force of two companies, plus mortar and anti-aircraft detachments, to test what appeared on the map to be a possible line of approach from the south-cast. This force was to secure a N.E.-S.W. line close to Giarabub before dawn on the 20th. Its experience in this task would decide whether or not a main assault from the south-east was practicable. It had appeared, from aerial photographs and such maps as existed, that the knolls on the southern sector dominated Giarabub, and that their loss by the enemy would, therefore break his defence plan.

The advance guard left the Brigade Headquarters area about noon-a long convoy of vehicles crawling and lurching deviously under the lee of rocky outcrops and escarpments. A barely possible route for wheeled vehicles had been prospected. Some trucks were bogged and others stopped through over-heating, but three hours of slow travel brought the head of the column to the double apron wire fence and a line of telephone poles running south-east of Giarabub.

Crossing a gap in the wire, the vehicles turned on to a track skirting it and running north-west between stony knolls.

These knolls were Italian observation posts. Shelling began. Troops debussed from the leading vehicles and pushed ahead in open order. The enemy quickly abandoned his advanced observation posts and our troops gained ground under light shell fire. The broken ground gave shelter from machine gun and rifle fire, and the advance was ahead of its objective by nightfall. After dark, extensive patrolling along the enemy wire was carried out by the 2/9th Battalion. Gaps were cut, and small posts inside the wire were raided.

The enemy shelled the route of the advance uneasily and intermittently during the night. He had not expected an attack from this quarter, where the approaches were through an appallingly difficult wilderness and where there had been little preliminary activity on our part to arouse his suspicions.

By dawn on the 20th, the companies of the 2/9th Battalion held well advanced positions south-west, south and south-east of Giarabub. The white dome of the mosque and some village buildings could be seen through a gap in the hills.

The enemy had lost his observation posts, but his artillery and machine gun fire were brisk.

Brigade headquarters moved up early in the morning, with the remainder of the 2/9th Battalion and one company of 2/10th Battalion. A battery of British 25-pounders also arrived. After a reconnaissance, plans were made for a dawn barrage and infantry attack next day. An easterly dust storm blew all day on the 20th. Supplies came laboriously forward through the sandy desolations. Brigade and regimental headquarters groups of vehicles parked against the reverse slopes of rocky knolls-completed their preparations for one of Libya's minor but strenuous "mopping up" actions.

At 5.30 a.m. on the 21st, the 25-pounders opened against the enemy's wire and gun positions. Engineers, with Bangalore torpedoes, were forward to blow gaps in the wire. Our barrage was answered by only slight artillery fire. Enemy dispositions had apparently been made on the assumption that our attack would come from the north, where most of the earlier demonstrations by the Sixth Australian Division Cavalry had been made. These demonstrations were now renewed, and kept the enemy guns busy in the north.

Under the barrage, the infantry seized enemy posts south of Giarabub, while the right company took a knoll which commanded the entrance to the village. Another fierce sandstorm, this time from the north-west, made conditions uncomfortable.

Later in the morning, the sandstorm reduced visibility to an extent which made it extremely difficult for Brigade Headquarters to plot the advance of our troops.

In some instances there was fairly determined enemy resistance. Before 8-3o a.m. however, he had yielded sufficient commanding ground to seal the fate of Giarabub. Groups of prisoners were trickling out, and his artillery was silenced. It was known that "nests" of the enemy were as yet untouched in the palm plantation on the eastern edge of the town, and plans were discussed for an artillery programme to subdue them. This proved unnecessary, however; as the infantry pressed over the hills and sand flats, the opposition dwindled. One enemy plane appeared to the west, about 10 a.m. and dropped bombs. By 11.00 a.m. 300 prisoners had been taken, including the officer commanding the southern sector.

In the meantime, the cavalry on the north had thrust ahead briskly and broken the enemy's line of defence posts. The final stages of mopping up the dugouts and stone-walled gun posts on the edges of the small village were without incident. Giarabub, its truculent little lieutenant-colonel, some 1,200 white troops, 30 Libyans and a few guns were in our hands. The mosque was undamaged. A few calm Senussi stood about, awaiting the new masters.

