Syria

SYRIA

The plan adopted was for three main lines of advance by British and Imperial troops. One took the main coastal road which ran from the Palestinian frontier, north of Acre, to Beirut. A second moved inland into the mountains from Metulla, in the direction of Merdjayoun and Rayak. A third thrust, in which Free French and Indian troops played important roles, was directed toward Damascus.

On the night of 7th-8th June, 1941, the first Australian contingents in the force of intervention moved across the frontier from Palestine. One formation took the coastal road, while another moved inland from Metulla.

Practically no opposition was offered on the border. On the coastal sector a small rearguard withdrew, carefully blowing up bridges and cliff-bordered sections of the highway to delay our advance. Engineers in our advance parties repaired these demolitions sufficiently for Tyre to be reached by 5 P.M. on the 8th. This town, twelve miles from the frontier, was not defended.

Difficulties were soon to commence, however. Vichy forces had placed mortars and machine guns in the rugged hills which closed in upon and commanded the coast road at many points north of Tyre. In such country die mortar was a very effective weapon, its high trajectory enabling fire to be directed steeply down from behind the concealment of a hill. The enemy's delaying actions grew stronger as our forces pushed towards the mouth of the swift-flowing Litani River. The northern bank afforded good cover, and was strongly held. An attempt to outflank this position by a landing from the sea failed, under withering fire. The first attempt of an Australian infantry company to cross the shallow river was similarly foiled. At this stage, two Vichy destroyers stood inshore and shelled the attacking Australians. The ships were engaged by the guns of one of our artillery regiments, and withdrew; this was the first occasion in the present war on which Australian gunners fought a warship.

After fierce fighting, the crossing of the Litani was forced. Engineers at once began to replace the demolished bridge while the infantry mopped up machine gun posts. Ahead lay Saida (Sidon). The distance by road was not great, but ridge after ridge flanked it, and each concealed the carefully chosen positions for artillery, machine gun and mortar opposition to our advance.

On our side, the campaign had now revealed itself to be one of patient stalking; of laborious climbs to outflank a hill post; of battles shredding out, at their climax, into close-quarter fighting by small sections of men. Complicating elements were the appearance of Vichy tanks before Saida, and the temporary advantage enjoyed at this stage by their aircraft.

As we closed in towards Saida, the Navy supported the attack by bombarding the approaches to the town. The Vichy troops again withdrew, and our troops entered early in the afternoon of 15th June. They were welcomed by the townspeople. While French opinion was mixed, the general tenor among the native population was one of friendly confidence.

Along the inland road, through the mountains, a confused situation now existed. Until this was cleared up, there was some risk that a further advance along the coast might expose our forces to a flank attack from the lateral roads and tracks that came down to the sea through the Lebanese hills.

Our columns crossing the border inland and moving from Metulla towards Merdjayoun had been preceded by Free French and British emissaries of peace. It was hoped that their overtures would induce the Vichy troops not to oppose us. This attempt at a parley was quickly abandoned, but the first Australian troops to cross the border wore their felt hats, the more militant "battle bowlers" being carried on their packs. The answer to this gesture was shell-fire. Steel replaced felt as headwear, and the troops grimly went to cover.

As elsewhere, the defence was cleverly disposed. Enemy artillery followed the movement of our troops with such precision that the presence behind our line of spies with signalling facilities was suspected. Measures were taken to suppress this. Our infantry continued to push into the hills, seeking always for a line of approach to close quarters. Whenever possible, the enemy evaded these moves, skilfully withdrawing his guns to another position and preparing for another phase of the delaying action. His troops fought as became a professional army. Very few of his officers and white troops fulfilled the expectation that they had no heart for the campaign. Their professional honour and the tradition of their service summoned up an instinctive effort.

The first enemy withdrawal in the central sector left Merdjayoun undefended. As our troops approached, a delegation of townspeople came out to surrender the town on 11th June. Progress to this point gave us control of the junction of a lateral road which wound through the hills to join the coastal highway near Saida.

Ahead, the country loomed more and more difficult. For the further advance towards Jezzine, the improvising of tracks was necessary. Mule transport was coming into use, visual signalling was replacing the field telephone; the primitive conditions of mountain warfare were temporarily eclipsing the mechanised technique. One of our cavalry detachments took some of its personnel out of carriers and mounted them on captured horses. Inevitably, these rough-riders of the hills became known to their comrades as "the Kelly Gang." There were also regular horsed cavalry operating on both sides.

There could be no "fixed line" war in such country. As a substantial part of the Australian force toiled and fought its way through the mountains toward Jezzine, a Vichy contingent cut in behind them to shell us out of Merdjayoun. The town remained in their hands for some time, although the lateral road to the coast continued in our hands.

Damascus by Harold  B Herbert

Supplies for the troops further north now had to be sent by mule and donkey train. Young soldiers had to learn the method of the muleteer which their fathers had painfully acquired in the last war. By day and night, on faint or non-existent trails, food and ammunition had to go forward. The machine guns had to be fed if the stalking and subduing of enemy posts were to go on. Only patience and the utmost capacity for endurance could bring the infantrymen within range of his target. From that moment, he became an individualist in his fighting. Company headquarters, in the next ravine, was to all intents and purposes in another world. One phase in each battle might consist of a dozen separate little dramas in which singly or by threes and fours or sections, men crouched and stalked and shot their way forward.

