THE island of Crete lies across the Eastern Mediterranean, an elongated mountain mass between the isles of the Grecian Archipelago and the North African coastline of Cirenaica and western Egypt. From east to west, Crete is approximately
170 miles in length. Its north-south breadth varies from ten to thirty miles. Behind
the narrow coastal plain on its northern shore rises a mountain chain. This is passable by only a few tracks and rudimentary roads. The south coast is rocky, and offers few
safe anchorages for ships.
The King of the Hellenes and his Government had moved to Crete when the Allied position on the Grecian mainland was worsening in April. Here, in the course of the evacuation from Greece, came a proportion of the British and Imperial forces. Many of these were moved on to Egypt before the Battle of Crete developed. Of those who remained, approximately fifty per cent only were able to take an active, combatant part in operations. The rest included details of non-fighting services and unarmed personnel who could not be equipped and employed under the extraordinary conditions which prevailed.
A.I.F. parties began to arrive on Anzac Day. Others landed on the island each day until 29th April, when the last planned phase of the evacuation from Greece was carried out. In the following weeks several small groups arrived in assorted light craft after escaping from the mainland. All of these troops were cared for, sorted out and reorganised as far as possible while a new military command, under Major-General Freyberg, of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, set about planning the defence of the island.
Equipment of all sorts was most limited. Incoming troops from Greece brought only their personal arms with them. Some, belonging to base and line of communication units, were not normally armed, and others had lost weapons and equipment when their transport was sunk by air action. Their arrival created an administrative problem with which the local resources of Crete were quite unable to deal. At the same time, there loomed up the tactical problem of preparing to meet a type of attack new to the Mediterranean theatre of war-that of the massed air invasion by parachutists and troop-carrying aircraft.
All the signs pointed to such an attack. It was expected that there would first be intensive bombing and low-level machine-gunning of Crete's few aerodromes and the surrounding country. Then would come parachutists, to seize and clear the landing grounds. The possibility of a sea-borne attack was also taken into consideration. Our resources were not great enough to face every possibility in strength. The decision
was made to group our defences at Heraklion, on the east-central part of the north
coast, at Retimo, and in the Suda Bay area. This disposition covered the most likely regions where an air-borne invasion would seek a foothold.
The early dispositions were made in accordance with this plan. British troops, with the 2/4th Australian Battalion, were allotted to Heraklion. An Australian force, under Brigadier Vasey, of the 19th Brigade, covered the landing ground at Retimo and the beach at Georgioupolis. New Zealand forces and a composite Australian battalion were at Suda Bay and Canea. The dispositions were altered before the air blitz started, but these areas remained the focal points of the Crete defence plan.
While preparations went ahead, the troops obtained some welcome rest in pleasant bivouacs. As many as possible-detachments of services for whom there would be no essential r6le in the coming struggle-were evacuated to Egypt. At the same time, some fighting reinforcements arrived, including Royal Marines. The policy was to prepare as many men as possible for close combat resistance to parachutists. Every fit man for whom a rifle and ammunition could be provided was to be made available for this task.
Owing to the enemy's complete mastery of the air, it was impossible to bring in the essential arms and tools to complete preparations for defence. Much was lost by the sinking of ships in the attempt to bring these supplies.
Conditions were pleasant, in those first May days of waiting. When not preparing
defence lines or reconnoitering the foothills, troops were able to bathe. There were great shortages of transport and cooking gear, but improvised supply and messing arrangements were made to work fairly satisfactorily in the bivouac areas. Each man had one blanket. The Australians did miss their felt hats, however; few of these had survived the evacuation from Greece. Generally, the health and morale of the troops were good. The Cretan folk were hospitable, and at many a simple little gathering expressed their goodwill. Their lives were frugal, and their island not
over well stocked with food; but little luxuries, such as fruit and honey, to some extent now punctuated the monotony of "hard" army fare.
The days of interlude were all too fleeting. These pleasant Cretan fields had to be measured as battle grounds. A tree was something to judge by its capacity to spread
enough shade to conceal a machine gun from air observation. A grove of olives was a place in which to dig trenches and hide men. To be ready and unseen; that was
the objective.
The test came on 20th May. It began with a dive-bombing attack over the Suda Bay area-an attack of hitherto unparalleled ferocity which was intended to blot out all thought of resistance on the island.
At about 8 a.m. on that warm, clear day, the air offensive opened against the landing ground at Melame. Extremely heavy air bombing and machine-gunning put a large part of the anti-aircraft artillery out of action. This was followed by the dropping of parachute troops and by the release of troop-carrying gliders over the area between Melame and Canea. The parachutists were dropped from as low as 300 feet. Their numbers here were estimated at
3,500 and a majority of these, landing within our defended areas, were killed. The parachutists were extremely well equipped, but the men themselves did not appear to be picked troops. Prisoners indicated that they had been led to expect no opposition when they landed. As it was, the spirited defence quickly blotted out the enemy's intention of occupying the Canea sector in this first attack.