Australian casualties during the operation were fewer than 100. As a battle, Giarabub was spectacular only in its setting of jagged wastelands and sandy mazes around a cluster of small buildings and burrows where men had lived for months.

To the 18th Australian Infantry Brigade who took the village, it may have seemed the very end of the world-a wind-swept misery in which the bodies of their dead were half covered in sand, an hour after they fell.

To the men of the cavalry regiment who had kept patient and difficult watch on the place for more than three months, and to the services who supplied them over appalling tracks, Giarabub was journey's end. Its fall released them for a well-earned rest and an overdue refit before the next call to action.

I. THE RETREAT

THE operations in which the A.I.F. took part from December, 1940, to March, 11941, had been strenuous and complex. They had formed a hurriedly and competently improvised pursuit movement. As that movement now lost momentum under the drag of circumstances elsewhere, the weight of Germany gathered for heavy counter-blows.

The British-Imperial armies of the Middle East were committed to the providing of an expeditionary force for Greece. They were engaged in a laborious encircling of the Duke of Aosta's divisions in Abyssinia, and in preparing intervention in Iraq to thwart a dangerous Nazi plot. There were three major fronts-Greece, Libya, and Abyssinia. A decision had to be made on the degree to which each would be supported from our limited resources. The decision was made. Clear judgment of its consequences must wait until events that are still unfolding have placed all the campaigns of 1941 in perspective.

Reversal of our fortunes in Libya began in the third week of March, 1941. Before the end of the second week in April all Cirenaica, except for a small but important segment round Tobruk, had been recaptured by the enemy.

The reinforcement of enemy troops in Tripolitania, and the presence among them of German armoured units, had been reported in February. German air strength also grew rapidly. Its reconnaissance and ground-harrying flights became more persistent. Convoys of vehicles pushed steadily eastwards along the desert routes beside the Gulf of Sirte as the Italo-German force prepared its advanced bases.

On 24th March, our thin outpost line on the Cirenaica-Tripolitania border withdrew its patrols from El Agheila. The enemy moved in.

There was some evidence that the enemy thrust was originally limited in intention, the object being to distract us in Africa while the German Balkan offensive was launched. However limited the original plan, the German Command now seized opportunities, as the British Command had seized theirs at Sidi Barrani in December. The full armoured and motorised weight of the new Afrika Corps was thrust boldly into the attack to exploit the weakness of our defence force.

Ninth Australian Division had joined this force early in March, relieving Sixth Division on the latter's withdrawal for service in Greece. The Ninth had moved into Cirenaica with serious deficiencies in weapons and vehicles. It had been thought that the Ninth would be occupied in garrison duties only, and that it would have a good opportunity to complete its training. It was proposed that, after the Division had occupied the forward area for a brief period, it should leave one brigade group there to support a British armoured force while the remainder of the Ninth were held in rear.

By 19th March it was clear that at least the greater part of a German armoured division was in Tripoli. The prospect of one immobile and incompletely armed infantry brigade remaining opposite this force was disturbing, especially as only eight guns were supporting it.

Representations for the brigade's withdrawal and retention under his command were made by the Commander of the Ninth Division (Major-General Morshead). It was agreed that the presence of the brigade in the forward area would only embarrass the operations of the British Armoured Division units and hamper the freedom of action of that formation. In consequence, orders were issued for the withdrawal of the detached brigade to Er Regima area, cast of Benghazi, where it arrived on 23rd March.

By 26th March, Ninth Division were preparing to defend the general line Tolmeta Tocra Pass-Er Regima. The right was held by 26th Brigade, which had only one battalion, the 2/24th, immediately available, with a second battalion, the 2/48th, on the way to join it. The 20th Brigade was on the left, and more or less complete. One regiment of British artillery was available to support the Ninth.

No troop-carrying transport was controlled by the Division, and the remainder of its troops were located in the Tobruk-Gazala area, completely immobile.

In the forward zone, cast of El Agheila, the weak British armoured units were attacked on 31st March. They began withdrawing after losing a number of men and vehicles in rearguard fighting with German medium tanks.

