Chapter 8 Air Service in the Middle East

AIR SERVICE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

AUSTRALIA has been represented in the air during Middle East operations by a fighter squadron of the R.A.A.F. and by squadrons in the R.A.F. which, to all intents and purposes, are Australian in personnel and character. The record of the R.A.A.F. in the Middle East is one of honour in a sphere 'where stiff problems have been created by desert conditions and where British, Dominion and Allied air units have set up high standards of achievement.

After arrival in the Middle East in the summer of 1940, the R.A.A.F. squadron was given an army co-operation role. One flight two were given Gladiators. The latter were used as was equipped with Lysanders and close-support fighters. Some Gauntlet planes were then added. Thus equipped, the Australians moved to the Western Desert before the opening of the British surprise attack which threw the Italians back from Sidi Barrani into Libya.

Reconnaissance work followed, and with it came the squadron's first encounter with the enemy. On 19th 'November, 1940, three Gladiators were attacked by 18 Italian C.R.42 fighters. In half an hour's fighting five of the enemy machines were shot down and another damaged. The action cost the Australians a squadron leader, whose plane crashed.

The British offensive opened on 9th December, 1940, with the drive of Western Desert Force on Sidi Barrani. From then until the 18th, the squadron carried out close-support and low-flying work, machine-gunning Italian posts and lines of retreat. Encounters with enemy aircraft began to crowd into this strenuous period in the Sofafi area of the desert. Five Gladiators scored three certain "kills" in their meeting with twelve C.R-42'S on 10th December. There were several actions against such odds, the results building up on our side the potent air weapon of confidence.

Much of the squadron's work consisted of reconnaissance over desert wastes where land features were either non-existent or extremely hard to recognise. Land forces matched their cunning against observers and air cameras with every trick of camouflage and dispersion. The Khamsin blew, rolling clouds of dust over the scene-and over the ground organisation of air squadrons. It was a campaign which quickly made weather-beaten veterans of those who served in it, and which demanded adaptability and ingenuity in maintaining air work. By mid-December the squadron's scale of operations was diminishing, as some of its Gladiators became unserviceable.

At the close of December, 1940, the Air Force joined the Army in careful preparations for the assault on Bardia. During these preparations R.A.A.F. pilots, again flying single-seater Gladiators, intercepted a strong formation of Italian S-79 bombers escorted by C.R.-42 type fighters. In the dog-fight which followed our pilots destroyed two C.R-42'S, shot down four others, the destruction of which was not confirmed, and damaged a seventh. All the Gladiators returned safely to their bases.

Perturbed by such reverses, the Italians were now avoiding air actions against British and Australian flights. This wariness aided the taking of the series of aerial photographs which were used in planning details of the attack on Bardia. On 3rd January, the first day of the land battle, when vital movements of troops, guns and transport were taking place, not one enemy aircraft appeared. The A.I.F. were receiving reconnaissance reports from machines which were able to fly at a few hundred feet over the battle area.

On A January, Australian-piloted Gladiators patrolled over the town to protect other aircraft that carried out last-minute reconnaissance to secure information on 'which the final stage of the action was based. The following day the Gladiators went on patrol over the Gambut area, where they intercepted twelve enemy S-79's which were about to attack a naval unit. These enemy were compelled to jettison their bombs. Two days later, when Western Desert Force were pushing on towards Tobruk, the Gladiators were again on patrol, covering our troops against enemy air attack.

On one occasion eight Gloster-Gladiators, manned by Australians, were assigned to escort an aircraft which was doing artillery reconnaissance over a heavily fortified Italian stronghold. During the flight, the Australians sighted five Italian S.79 bombers escorted by a large force of C.R.42 fighters, and followed by a separate formation of eighteen fighters 2,000 feet above them. Although apparently hopelessly outnumbered, two of the Gladiators immediately attacked the bomber formation and the remaining six climbed to meet the eighteen fighters. A dog-fight followed, with the Australians concentrating their fire on the Italian fighters. Two of these were seen to fall into the sea, one was probably destroyed, and four others were classed as "possibles." Although there were no Australian casualties, three of the Gladiators were slightly damaged.

During the operations at Tobruk the squadron put up offensive fighter patrols, watching the area west of the town for signs of enemy intervention. At this stage, however, Italian aircraft were hard to find over the forward sectors. All the brief air encounters and pursuits of December and January were building up into a considerable contribution to the further swift advance of the army across Cirenaica.

Towards the end of January, Hurricane aircraft were taken into use by the squadron. After the occupation of Benghazi, these operated from Benina aerodrome -graveyard of so many Italian machines-and maintained "standing" patrols over the harbour.

The Germans were now flying in North Africa. A toll of their J-U-87's was taken over Benghazi harbour on i8th February. Down near El Agheila, we lost two of three Hurricanes which fought seven M.E.110's.

