BRITISH and Imperial troops were still moving forward to take up positions on a chosen defence line, facing generally north-east, when the German invasion of Jugo-Slavia and Greece developed on 6th April, ig4i.
Many of our troops had landed in the country only a few days before, to be greeted with cheers and flowers from the warm-hearted people of a lovely land. Their spirits were high as' they travelled north through the April sunshine. Green crops and vines, lush valleys, fields of poppies and, in the distance, snow-capped mountains; this seemed indeed a country worth fighting to preserve from the mechanised rule of the Nazis.
The area in which the Australian and New Zealand troops were first to face the invader was in the right, or eastern, sector. The right of a roughly straight line rested on the coast near Katerini and ran through Veria and
Edessa. It confronted the three routes-to the south, the south-west and the west-that a German force might take in advancing towards Central Greece from
Salonika. Mountains rose behind the chosen line. These could be penetrated in force through only three passes.
The passes of Katerini and Veria were most formidable. The complete destruction of a length of road in either of them would possibly have required months to repair. Gradients in the Edessa Pass were more gentle, and the same delay could not have been imposed on an attacker. The topographical weakness was in the north, where a German move through either
Jugo-Slavia or the Edessa Pass would mean the loss of Florina and would give the Germans access to the area south from Florina to Servia, which was most suitable for armoured units. However, should the Edessa Pass and Florina fall, the River Aliakmon would provide a powerful second defensive line.
Although the position was in the main topographically strong, with the small forces available there would have been advantages in preparing to defend only a shorter line, further south. Communications forward from Athens were by a single railway line and one main road with few alternative routes. The difficulties were fully recognised in advance. Political as well as strategic considerations were present, however, and the Greek High Command felt itself bound to attempt a forward defence policy.
From Katerini inland, our small force was disposed on a line more than 70 miles in length. At the time of the German invasion, the only forces present in the north were the New Zealand Division, holding the Katerini area, the 16th Australian Infantry Brigade, holding the Veria Pass, the XII Greek Division in the Edessa area, with the XX Greek Division further north on its left flank, and a British Armoured Brigade forward in the broad valley of the Axios River. All of Sixth Australian Division had not yet arrived in Greece, and other Australian formations would not be available
for some time. Against this comparatively weak force it was estimated that the Germans concentrated six or seven divisions, including armoured formations, and extremely strong air support.
Our own air power in Greece was slight at the outset, and the overwhelming weight of the German attack rapidly reduced it to vanishing point. With the resources available to them, air crews and ground staffs did all that was humanly possible. They fought and worked in those feverish April days (and many of them died) with a gallantry second to none.
Our first handicap, however, was the quick collapse of the poorly organised Jugo-Slav defence. The only allied troops in the important north-central frontier area between Florina and the "Monastir Gap" were an improvised body from such British and New Zealand units as could be spared. The Armoured Brigade was also withdrawn from the Axios River valley to help. By 8th April, a German thrust southwards from the Gap had become a probability. If it went deeply and swiftly through, such a thrust would put the enemy in rear of our Edessa-Katerini line.
A force under the command of Sixth Australian Division was accordingly formed to defend the pass on the Monastir-Servia road, just south of Florina.
It was recognised that this force could do no more than briefly delay a German attack from the north, and plans for
coordinating an orderly retirement were in hand. From the right flank, at this time, the enemy was reported to be advancing towards our Edessa-Katerini positions.
There had been a curious lack of enemy air activity, and our troops had been able to move up to these right flank positions unmolested. They were deployed by the night of 9th April-eve of the first clash between Germans and Australians in Greece. On the extreme right of the 75-mile "line" were the New Zealand Division, holding the Katerini area, their right flank on the coast. Left of them, the 16th Australian Infantry Brigade were astride the Veria Pass. Further west, the XII and XX Greek Divisions held the Edessa area and the hills north-west. On their left were the 19th Australian Infantry Brigade, in the Veve Pass, together with the British Armoured Brigade.
Our intention was to fight a delaying action -along this line, giving time for a
general Allied readjustment and for organising a rearward defensive position along the strong Mt. Olympus-River Aliakmon line. The 4th New Zealand Brigade was moved from Katerini to Servia, to act as a pivot for the
subsequent withdrawal to this line.