As a withdrawal was ordered, Ninth Division were given the task of imposing the maximum delay on the enemy advance along the main coastal route to Benghazi. The Armoured Division units were to cover the left flank of the Ninth. Before this alignment was achieved, however, it was reported to Cirenaica Command that enemy forces were at Msus, sixty miles inland and outflanking the proposed lines of Ninth Division's delaying actions. Plans were now changed to provide for a retreat to the general line Wadi Derna-Mechili.

It was now found that the troops reported at Msus were not enemy, but our own. Communication with the British armoured units had broken down. Lack of prompt information was opening the way to serious confusion in plans for the withdrawal.

On 4th April, Ninth Division's task was to occupy a line between Tocra Pass and Er Regima, but not to become closely committed to action.

During the afternoon an enemy force of 13 tanks, 4 armoured cars and 3,000 infantry attacked the positions held by the 2/13th Battalion at Er Regima, and orders were issued for the evacuation of Tocra Pass-Er Regima line. After fierce fighting, in which the 2/13th were critically threatened, the battalion was finally extricated about midnight.

The situation was now vague and the location and movements of armoured units uncertain. Air reports indicated some movement on the road Er Regima-El Abiar, and in the coastal plain between Benghazi and Tocra. Instructions were given by Cirenaica Command for Ninth Division to be prepared to move back to Wadi Derna during the night of 5th-6th April. Verbal warning orders for the withdrawal had been issued when it was learned that there was considerable doubt about the accuracy of the air reports, it later being ascertained that the movement seen was that of a British Armoured Brigade.

After some further issuing and countermanding of orders, it was established that the enemy was using the cross-desert inland routes in an advance on a broad front. When his columns appeared at Mechili, the situation was critical. To avoid envelopment, the Ninth were ordered to withdraw to the Gazala area.

Units of the Armoured Division were out of touch with each other, urgently needed petrol, and were disorganized. The Division had been ordered to Mechili. A portion only arrived there, and was surrounded and overwhelmed by the enemy.

The 2/13th Battalion arrived in the Martuba area just before dark. Hurriedly taking up a defensive line, they were able to impose caution on the advance elements of a German reconnaissance unit which arrived there almost about the same time. These elements, however, succeeded in the half light in placing themselves astride the track leading to Derna. During the night they captured a number of men and vehicles, including Generals O'Connor and Neame and some Australian troops. A captured German officer declared subsequently that there were only 2o Germans in the party, but they made a lot of noise and their audacity prevailed against fatigued parties driving slowly and uncertainly through the dark. Some vehicles of the Ninth Division were halted in this area by German patrols who endeavoured to bluff the party into surrender; but one of the enemy was promptly killed and the remainder fled.

After the withdrawal of our armoured units there was hardly any choice of action for Ninth Division. It was necessary to retreat before the constant threat of encirclement by German tank formations on our left flank.

On the night of the 6th-7th April, the Division got back to the Gazala area-which, three weeks earlier, had been envisaged as its training ground. It was then ordered to withdraw to Tobruk's defence lines and assume the functions of a fortress command.

And so, with a rearguard coming in from Derna, and the Navy helping to delay the pursuing German tanks with a bombardment of the coastal road, Ninth Division turned at bay on the old Italian defence perimeter at Tobruk. A number of British units and detachments joined them there.

Eager to emulate their comrades of Sixth Division, there was bitterness in the hearts of the Ninth that their first contact with the enemy had developed into a series of hasty retreats, with little opportunity of inflicting losses or delaying the enemy's advance. But the truth was that the Division had performed a remarkable feat in extricating itself from a precarious position and withdrawing a distance of 270 miles. In relation to the difficulties, the losses of men and equipment had been light.

Cirenaica had been left with a garrison insufficiently equipped to withstand the form of armoured counter-attack that was launched from Tripolitania. A risk had been taken and the penalty incurred.

But, out of this, a strange and stirring epilogue was to come in the British Australian defence of Tobruk.