Where there were roads the mountain grades were often so steep that the field guns could be moved only at a slow walking pace. Stretches of these roads were invariably targets for the enemy's artillery. There were hair-pin bends around which the guns had to be maneuvered slowly, backing to the edge of precipitous slopes. On this troublesome way to Jezzine were points that acquired a special notoriety. Australians came to know very well the "Mad Mile" and "Hell Fire Corner." Every truck that travelled these sections of the road drew, as a matter of course, a burst of shell-fire from the enemy. Also as a matter of course, the trucks continued to run the gauntlet. The drop from the edge of the road to the gullies below was over one thousand feet.

The fight for Jezzine could not go otherwise than slowly, and it was not until eddy in July, shortly before the armistice, that notable progress north of the town had been made.

In the meanwhile, the third line of advance into Vichy territory had been followed steadily by British, Indian, Free French and some Australian troops. They operated in the right, or eastern sector, with Damascus as their first main objective.

The taking of Sheik Miskin by an Indian Brigade, and the fall of Qouneitra, some eighteen miles within the border and overlooking the Jordan Valley, forced the Vichy troops back along the Qouneitra-Damascus road. This road traversed comparatively easy country for some distance. While this enabled the enemy to employ his tanks to some advantage, it also helped us. Our artillery was able to take its toll of Vichy's armoured vehicles, and others fell into our hands when they were abandoned through lack of petrol.

By 20th June, the Allied forces were closing on Damascus. The role of an Australian battalion was to cut the Damascus-Beirut road. Against strong resistance, the battalion stormed the high ground west of Mezze, occupied the forts there, lost one of them in a counter-attack, fought its way on next day against very stubborn defences, and finally occupied a big sector of high ground south of the road. Many prisoners were taken, and the battalion was in a position to destroy many lorries that sought to escape by the Beirut road from Damascus.

This action had a strong influence on the fall of Damascus. A first and tentative thrust towards the city had been checked. Reinforced, and covered by a bombardment of the strong posts, the Allied troops again closed in. The city was surrendered to them at 4 p.m. on the 21st. It was learned that the civic authorities had asked the Vichy military command to surrender earlier, in order to avert loss of civilian lives and damage to the city. This had been refused. A great majority of the defenders evaded encirclement, however, removing with them all the foodstuffs they could carry from Damascus.

The Allied plan now was to swing towards the coast, rolling up opposition along the road to Beirut. Again, the nature of the country gave the Vichy troops every opportunity to slow down this move. In the Jebel Mazar, north of Hermon and its snow-patched peak, their resistance held strongly. Repeated attacks against it failed under their artillery and mortar fire. A gradual outflanking of this Vichy mountain defence was in process when the fall of Damour, on the coast, took place.

The stroke against Damour was among several influences that now made the capitulation a matter of days. One factor was the advance from Iraq toward Palmyra of mechanised British units in the northern sector. Another was the increased activity of the R.A.F. and R.A.A.F.

By the end of June, we were in command of the air. An Australian squadron participated most successfully in the offensive. Its covering patrols operated with the Navy, and sweeps were made over Palmyra and Horns. The enemy's supply routes were harried. On one day alone, Australian pilots made 25 sorties against the Beirut area.

On 30th June, a message was relayed to the Vichy Commander (General Dentz) through the American Consul in Jerusalem, suggesting a meeting to discuss armistice terms. When this was refused, preparations began for an assault on Damour, the last place of consequence on the coastal route before the fortifications around Beirut were reached. Damour was strongly held. To reach the town, our attack had to win the heights of a rocky promontory. The road ran along this, and then turned sharply inland along an embankment before entering the town.

An outflanking movement, to reach the road north of Damour, was part of our plan. The force available for this move was numerically weak, but experience had proved by now that small parties could be more effective than large ones in rugged country if they were well equipped with fire power. In this particular area, it was doubtful if troops could average a mile an hour in their approach march. By almost superhuman efforts they crossed the ravines to the start line for their encircling attack. On 6th July, the main thrust was launched.

The main coastal positions held by the enemy had been spotted by aerial reconnaissance. Through good liaison with the Navy, it was possible to bring a flank bombardment from the sea to bear on these defences. The naval gunfire was accurate and intense. Before it, the Vichy troops gave ground and our troops pressed along the highway. On the inland flank of Damour, in the meanwhile, the last of the long series of mountain fights was being grimly waged. It was a series of scrambles and dog-fights, but the unifying influence of determination was in all of them. The enemy broke away under the pressure. By the morning of 9th July, Damour was ours.

Beirut was only a few miles away. Fortunately it was to be spared bombardment, for General Dentz realised that nothing further could be achieved by resistance. He indicated that he was ready to parley. The order to cease fire took effect from 1 a.m. on 12th July.

Vichy representatives subsequently came through our lines under escort, and a convention formally ending the campaign was signed at Acre.

The five weeks' campaign had been dour and exacting. Even the ultimate success left a bitter taste; there could be no exhilaration when Frenchmen fought Frenchmen, when Briton and Australian marched against those whom they had counted as friends and allies a year before. In physical effort, much had been demanded of our troops, and their response had been magnificent. Now, amid the groves and hillsides from which the roar and stench of battle had departed, the armies drew apart to rest and tend their bruises.

Armistice Convention by Harold B Herbert

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