Early on the morning of 10th April, a patrol of three armoured cars of the British Armoured Brigade crossed the Jugo-Slav border on the Monastir road and attempted to destroy the bridge just inside Jugo-Slavia. Attacked by enemy light mechanised forces they were forced to withdraw before achieving their object. On the way back the patrol destroyed two other bridges and fought their way through a mechanised battalion of the enemy, surprise enabling them to get through to their own lines. Not long after their return, enemy motor transport were sighted approaching on the road leading through the Florina Gap. Our field and medium artillery opened fire on the enemy columns and they retired out of range. They were waiting for the cover of darkness to approach our forward defensive lines without running the gauntlet of our artillery fire.
Covering a front of eight to nine miles was the hastily formed force which was to oppose this southward thrust. On the right of the bottle-neck where the Monastir road and railway drew together to traverse the Veve Pass, was the 2/8th Battalion. In the centre was an infantry battalion of the British Armoured Brigade, and on the left was most of the 2/4th Battalion. Dispersed along the line in support of the three Battalions were New Zealand machine gunners and British and Australian artillery. Dug in along the forward slopes of the pass, overlooking the road which led from Monastir, the force had an excellent view of the ground before them; but the line was dangerously thin.
The infantry were extremely fatigued, having been on the move for several days. They had moved north to Larissa in a goods train, where the 2/4th Battalion had taken over security duties in charge of the important railhead. The 2/8th Battalion had marched 16 miles further north to the vicinity of Tyrnavos and from there, had been conveyed to Veria by motor transport. Tents had been pitched for them when they arrived in their area on 8th April, but it had been raining heavily and the ground was sodden and boggy.
The same night both battalions were ordered to move to the Florina area, and travelled all night. It had been raining heavily in the Kozani area also, and the only road was choked and greasy, making driving difficult and accidents frequent.
The 2/4th Battalion had taken up its position on the left of the Veve Pass late on the afternoon of 9th April. It was very cold and wet, the average height of the
area occupied being three thousand feet above sea level. After standing to near the Xynon Neron position during the night of 9th April, the 2/8th Battalion moved forward to take up its position on the right. The Battalion deployed along its
reconnoitered line, the last men of the unit arriving about the time the enemy columns were first sighted and our artillery opened fire. Members of the Battalion suffered severely during the strenuous climb of ii-I miles across the rocky ridges and stony valleys which lay behind their
position. The lack of sleep, continuous movement, climbing and digging of the previous days caused many cases of altitude exhaustion.
Establishing contact with the Dodecanese Regiment of the Greek XII Division on the right flank, the Battalion continued their digging in and made no contact with the enemy in daylight. At about 9 that evening, one small party were surprised and captured by an enemy patrol while still digging in.
The enemy had moved up under cover of darkness and patrols were active along the whole front,
While our artillery put down harassing concentrations on Veve throughout the night. Most of our infantry were without blankets and there was practically no sleep for them during that bitterly cold night. A blustering snow storm raged all next day, covering the more gentle slopes of the disputed territory with a mantle similar to that perennially on the nearby peaks.
During the afternoon of 11th April, determined enemy attacks developed simultaneously on the 2/4th Battalion front and at the junction of the 2/8th Battalion and the Dodecanese Regiment. Both attacks were broken up by well-directed artillery fire. Supported by tanks, the enemy continued to attack but were repelled with heavy losses. Prisoners taken were identified as belonging to the "Fuhrer" Regiment of "Verfugungstruppe," picked troops who were formerly Hitler's bodyguard, but who now formed part of a motorised division. There was still constant enemy pressure and further enemy transport coming down from the north. To prevent infiltration of our line in the darkness the Commanding Officer of the 2/8th Battalion gave orders that between 9-30 p.m. and 5 a.m. men would remain in their rifle pits and fire at any movement. The Commanding Officer's message read:
"You may be tired. You may be uncomfortable. But you are doing a job important to the rest of our forces. Therefore you will continue to do that job unless otherwise ordered."