II. SIEGE OF TOBRUK

WHEN the enemy forces first pushed through from El Agheila, a local defence scheme had been hastily improvised by the sub-area command at Tobruk, the main and much-battered port of supply for our troops in Libya. Around this "scratch force," a medley of detachments flowed as administrative staffs and fighting troops fell back from Derna and Mechili. Detachments, stragglers and escaped prisoners continued to arrive for some days.

With the appearance of Ninth Division, the defence coalesced on the line of the old Italian perimeter system. Command of all forces in the area was assumed by General Morshead on T4th April.

In the meantime, the Bardia road had been cut. Tobruk again became a besieged fortress-with the difference that sea communication with Egypt was still open; a difficult, costly line of communication, harassed by the Luftwaffe, but a life-line which made Tobruk a real obstacle to the German drive.

To our forces at Tobruk were allotted the tasks of:
- Maintaining their present position in order to deny the use of the part to the enemy, and to enable it to be used as a base for future operations when reinforcements became available and the situation permitted.
- Taking any opportunity that might occur for local offensive action to hinder the enemy's advance on Egypt, in so far as such operations proved possible without jeopardising the defence of Tobruk itself.

The first defence plan was based on the fact that i8th Australian Infantry Brigade, which had been moved up from Egypt, were a fresh and well-equipped reinforcement. With a force of tanks, including those which had managed to fall back on Tobruk, i8th Brigade were placed in reserve for counter-attack, while Ninth Division were disposed about the perimeter defences. The preparation of other defence works in depth was pushed ahead.

After preliminary skirmishing and probing, the enemy launched his first serious attack against Tobruk on Easter Monday, 14th April. Panzerkampfwagen-strongly armoured 22-ton medium tanks-led the attack against a section of the perimeter held by the 2/i7th Battalion. These tanks passed through our forward defended localities in the dark, and at first light had progressed almost up to El Adem-Bardia road junction, a distance of about three miles. Here, however, a surprise awaited them. Intense fire from our field and anti-tank guns caused them to turn. Seventeen were knocked out, the remainder retiring precipitately through the perimeter.

The fire of our 25-poundcrs was particularly effective. In some instances the heavy turret and 75-mm- gun and mounting were blown completely off the German tanks.

Our front line infantry had held firm while the tanks passed between their posts and They remained ready to deal with the enemy's supporting infantry, and so isolate the tanks. The situation was completely restored, with, in addition to the heavy tank casualties the loss to the enemy of 110 dead and 250 captured.

Perhaps the most striking tribute to the spirit of the defence was that written by the commander of a German tank regiment. The following passage is from a document prepared by him, which subsequently fell into our hands:

"The Intelligence gave out before the attack that the enemy was exhausted, that his artillery was extremely weak, and that his morale had become very low. Before the beginning of the third attack the regiment had not had the slightest idea of the well designed and executed defences of the enemy nor of a single battery position, or of the terrific number of anti-tank guns. Also it was not known that he had heavy tanks. The regiment went into battle with unbendable will, determined at all costs to break through the enemy and take Tobruk. Only the vastly superior enemy, the frightful loss and the lack of any supporting weapons caused the regiment to fail in its task.

39 tanks went into battle.

17 tanks were shot to pieces by the enemy.

2 officers are missing and wounded.

21 N.C.0's and men are missing.

10 N.C.0's and men are wounded.

This means a total loss of 50%."

The little garrison on the perimeter had a smile on their lips, a new confidence in their hearts. They had begun to take their revenge.

The defence was also successful in the air on this day. Of a force of more than 40 enemy planes which came over in conjunction with the tank attack, 13 were shot down by the R.A.F. and 4 by anti-aircraft fire.

A number of local attacks continued to be made, as much perhaps as reprisals for audacious raids from the fortress and to maintain ltalo-German morale, as to test our defences. However, it was clear that there was not perfect accord in the enemy camp.

On one occasion Italian infantry came into action and, on withdrawing after a severe hammering, were fired on by German tanks, which were "supporting" them. On another, the tanks went in but the Italian infantry did not follow. Again the tanks were driven out without loss.