But the German resources for other blows seemed endless. Against Heraklion and Retimo the enemy now turned the reckless torrent of his air strength. After heavy bombing to subdue the defences, about 3,000 more parachutists were dropped. Of these, about
1,000 are estimated to have been dropped at Retimo. In the first three days, all but 200 of them had been accounted for. At Heraklion the same furious defence was put up and a similar toll of the invaders was taken. Greek troops near Candia killed 300 parachutists. At the
close of 20th May, all the landing ground centres of defence were intact.
At great cost, the beginning of a foothold had been made, however. There were small groups of parachutists who had been dropped beyond range of the defences. Next morning, the bomber and fighter aircraft again attacked, and further parachutists were landed clear of the areas covered by our troops at Melame and Canea. We had withdrawn from the Melame aerodrome, but kept it under fire from artillery and mortars. Despite this, German troop carriers began to land here in the evening. They were now also coming down on the beaches, and on the area west of the aerodrome which was then out of range of our guns. The losses in this onslaught were enormous; the wreckage of
100 planes in the Melame sector testified to that. But enemy troops were getting in, scurrying to cover in the dusk, rallying, picking up their
parachute-dropped weapons, creeping in to reconnoitre the defence lines.
The German tactics, developing as their numbers grew, were a cautious feeling for our defence positions, and then a violent plastering of the discovered sector with mortar and machine gun fire. Attempts to push troops forward came later, and always with a probing for weak spots. The first move was the attempt to cow our men with the sheer volume and noise of fire.
The arrival of the troop carriers made it necessary to reinforce the Melame defences, and plans made earlier for a counter-attack near Canea had to be altered. The headquarters of 19th Australian Infantry Brigade moved into the Canea area on the 22nd, and took under command the 2/8th Battalion and some Greek troops. That night, the Navy dealt successfully with a German attempt to land reinforcements by sea.
But next day troop-carrying planes continued to arrive in what seemed to be ever-increasing numbers. The Melame landing ground was now in use by them, and
their numbers threatened to overwhelm our forces in the western sector. A withdrawal eastward from Canea toward Suda Bay was ordered.
Meanwhile, no further attempt had yet been made by the enemy to capture Retimo and Heraklion, although he had landed forces in both those areas, outside the range of our fire, and was moving with the object of pinning down the garrisons until he had mastered the Canea and Suda Bay zone.
In this latter zone, a new line was formed. It held from the fourth day until the evening of the sixth. By then, the enemy was through to Suda Bay. Retimo and Heraklion still held, but communication between them and the Crete Force Command had been severed. It was known that Retimo was short of food and ammunition. Under the intense air bombing and machine-gunning, it was felt to be impossible to do more with our limited resources than delay an inevitable German seizure of the island.
Never was a stranger or fiercer rearguard action fought. In general there was no "front" as the word is normally understood. Under the parachute technique, a front becomes a fluid grouping of defenders dealing with attacks from any and every direction. To clear an area and hold it, shooting at every figure that dropped from the sky, and then hunting down the survivors in wheat-fields and olive groves until themselves hunted to earth again by machine-gunning aircraft; that, for many an Australian detachment, was the battle drill of Crete. It took a heavy toll, but it could not keep pace with the invasion. At Retimo, one group of defenders found on the body of a German the code for signalling with colours to supply-carrying aircraft. Well supplied at the time with captured German machine guns, our troops signalled for ammunition-and cases were promptly dropped to them by parachute! It was a fantastic episode in a fantastic fight.
To a great extent it was a blind fight. Communication between the sectors was always difficult and generally impossible. After Retimo became isolated, an infantryman was sent out from there to carry a message to headquarters at Suda Bay. A section of the only road was at the time occupied by the Germans. The runner was forced to go twice through enemy lines. He got through-but the journey of forty-five miles took him six days.
Facing west against the enemy near Canea, the force under command of 19th Brigade took up a r6le which was to become that of rearguard. The infantry
concerned were New Zealand units, including a Maori battalion, and the 2/7th and 2/8th Australian Battalions. This force withdrew its line towards Suda on26th May.
Next morning, strong enemy patrols heralded a German drive for Suda Bay. The usual heavy mortar and machine gun fire came down with this attack, and there was heavy fighting on the left of the 2/7th Battalion front. This battalion moved to the counter-attack with a determined charge. Modern German soldiers are not bayonet fighters. Before this spirited opposition they fell back. The Maori battalion on the left of the Australians now came forward. With magnificent courage under heavy fire, the Maoris closed again and again with the enemy. It was their hour, and the bayonet
was their weapon; before them and the Australians, the Germans fell back a distance
of one and a half miles.
Our force here was ordered to withdraw that night, by way of the Suda Bay road and inland toward Neon Khorian, on the first stage of the rough overland journey to the south coast and evacuation.
Rations were to have been drawn next day from a depot near Neon Khorian. In fact, the depot was under enemy fire, and no rations were issued. A phase was now beginning in which shortage of food and water was to be added to the burdens of a confused and bitter fighting passage across the mountains.