Intermittent attacks over the snow-covered ground continued throughout the night, and early next morning a heavy attack was launched on the centre. By ii a.m. the British Battalion here had been forced to yield ground. Heavy attacks along the 2/8th Battalion front were repelled, and the line straightened by a counter-attack. Early in the afternoon the enemy attacked up the centre of the pass once more in great strength, and broke through the front. Part of the 2/4th Battalion was moved over to attempt to close the gap and stem the enemy's attack. Owing to the heavy German force employed, this proved unavailing. The enemy were now firing on the 2/8th Battalion from the left and left rear.
A general withdrawal from this sector to the Olympus-Aliakmon River line had been planned for the night of 12th April. The break-through by the enemy, however, precipitated the withdrawal by a few hours. The 2/4th Battalion had to withdraw their whole front immediately. Through poor communications nearly a whole company was unable to retire in time, but many of its members ultimately rejoined the unit.
On the 2/8th Battalion front, enemy tanks were shelling company positions and heavy machine gun fire was coming from the left and left rear. The Battalion withdrew to the right, the route followed being over the hills to the right of the pass, following a line roughly parallel to that of the road through the pass, along which the enemy forces were now advancing rapidly. After a
10-mile march the Battalion reached a road near Soder, where motor transport was waiting for them.
Warned of the break-through by the retreating infantry, the supporting artillery had had time to withdraw their guns from the south of the pass. One battery of an Australian Field Regiment remained in action, delaying the enemy advance and firing up the pass over open sights. Two miles back along the road a second
battery again came into action, firing over open sights, and the first battery were able to withdraw.
Near the crossroads between Soder and Rodona a force was forming to fight a rearguard action. The Field Regiment withdrew to support this force, having difficulty on the way, as the enemy was sufficiently close to machine-gun the last guns out from the position. The rearguard delayed the enemy until early the following morning, and then withdrew to positions on the Olympus-Aliakmon River line. Astride the road at Kozani, the British Armoured Brigade waited to delay the advancing enemy columns.
Right through the engagement there had been little air activity, and after snow fell in the Veve sector there was none until the dive-bombing of the Mount
Olympus-Aliakmon River line began a few days later.
The battle at Veve Pass had given further evidence of the fact that our forces were much too few to hold the enemy for any length of time without reinforcement. The mountain ranges on either side of the pass were a natural obstacle, but would not have prevented the infiltration of German detachments to points from which they could have attacked our force in the rear. Further, there was no defence in depth, simply because there were no troops available for that purpose.
Although individually gallant, the Greek troops on this front were not equipped or organised to face the modern German army. In the retirement programme, it was arranged that their XII and XX Divisions should cross to the westward, behind the
front, to take up positions with the rest of the Greek Army. It was necessary in the Veria area to commence thinning out their troops the day before that scheduled for the
retirement, which for them involved a withdrawal on foot to new positions on the left of the Olympus-Aliakmon River line. They had mules and donkeys, but no motor transport. Australian lorries were lent to clear their leading battalion to its new position.
The Greek withdrawal presented the picture of a long stream of poorly clad men,
rifle over one shoulder and thin blanket over the other, moving slowly from the hills of their position down to the main road and back in the direction of the distant Aliakmon River. When the Germans broke through, the stolid plodding figures appealed to the passing vehicles, conveying our troops, for a ride. This was given wherever possible.
On 12th April, the title of First Australian Corps was changed to that of Anzac Corps. This recognition of the partnership in Greece was very popular with all ranks of both the New Zealand and Australian Divisions. The change took place while the Battle of the Veve Pass was at its height.
Simultaneous with the withdrawal from Veve Pass the 16th Australian Infantry Brigade had commenced a long and difficult march back. Owing to the complete absence of roads, all unit transport had been withdrawn and a limited number of pack donkeys allotted for the carriage of some of the heavier stores. All weapons and ammunition had to be carried, as well as a reduced quantity of food and blankets. The country was mountainous, and a great part of the march was carried out in bitterly cold weather with snow on the upper levels. The distances covered were from 50 to 70 miles. Although there was no pressure by the enemy, this movement must rank high as a feat of disciplined endurance.