As work on strengthening our defence system progressed, the garrison developed a policy of vigorous patrols and raids. These, coupled with strong air action against concentrations of enemy vehicles, put the besiegers on the defensive, and they began to dig in.

All arms and services within the Tobruk line added something to the tradition of aggressive defence that was being built up here. The British character and the Australian found in this tight corner an atmosphere that drew out and blended their particular qualities. Stubborn, ironic in humour, inventive, cunning, fundamentally sure of themselves, they grew into a compact community. If in this narrative the emphasis is given to the work of the infantry, it is because there is much in the work of other arms and services at Tobruk which cannot yet be revealed. The "spirit of the bayonet" can be taken as typical of the whole garrison.

One of the early fighting patrol episodes, which illustrates this spirit, was carried out by a company of the 2/23rd Battalion on 22nd April. The purpose was to discover the locations of enemy positions astride the Derna road on the western sector, to comb wadis in the area and to take prisoners. The company went out in two parties before dawn.

The first party, under intensive artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire, proceeded for about two miles, when they were unable to go further. The party then retired, driving before them one captured officer and 18 men, in addition to a previous batch of prisoners captured on the way out and sent back.

The second party were quickly sent to ground by heavy machine gun and artillery fire, but they engaged enemy infantry positions and caused heavy casualties at short range. Later they seized the positions and took prisoners. One of these prisoners indicated that he and nine others were all that were left of their company after the fight.

The party continued their advance, still under heavy fire, and came within point blank range of at least two batteries. This patrol was now about 21 miles from the starting point. At this stage carriers moved forward and gave Supporting fire as the party charged the batteries.

After a hot action, the little force began to fight their way back under intense fire of every description. One carrier returned to the perimeter with wounded and then went forward again for more. Three carriers were extricated, two were destroyed by direct hits, and two broke down, their crews dismounting and taking up positions supporting the party. Very heavy casualties were inflicted, and prisoners were taken who, moved back with the party (prisoners captured in earlier stages had already been returned under escort). The fight lasted over five hours, and we were extremely fortunate to extricate the bulk of our forces.

This action was typical. Time after time, our raiding parties and patrols sallied forth from the perimeter, gaining information, inflicting heavy casualties, capturing prisoners, and generally forcing the besieging force to adopt a defensive r6le.

Before either side had consolidated its position, there was a slight outbreak of 4'warfare of words," the enemy taking the offensive by dropping pamphlets which read

"The General Officer Commanding German forces in Libya hereby requests that British troops occupying Tobruk surrender their arms. Single soldiers waving white handkerchiefs are not fired on. Strong German forces have already surrounded Tobruk and it is useless to try and escape. Remember Mechili. Our dive bombers and Stukas are awaiting your ships which are lying in Tobruk."

To this we replied with the following leaflet, using a rather more cajoling tone:

"Soldiers of Italy !

"For you and your companions the day of peace and happiness is close at hand. In all Africa your comrades have given up the battle-in Abyssinia the war is over; the Ambassador from the Duke d'Aosta has already made preliminary peace terms with British General Headquarters.

"Yesterday thousands of your countrymen were taken prisoner at Tobruk. It is quite useless to make any further sacrifices of this kind. All Italian soldiers who have been captured by the British have been treated in the finest manner.

" So make an end of this before your losses become considerably larger."

Where victory lay in this verbal skirmish is not clear, but at least the number of Italian prisoners in our hands continued to mount.

By the end of April the provision of direct air protection for Tobruk by fighter aircraft had become most difficult. The Air Force, however, was striking powerful blows a*d of the defence by its bombing attacks on enemy posts and supply lines.

Enemy air-raids increased in number and intensity. Although many machines had been shot down by our fighters and anti-aircraft defences, the scale of attack was. maintained. The main objective, of course, was to make the port of Tobruk unworkable. The extent of the enemy air-raids can be gauged from the fact that, between 9th April and 31st May no less than 1,431 enemy planes were over Tobruk. Forty-nine of these were shot down by anti-aircraft fire, and at least 42 were severely damaged but were not seen to fall. The continuous programme of bombing raids naturally took toll of our shipping, but it did not succeed in closing the port.