At both Heraklion and Retimo, a stiff and, on the whole, a very satisfactory resistance had been maintained against increasing enemy pressure so far. The 2/4th Australian Battalion were the only A.I.F. unit with the British force holding Heraklion. One of their companies had an experience similar to that of Australians at Retimo. When a Very light signal was put up by them, a German transport plane flew over and dropped stores, medical equipment-and a motor cycle. The grim truth behind such incidental ironies was, of course, that the Germans dominated the sky and used it as a supply line in a way so tireless and watchfully
efficient that their invasion must, in the end, succeed.
The decision to evacuate Heraklion was made on 28th May, and a successful embarkation was made from the harbour on the following day.
At Retimo, our forces were by now too closely pinned to have any chance of extricating themselves as a formed body. Communication with them was well-nigh impossible, but an effort was made to get through word of the proposed evacuation. Comparatively few of those who made such a fine stand here were able to get away and cross the mountains in time to leave with the main party.
The rallying point for embarkation on the south coast was a beach near the small village of
Spakhia. The rearguard to cover the movement included the 2/7th and 2/8th Australian Battalions, with some Royal Marines, a few guns and two tanks.
As this force moved back through the mountains, it allowed to pass through its ranks a contingent of Italians. Straggling northwards and waving white flags, these were some of the prisoners taken months before by the Greeks in fighting on the Albanian front. Now they were being turned loose and given safe conduct through our lines to where a more than dubious welcome awaited them from their German 64allies." Our men grimly watched their passing, which was so eloquent of the strain on our supply resources.
The Germans were pressing close now, their motor-cycle patrols coming into. view every now and then, a mile or so behind the rearguard. Fortunately air action was slight at the beginning of our withdrawal to the south. The main body was able to make progress, with the rearguard spiritedly keeping enemy troops at a distance. The two tanks, with some carriers, were particularly useful in this work. On several occasions they turned and severely punished bodies of Germans who were following up in close formation.
The infantry toiled on. The men were weakened considerably. Their rest during the past ten days had been fragmentary. Numbers of them had not taken their boots off and now, with the marching over rough trails, their feet were in poor condition.. Water was not plentiful, and was low in salt content.
Some men dropped out, so lame and utterly exhausted that their bodies would no longer respond to the spirit which urged them to move on and fight on. It was that spirit which supported those in whom the dregs of strength remained. Somewhere beyond the next vista of winding track lay their hope-the sea and the Navy.
As the last phase began, on 30th-3Ist May, the 2/7th Battalion was given the main holding r8le on the ridge above the beach at
Spakhia, with other units of the rearguard disposed behind and watching flank approaches across the hills. Ammunition was now very short in this force. There were no rations until the evening Of 31st May, when very meagre quantities were brought up from the beach. The nature of the country imposed heart-breaking difficulties. There was no road to the beach, but only a precipitous hill climb, with one narrow track through
Spakhia village. By now the way to the beach was congested with large numbers of British,. New Zealand and Australian troops. They included the unarmed details who had had no operational tasks in the fighting, and stray parties who had become separated from their units.
On either side of what might have become a shambles area stood the saving, forces-the Navy offshore, and the rearguard on the hills. To their discipline and patience belongs the credit for the measure of success achieved in the evacuation.
The sands were running out now. The Navy had already borne heavy losses in its evacuation tasks, as well as in reinforcing and supplying the troops in Greece and Crete. Near the shores of this island it was practically impossible for any ship to remain without grave hazard during daylight hours. In its
Spakhia. programme the Navy did, in fact, manage to embark many more men than it had undertaken to., A time limit had to be set on the operation.
A part of the rearguard was unable to reach the beach within that time limit. When it came down, over the rough way from the ridge where it had stood so effectively against the enemy, that force was still a formed body, marching under discipline-and still ready to turn and fight, even on the water's edge. By a small margin its magnificent effort had missed a successful conclusion. The pursuit was close and powerful, supported by the waves of fresh troops which the Germans had always been able to bring forward after their first considerable foothold in Crete was assured. For the British and Imperial troops who remained, worn out and short of ammunition, surrender loomed as the only course.
The Battle for Crete ranks as the most extraordinary yet fought in this war. In it, the German technique of bombing and machine-gunning from the air produced a most severe barrage effect. The enemy drove prisoners and civilians before his troops to mask their attacks on our lines. He endured enormous casualties. A remarkable fact was that, while the blitz eventually overwhelmed our slender forces and took many of them prisoner, it killed comparatively few.
Among the people of Australia and New Zealand, Crete will have a special place in memory. In remembering with pride the gallantry of their men in that forlorn hope they will come, as the full story unfolds, to honour equally the shining spirit of the Cretan people, of simple village folk whose faith and courage were not to be, dimmed by the terror that shadowed their homes.
Unyielding as the stones of their native isle, they, too, await another day. |