The road in the Veria Pass had been blown before leaving. Crossing the Aliakmon
River on a flying bridge, north of Velvendos, the 16th Brigade was assisted by engineers who formed tracks through the snowy ranges. The Brigade came to its position in the Olympus-Aliakmon line near Leivadion.
The New Zealand Cavalry Regiment, operating north of the New Zealand division in the Katerini area, successfully engaged the enemy before retiring. After inflicting heavy losses on the Germans, whose infantry had made several thrusts supported by artillery and mortar fire, the cavalry fell back with very slight loss. The enemy appeared to be advancing in strength through the coastal sector towards the New Zealanders.
By the night of 13th April, all units of Anzac Corps had withdrawn to the Olympus-Aliakmon line. On the right, a New Zealand battalion was astride the coastal road near the mouth of the Peneios Gorge. Mount Olympus reared between this position and where more New Zealanders held the Katerini Pass in the vicinity of Ag Demetrios. Holding the pass at Servia was a group under command of Sixth Australian Division, comprising one New Zealand and two Australian Brigades. Preparations were made for the protracted defence of the line, anti-tank ditches and other obstacles in the Servia area having been constructed by Greek labour before the withdrawal to the position. The defensive position at Servia was a good one, with the infantry deployed roughly along the line of the Aliakmon river flats. Because the frontage of the Servia defence was so great, however, and the forces available comparatively few, the line was again dangerously thin.
Immediately behind the line was a steep escarpment, rising sheer for two thousand feet, on the top of which the supporting artillery were concealed in defiles and valleys. Observation posts had an uninterrupted view across the plain in front of the position. During the afternoon of 13th April, enemy transport was observed in the vicinity of Kozani, and troop-carrying aircraft appeared to be landing on an aerodrome to the south of the town. The Armoured Brigade had fought a series of sharp engagements with the advanced enemy troops before withdrawing on the road west of Kozani, to Greverma. This had greatly delayed the pressure on the retiring Australian infantry.
Enemy aircraft appeared in large numbers for the first time on 13th April, a flight Of 21 planes dive-bombing and machine-gunning the Servia area. There were further signs of the approach of enemy troops and tanks on 14th April, seeking a crossing of t1he River Aliakmon. It was
decided to constitute a force near Kalabaka under Brigadier Savige (Commander of i7th Australian Infantry Brigade) to protect the left flank of Anzac Corps and to support the British Armoured Brigade which was now in the Grevenna area.
Large flights of aircraft again attacked our positions, and German air reconnaissance proceeded without interruption. Early on the morning of the '5th, the enemy attacked the head of the Servia Pass, but this attack was caught under our close range fire and
wiped out.
The Greek forces on our left were in grave difficulties, and their disintegration had to be allowed for in our plans. To check the dangers arising from a break-through on the Greek front to our left, it had been decided, late on 14th April, not to offer prolonged resistance on the Olympus-Aliakmon River line, but to withdraw to a much shorter line. The positions in view were those covering the Thermopylae, Brailos and Delphi passes-known generally as the Thermopylae line.
Our Greek allies were, in fact, in desperate plight, and the bulk of their forces on our left were about to seek an armistice.
Facing renewed attacks on their Albanian front to the west, and threatened with
encirclement by the German drive from the north, the Greeks could no longer supply -heir forces in the mountains. Sustained chiefly by their own courage, Greek troops had for months been fighting and thrashing the Italians. Now, under the heavy German pressure, the strain was proving too great.
To the British and Imperial forces, the Greek surrender meant a vulnerable left flank. To evade the danger, a system of controlled withdrawals by brigade groups had been worked out. The conduct of this operation was given to General Blarney, commanding Anzac Corps. To get back to the Thermopylae line, the Corps now had to put into effect a carefully
synchronized time-table of rearguard movements, and to be as watchful as a fencer to parry any sudden thrust.
The first rearguard was to be a New Zealand Brigade group, placed south of Ellason to cover the withdrawal of troops from the Katerini and Servia passes. A second, the 19th Australian Brigade, was to cross the Aliakmon and move to Domokos to take up a further rearguard position. On the left, the 16th Australian Brigade was to cover the Larissa-Kalabaka road along which the withdrawal of the Armoured Brigade from Grevenna and the 17th Australian Brigade group from Kalabaka was to take place. The first part of this plan was to begin on the night of the 15th-i6th April. On the night of the Uth-18th, forward brigade groups were to be withdrawn through the rearguards.