For the sake of Axis solidarity the Germans had intended to allot a share of success to the Italians in the re-conquest of Cirenaica. The first infantry support in the April attempts to take Tobruk had been Italian. But the Germans soon recognised that Italian morale was chronically low. It was not surprising, therefore, that a primarily German force was used when the enemy made a determined drive against the Medauuar sector on the morning of 1st May. This time he meant to overwhelm finally the Tobruk defenders.

The attack was led by about 60 tanks, including the heaviest and best vehicles which Germans had at their disposal. These were followed by newly arrived Germans short of desert experience but accustomed to victory in France. By dusk, the enemy held about 4,000 yards of the perimeter defence frontage. But he failed against the secondary line, and his losses were heavy. In this assault, enemy tanks "sat down" on some of our forward posts and pinned down the garrisons while infantry enveloped the positions.

During this operation the enemy used flame throwing apparatus. He had thrown his most formidable resources into the attack, and had gained ground which included a hillock useful for observation. In his wider purposes he had failed.

Toward the end of May, the enemy was settling down to a plan for economically containing the garrison of Tobruk. Attacks by tanks were discontinued. The German armoured formations in Cirenaica now seemed to be reserved for holding off British forces on the Sollum front, and for probing south-eastward on the escarpment edge in the Halfya Pass area. Italo-German reinforcement plans were seriously upset by the interception of convoys between Sicily and Tripoli, and by the regular air attacks on Benghazi. This probably influenced the adoption of "defensive siege" tactics by the Germans and Italians outside Tobruk.

The machine gun was the most important weapon used in these tactics. 'Me German posts were well armed with machine guns sited to operate on fixed lines of fire against our positions. The enemy policy was to pin down our forward section posts and to become master of the perimeter through fire superiority. Part of his artillery support for this plan was Italian. It produced prompt and accurate shelling whenever movement was detected in our advanced positions. The high ground which the enemy had taken on ist May in the Medauuar sector aided his fire plan. But against this observation point the frequent dust storms gave some protection to movement within our lines.

Night patrols were active on our front. The use of Bangalore torpedoes, which had aided us in our attacks on Bardia and Tobruk in January, was now an enemy means of blowing our wire. At night he also dug cover close to the wire, and this was used by the probing forces sent out in daylight to test and draw fire from our outposts. In general, sporadic duels of automatic weapon fire, with artillery on both sides sensitively responding to local movements, marked a phase of watchfulness along the perimeter.

In the air, the "Stuka parade" of German bombers continued unabated over Tobruk. Their raids were primarily directed against harbour shipping, where even old wrecks were subject to determined attack. It was common for 5o bombing planes to take part in the attacks, which were of daily occurrence. The town grew more and more untidy in appearance, but the working of the port continued. The spirit of aggressive defence, which had given early proof of its quality against tank attacks, remained throughout May. On the perimeter it found a cautious expression as the use of sorties became restricted by the accuracy and strength of enemy machine gun fire.

The defenders had learned the weaknesses in the Italian-built lines which they now held. Some of the concrete pillboxes had proved to be traps. In one attack enemy tanks which had been immobilised but not abandoned had been able to keep the wide apertures of these pillboxes under such punishing fire that the garrisons were unable to use their weapons. These blinded posts were then approached by the enemy, who killed or drove out our men with grenades. The countering of such defects formed part of the extensive re-planning, and supplementing of the defence lines.

The immediate aim, in the long-drawn fire duel of the perimeter, was to retain observation of the enemy. In a bare, hard landscape that lacked minor cover, the possession of a wadi bank or precedence in setting up a machine gun to command a thousand yards of featureless plateau, meant the suppressing of all daylight movement among the troops opposite. In this ground stalking the Australians supplemented their own automatic weapons with captured Breda and other enemy guns.

Huge quantities of Italian ammunition had been taken when the town fell in January. Some of this was now used against the enemy. Our regular artillery support was mainly British. Its value, like that of the infantry defence, depended on observation. Courage and enterprise by the artillery observation officers, and a typically informal and effective co-operation between the guns and infantry posts, enabled our resources to be used very effectively.