The first phase of the Libyan campaign may be considered to have ended by mid-March, 1941- In its service up to that time, the R.A.A.F. squadron had destroyed for certain eighteen enemy aircraft, had probably destroyed twelve others, and had damaged seven more. It's own losses by enemy action had been eight planes.

The next brief and exacting phase was the retreat of our reduced Libyan garrison before the German-Italian attack in April.

Enemy air power had been greatly strengthened by German units. British air strength had been weakened by the withdrawal of units for the Balkan campaign. These factors, with the frequent moving of ground bases made necessary by the retreat, imposed a great strain on the British and Australian air personnel in Libya.

Much good work was done in this period. On 3rd April, a Hurricane patrol of the R.A.A.F. squadron in the Agedabia-Solluch area came upon a large formation of J.U.88 and M.E.110 aircraft which were "ground-strafing" our troops. Determined intervention accounted for six "certains" and four "probables" without any loss to our own aircraft. Two days later twelve enemy planes were destroyed by British and Australian planes operating together.

For days on end, the ground staff got little or no sleep. By day, they serviced aircraft. By night they packed the squadron gear and drove their trucks to new bases. In six days, the squadron operated from seven different aerodromes. The ground staff would often arrive at their destination just in time to prepare the Hurricanes for another sortie. In this and other operations, our squadrons have been fortunate in having men well suited for mobile action of this type. All ranks displayed great initiative throughout, efficiently and cheerfully bearing heavy responsibilities.

On one night, during the retreat from the Benghazi area, orders were received for the squadron's aircraft to be burned and for all personnel to move off by motor transport at once, as German mechanised forces were believed to be close at hand. The pilots stood by their machines, preferring to take off in pitch darkness rather than destroy them. The Germans did not find that landing ground during the night and the Hurricanes took off, unharmed, in the first dawn light. They returned later in the day and gave the new enemy occupants of the place an unpleasant strafing.

Our forces rolled back and Tobruk became a besieged British-Australian outpost in Libya. Hurricane patrols flew here and in the Libya-Egypt frontier area in April. On the 15th one R.A.A.F. Hurricane attacked four J-U-52's near Fort Capuzzo. One of the enemy was shot down outright. All the others were then forced down to hasty landings and destroyed on the ground by machine gun fire.

By now, a rest and a re-fit were long overdue. The squadron had been in action since 7th November, 1940. On 21st April, 1941, it was withdrawn from the Western Desert.

Early in May it was re-armed with American Tomahawk aircraft, and by the beginning of June was ready for new operations in a new campaign. In addition to this R.A.A.F. squadron, we now had what might be called two Australian squadrons in the R.A.F. in the Middle East. One of these Australian-manned squadrons comprised fighters and the other consisted of army-co-operation aircraft. The latter was assigned to tactical reconnaissance work in the Western Desert. The two fighter squadrons, in the meanwhile, were to take an important and most successful part in the operations against the Vichy French in Syria.

The following is a list of typical activities by the Australian aircraft in Syria:
- 13th June: patrols of Tomahawks over the warships that were bombarding Vichy coastal positions. J.U.88's intercepted.
- 15th June: 31 sorties made this day, patrolling and ground machine-gunning
- 20th June: machine-gunning enemy transport on the 'Beirut-Damascus road.
- 28th June: eight Tomahawks intercepted six Glenn-Martins which were attacking troops near Palmyra, and shot them all down.
- 9th July: 25 sorties made. One of these sorties by the Tomahawks destroyed 100 enemy vehicles on the Damascus road. On another day, fifteen enemy aircraft were destroyed.

After the close of the Syrian campaign, the R.A.A.F. fighter squadron moved back Jo the Western Desert. Here it often flew in company with South African planes. Enemy aircraft were now rarely met-and seldom dallied for an encounter. Air command on the desert frontier was definitely ours. The army-co-operation squadron watched and reported the dispositions of German and Italian land forces. This, squadron had a very active tactical reconnaissance role. From 13th July to 20th August, its aircraft made 140 sorties, and 56 between 20th August and 5th September.

By 25th September, the three squadrons between them had definitely destroyed 95 enemy aircraft. They had also inflicted eighteen probable total losses, and had damaged 70 other planes. In more than ten months of service, the R.A.A.F. squadron had lost fourteen aircraft by enemy action.

The story of our air force in action must at this stage of the war be deduced mainly from the cold evidence of figures-from the ratio of losses inflicted to losses sustained. The story is lighted by the flash of nonchalant gallantry behind the pilot's matter-of-fact report of an encounter, by the tribute to the ground staffs in the fact that squadrons continue to fly and fight with such confidence.

These are the visible threads in a pattern of teamwork which covers all the activities of our air force. Broadly this teamwork is a family affair, and the Empire Air Scheme is weaving the threads closely. Perhaps the final compliment to Australia's squadrons in the Middle East lies in the clear evidence that their section of the pattern of achievement is loyally uniform with the whole.