As the move began, on the night of the i5th, it was found that there was no immediate danger of the enemy pressing hard on the left flank. Isolated forces of Greeks were still delaying the Germans north of Greverma. Heavy rains had turned the tracks into quagmires, and enemy armoured formations could move only with difficulty. This easing of the position on our left made it possible to switch support over to the right, where the enemy now began to probe strongly down the coast past Mount Olympus and into the Peneios Gorge.
Here, the 21st New Zealand Battalion was heavily engaged. It was reported that one armoured and one mountain division of enemy forces were massing to break through the Peneios Gorge towards Larissa. It was vital to parry this thrust until the general withdrawal programme had been carried out. As there was no close pressure on the left, the 16th Brigade group was diverted to the Peneios Gorge.
Elsewhere, the withdrawal continued. The Armoured Brigade withdrew from the left flank and fell back through Larissa. It had fought hard, and was no longer able to carry on in the battle area. The holding force south of Kalabaka then retired.
Meanwhile, the Peneios Gorge was becoming the scene of the fiercest struggle of
our campaign in Greece.
The first unit of the 16th Brigade group, under Brigadier Allen, arrived at the Gorge early on 16th April to support the hard-pressed New Zealanders. The 2/2nd Australian Battalion deployed on the left of the New Zealand Battalion, and the 2/3rd were in reserve. Enemy cruiser tanks attempted three times to cross the river on the left front Of 2/2nd Battalion on the morning of the 18th, and finally got some tanks across about 1.30 P.m. In the face of strong attacks, the right flank had yielded ground.
The order had been to hold the Gorge until 3 a.m. on the 19th. At 4 p.m. on the
18th, Brigadier Allen reported that he was endeavouring to hold on, but that he could do no more than his best. When the pressure was becoming overwhelming, he decided that he would be unable to hold the position until the time ordered. Small parties of the enemy were filtering through on the left.
Brigade headquarters began to withdraw at 9 p.m. on the 18th. The determined resistance which had been offered during the day had made the enemy wary, and his attacks were not now followed up. Some of the vehicles retiring with 16th Brigade personnel were halted a few miles north-east of Larissa with a warning that the town was occupied by Germans. This report was incorrect, although it would seem that at least one enemy post had been established to cover the road. However, in the light of the information then available to him, Brigadier Allen decided to go round Larissa, and took a track south from the main road. This track eventually faded out. After
cross country driving, during which some vehicles had to be abandoned, the main road was regained well to the south of Larissa. As a result of this movement, the units that had been fighting so hard in the Gorge fell back to the Thermopylae line in some disorder. Collecting posts were established to sort out the units.
The withdrawal to Thermopylae had been a difficult operation, but the clear plan of successive rearguards had enabled it to be carried out generally in good order and without disorganisation. With air superiority by now unchallenged, with unlimited air reconnaissance and knowledge of the small numbers of our forces, the enemy had been quick to attempt encirclement when it became apparent that the main Greek resistance was at an end and that our forces would have to withdraw. The main thrust with this intent was made through the Peneios Gorge. Only the gallantry of the defenders forestalled its success.
As our forces fell back, the roads were blown by engineer detachments in the various defiles. This was a considerable factor in stemming the rate of the German advance. However, as the withdrawal progressed, the columns in retreat thickened to congestion point until, by 18th April, the road from Larissa to Lamia was choked with a continuous stream of vehicles with hardly six feet between them. Movement had been made only at night when the withdrawal commenced. But now the time during which the thinned-out stopping forces could hold the enemy was strictly limited. The two roads had not sufficient capacity to allow the move to be completed under the cover of night. By i8th April, traffic was moving throughout the daylight hours. There were no hordes of refugees to complicate the withdrawal, for the Greeks kept the roads commendably clear.