Unrelieved service, heat and dust in a Libyan summer affect the quality of machines and weapons. The outward bearing of men, also, changes under the abrasives of desert warfare. Among troops with the general high calibre of the garrison of Tobruk there remained a will to hold on and a readiness to challenge the enemy at any time. But in manner the A.I.F. in Tobruk were very different from the men who had ridden through Cirenaica in February and March to occupy a province abandoned with so inept a resistance by the Italians.

These men were tempered in a steadier heat of war. They kept watch on horizons of dust storm and sun haze, and wind and sun burnt their bodies to a mahogany brown. They lived harder than the simplest drover "back o' Bourke" -and disliked it. There were fleas and flies to disturb their sleep. There were patrolling and digging and-quite as ex-acting in its way-hours of motionless watching. The men of the perimeter lived in a world of dust and aridity in which Nature had left not one soft, redeeming feature.

Some of them were sardonic, and all of them were tired before the summer ended. After the first phase of boredom came a reaction. The love of record breaking is strong in Australians. Perhaps there was a new record to be made by holding this wilderness and driving the enemy to despair and defeat. Men who had reflected on the pleasant possibilities of being transferred away from Tobruk were now inclined to qualify the thought. Having endured so much for so long, there was something to be said for "seeing it through" to the end.

Of themselves as men and soldiers they remained confident. They had found that whenever the odds were approximately level, they could out-fight the German.

The enemy knew the qualities of our men. Some interesting observations were found in a captured German document, prepared by the O.C. of a Lorried Infantry battalion.

"The Australians, who are the men our troops have had opposite them so far, are extraordinarily tough fighters," wrote the O.C. "The German is more active in the attack but the enemy stakes his life in the defence and fights to the last and with extreme cunning. Our men, usually easy-going and unsuspecting, fall easily into his traps.

"Enemy snipers have astounding results. They shoot at anything they recognise. Several N.C.0's of the Battalion have been shot through the head with the first shot while making observation in the front line. Protruding sights in gun-directors have been shot off, observation slits and loopholes have been fired on and hit as soon as they were seen to be in use."

Behind the front, another phase of the struggle went doggedly on. Anti-aircraft defences, hospitals, workshops and a whole series of administrative and supply services had to function as part of the defence of Tobruk. Men working in or near the town were apt to talk with sober respect of the dangers "up forward" in some exposed sector of the perimeter. In the forward posts, on the other hand, the uncertainty of existence in the bomb target areas further back was stressed. It is part of the saving philosophy of troops in a war zone that the accustomed dangers of their own sector are measured more lightly than those under which they see other units living.

Along Tobruk's lines of communication, the essential services functioned under air blitz and long-range bombardment. Bits of the town crumbled away. Men who had to live there made themselves as safe and comfortable as possible, and got on with their jobs. The harbour was wreck-strewn. Lighters still plied upon its waters, men still worked the ships. Tobruk's news sheet, "The Dinkum Oil" (its name conjuring up memories of another Australian production on Gallipoli, in 1915), lived up to its motto of "always appears," by reproducing the B.B.C. news bulletins daily, with an occasional cartoon and local supplement. The whole area, in fact, lived up to the spirit of a slogan lettered on one water front office-"Business as Usual During Air Raids."

One thing sustained that spirit and gave it reality -the unfailing efficiency and hard work of the Navy. British and Australian destroyers made it possible, month after dangerous month, for reinforcements and supplies to reach Tobruk, for sick and wounded men and small parties to go out. The Navy bore its drudging share in the defence of Tobruk not only with skill and courage, but with a cheerful courtesy which the men of the garrison will always remember.

Tobruk has become a tradition. In history it will surely stand as starkly and poignantly as a cenotaph of stone. On a hillside near the Mediterranean is the cemetery with the graves of those who died to take and hold Tobruk. Nearby is a harbour of wrecked ships and the white shell of a wrecked town. Beyond, the fantastic litter of war spreads over a stony waste. Desolation could hardly be more complete. But men have endowed the vista with an inner meaning, and the escarpment of Tobruk has become a monument to their endurance.