After a comparatively quiet beginning, the German Air Force soon asserted its great numerical superiority, and thereafter harassed our troops unceasingly. During the Battle of the Veve Pass there had been little air activity, and it ceased entirely when snow commenced to fall. By the time the Olympus-Aliakmon line had been manned, German aircraft made their appearance in large numbers and dive-bombing of our positions commenced.
Surprisingly little material damage was inflicted from the air at this stage, indicating that troops under cover had little to fear from dive-bombing. During the early stages of the retirement to Thermopylae, cloudy and rainy weather kept most of the Luftwaffe on the ground, but increased the difficulties of our road transport driving at
night without lights. Many vehicles slipped off the road when withdrawing through the narrow passes, and there was insufficient time for their recovery.
By 17th April, the rainy weather had cleared once more, and the German Air Force was able to carry on its dive-bombing and machine-gunning.
Larissa was bombed incessantly, and was devastated. The troops of each of the holding forces came in for some attention, while long-range bombers operated as far south as Athens. It was the stretch of road between Larissa and Lamia which received the most violent air attacks. From dawn to dusk, large flights of dive-bombers came over and bombed the long column of vehicles. Moving at a modest ten or fifteen miles an hour because of the congestion, the column halted whenever the bombers were sighted, and the occupants of the vehicles scattered to either side of the road. The bombers circled slowly, then selecting a crowded spot, dived on their target one after the other. Sirens screaming, they came down to the tune of the small-arms fire from the men lying in the fields by the roadside. A shriller scream, and bomb after bomb detonated along the road. Then the dive-bombers zoomed off, their sirens then taking on a seemingly mocking note to the sorely tried men below.
Their bombs dropped, enemy aircraft would often machine-gun the vicinity of the column for half an hour before making off for another load of ammunition. Our troops returned to their vehicles, wounded received treatment, and the long column moved slowly on once more, skirting blazing wrecks and making detours where the road had been cratered. Their progress was difficult, for the ground along the Larissa-Lamia road was rather marshy and soon churned to mud. Before long the bombers would be back again, and the performance repeated over and over again while daylight lasted. At night, free from
the bombers, the column had to push on unceasingly to make way for the units which would be retiring next day.
The journey along the Larissa-Lamia road at night was an unforgettable one. Marked by the glow of burning vehicles, the way was crowded with transport barely averaging ten miles an hour. Detour followed detour. Driving conditions were most strenuous. Halts were frequent, and were very often caused by a driver falling asleep at the steering wheel,
whenever a column halted it was necessary for an officer to endeavour to reach the head and wake the exhausted driver. Vehicles in trouble had to be abandoned, for there would be no time on the morrow to recover them. Their occupants gathered their equipment and found room somewhere else in the column.
When dawn came a grim scene was unfolded. A long, crawling column with its occupants tensely waiting for the threat from the sky to materialise; the road cratered by the previous day's bombing, blackened wrecks lying by the side of the road, and numerous fine vehicles upturned in ditches.
The Luftwaffe dealt severely with the targets offering in the last three days of the withdrawal to Thermopylae. It was a tired, battered but unbroken force which turned at the new line. The main routes into the new positions had been put into a reasonable state of defence by the 19th. The Thermopylae line was occupied by the
night of the 20th.
During the previous night, a rearguard withdrew from Domokos, covered by a small party holding the pass north of Lornia. Although they were in contact with
enemy forward elements, the rearguard had not been pressed. It was evident that road demolitions would delay the enemy for about forty-eight hours.
Anzac Corps had won through a critical period. It had parried a German thrust at a vital point and, in spite of fierce air attacks, had re-established itself without undue loss on a new line.
Main features in the Thermopylae position were the low coastal area, along which runs the road from Lamia to Molos and Atalanti, and the steep Brailos Pass, over the central Greek mountain system, which carries the main road from Athens to the north. One division might give adequate defence to each of these areas. While the New Zealand Division was still reasonably complete, the strength of Sixth Australian Division had been appreciably weakened by battle casualties. No reserve was available, and there were still flank dangers. To cover the right flank, the Navy had been asked to patrol the waters between Khalkis and Molos. Some New Zealanders were ordered to Euboea Island to watch for and delay any German approach, and others were placed for an anti-parachutist r8le on the plain of Thebes. On the left, there was still a way for German columns to come through the surrendering Greek forces, from Yannina, and work into the rear of the Thermopylae positions.
Heroic and forlorn, the fight on the mainland was drawing to an end. The Greek Government informed us that it could no longer maintain organised resistance in Greece. The decision to evacuate the British and Imperial forces was taken on 2ist April.
Advanced elements of the enemy appeared to the front of the Thermopylae positions
on that day, and again commenced to mass troops for an attack. Enemy aircraft were using the landing ground south-east of Lamia, and each large machine brought as its load a detachment of infantry or a field piece.
The first date given by the Navy for an evacuation was 27th-28th April, but this was subsequently advanced to 24th-25th April and the main part of our withdrawal was made at that time. Movements to disengage Anzac Corps from the enemy, were made by the Corps Commander (General Blarney) in anticipation of a German thrust On 25th April. The date, being the anniversary of Anzac Day, suggested a possibility that the enemy would endeavour to make it the occasion for a special effort to destroy a force containing so many Australian and New Zealand units. Whether or not the anniversary consideration counted with them, the Germans were, in fact, preparing for a climactic effort. The thrust was made, but it did not reach our forces: they had retired sufficiently to gain a breathing space of a few hours.
General Blamey sent a personal message to the troops on the eve of the evacuation: "This is a time when all our training and control must be exerted to the full. Duty is duty, and everyone on duty must be at hi; post. Units must be ready with self-help to keep the withdrawal moving steadily and under control. Every officer must pull his weight, using all his initiative, energy and courage to carry out this movement in military order. Cool heads!"
On the night Of 22nd-23rd April, the rearguard force took up its position at Kreikouki with orders that the position would be denied to the enemy until early on 26th April.
An Australian Brigade group moved to Megara and a New Zealand group to Marathon on the night Of 23rd-24th April. On the following night other groups of Anzac Corps moved to Argos and Khalkis. The covering force began its withdrawal according to plan on the night Of 25th-26th April.
The Navy, once again, was standing by. From a series of beaches the ships took off the British and Imperial forces. There were to be some exciting epilogues in the following days, as
isolated units and detachments were picked up at various points on the intricate coastline below the Isthmus of Corinth. In the meanwhile, a relatively large proportion of the force was extricated in the first planned effort. An operation of the utmost difficulty was achieved.
We left much behind in Greece. Gallant friends, whose country was passing under the shadow of Nazi occupation. Many a group of British and Anzac soldiers, who had held doggedly to their tasks until overwhelmed. Vehicles, guns and quantities of stores had to be destroyed or abandoned. Units made it a point of honour to bring out with them as much of their machine gun and other light armament as possible. Sleep-heavy men stumbled to the boats, grasping anti-tank rifles and Bren guns, leaving the small treasured trifles of personal kit behind. They were never a rabble. They had gone in as soldiers, light-hearted and eager. They came out as soldiers, grim, tired, but bitterly determined that there should be another day and another ending to its battle.
The story of Greece is not yet fully told--or even known. The murk of war obscures it, and covers many an episode of tragedy and heartening heroism. It is not possible at this range to appreciate the many-sided effort that was made. A dim panorama passes, and in it looms the pathos and dignity of a peasant army bowing at last to defeat on its own beloved soil. The Briton and the Anzac; the airman who flew while there were planes to fly and bases to rest them on; the Navy, matchless in efficiency and courage.
The nurses and masseuses of our hospital units played their part in Greece to the
end. They were prepared to stay and tend those of our wounded who could not be moved. In one hospital, when it was thought that some of the nursing staff would be required to stay after the general evacuation, a secret ballot for volunteers was held. In that ballot, every member of the nursing staff offered to stay. In the end, other arrangements were made, and the most emphatic orders were given to ensure that all our nurses embarked. All through, their bearing was on the traditionally high level of their service.
In human endeavour, the men of the Expeditionary Force in Greece rose to great heights of fortitude. In military technique, the Force had constantly to avoid being pinned down or encircled by greatly superior numbers.
It achieved this by the skill of commanders and staffs and the tenacity and spirit of its men.
|
