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Chapter 3

This page is from the book "Soldiering On".

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Jungle Ambush

Prior to the withdrawal of the 3rd Indian Corps, the 2/30th Australian Battalion, under Lieut.-Colonel Galleghan, had taken up a position about seven miles in advance of the main post between Batu Anam and Gemas, a company under Captain Duffy being hidden about three miles farther ahead in the jungle alongside the road.

Of this advance company a small party of twenty men, including some engineers and an artillery forward observation party under Captain Duffy, had taken up a position covering a bridge over the Gamencheh River, which had been prepared for demolition. A telephone line had been laid to this forward party so that the battalion commander might be advised exactly when the bridge was blown behind the enemy advanced cyclists. In addition, our artillery laid a wire to communicate with the guns and to advise when open fire on the enemy, who were expected to be massed beyond the bridge. The wire would also enable the artillery fire to be controlled.

The battalion had been in position for over two days and was anxiously waiting to out its well prepared plan. The enemy was not expected before January 15 at the earliest.

During the afternoon of January 14, Colonel Galleghan found that his telephone line to the forward company had been disconnected, and a sergeant and one linesman went forward to discover the break and repair it. On reaching the break, they found a party of the enemy lying in wait for them. When fired on, the Australians escaped injury and withdrew. The sergeant cut in on the line to advise the commanding officer of the position. He requested to be permitted to return and deal with the enemy at the break, but was ordered back to headquarters to report.

A patrol was then sent forward to spot; but, instead of meeting a small party of enemy found him in strength with machine-guns on both sides of the road. After a severe bout in which several of the enemy were killed, our patrol returned to our lines with two wounded.

Suddenly at 4.10 p.m. the enemy appeared. About 300 had crossed the bridge, which was packed with marching infantry, when Captain Duffy gave the order to his engineer officer to "blow" it. 

More than 30 Japanese were sent skyward. Immediately everything Captain Duffy possessed opened fire on the column of Japanese on the straight stretch of road beyond the bridge. Machine-guns, Tommy guns, rifles and mortars poured devastating fire into the surprised enemy. This continued until the road was covered with a still mass of human bodies.

The din attracted the attention of the advanced party of the enemy, who turned and discovered the main portion of the forward Australian company. The Japanese hopped off their bikes, released their rifles from the frames, and, fixing their bayonets, attacked. Steel clashed with steel in a series of bayonet duels, but the Australians were easily the masters. The remainder of the Japanese were dealt with by machine-guns and hand grenades. The Australians were at the top of their form and seemed to enjoy the clash.

They threw their grenades into the massed enemy infantry, yelling "Take that, you bastards." One man walked calmly to the top of a cutting and, dropping a grenade into the midst of a number of cowering Japs, said in a ladylike tone, "'Ere you are, luvvy."

The company conservatively estimated killing more than 500 Japs. Some said 800. Our losses were extremely light. Having completed their task, both portions of the gallant company set out for their lines.

Just as darkness overtook them, the main portion bumped into a large body of the enemy which had established itself in the jungle between the railway and road. Darkness favoured the enemy in their fixed position, so our men did not return the fire directed at them, but lay "doggo" until the excitement died down. By a wide sweeping movement, they avoided the enemy and returned home the following morning. 
The smaller party under Captain Duffy had a more difficult time. The enemy had sent troops via the railway line which ran into Gemas from the south-west, thus moving around the company which laid the ambush. 'Me party, which had a few wounded, had to evade these Japanese and, as a result, took two days to reach our lines. They spent a night in the golf club house at Gemas.

By the time they arrived there the main body of the battalion had withdrawn to the main defensive position; and while they were sleeping there, our own artillery opened fire on the building. They quickly decamped and had not gone 200 yards when a shell demolished the building. 

Realizing that the enemy was between them and our own lines, they made a wide detour and eventually reached home to be received by welcoming cheers from the men.

In the Battle of Gemas

In the early hours of the morning the enemy, who brought four medium (20 ton) and 10 light (10 ton) tanks with them, approached our road block, which consisted of concrete blocks standing about 2 feet 6 inches high and scattered  across the road to a depth Of 20 or 30 feet. Our anti-tank gunners opened fire too soon and missed the first tank, which swerved quickly into the thick rubber plantation on the south of the road. It was understandable that the gunners were over-anxious, since it was their first shot at a real tank.

Soon enemy tanks again appeared, but this time the gunners held their fire till the tanks were under 200 yards away. Four tanks were destroyed. This checked the attack on the road party, but not for long. At about 7-3o a.m. the enemy began infiltrating through the rubber opposite C Company on the north of the road. At the same time parties appeared in front of D Company about 6oo, yards to the south of the road. Both companies engaged the enemy and checked him. 

D Company, which was on the extreme left flank, had taken up a position in young rubber which concealed the troops extremely well. 

It was the fire from this company that gave the Japanese the greatest shock suffered in their attack. They followed their usual tactics of ascertaining the exact location of our posts so that they could send their patrols around them while bombarding them from the front with their mortars.

Shortly, one isolated man, dressed in white shorts and white coat with white topee to match, calmly walked down the railway on the left of D Company. The company decided to wait until the man had come right into position and then to capture him. 

Unfortunately, the enthusiasm of our men was too great and they killed him, but not 'before he had pointed with his hand to our position in the scrub.

The signal was picked up by the Japanese opposite, and within five minutes heavy fire from mortars and artillery commenced to fall on D Company.

The enemy launched another attack against D Company, but it was again dealt with successfully by machine-gun, rifle and mortar fire. These small attempts to penetrate our position continued until 11-30. After that, there was a temporary lull.

Meanwhile, our patrols were vigorously penetrating the jungle on both flanks of our position. These patrols contacted many enemy parties attempting to come through.

 The parties consisted sometimes of a platoon, sometimes of a company. Our patrols reported the enemy digging in, so Lieut.-Colonel Galleghan sent a company to attack with the bayonet. The enemy ran away yelling. Another concentration of enemy troops was dealt with by mortars. As the shells crashed noisily among them, the Japs ran screaming for cover.
A little later a company commander saw troops approaching his position. At the time he was on the phone talking to his colonel, beside whom sat Brigadier Maxwell. 

As the troops appeared, they called out, "Don't shoot, we are Indians." The company commander passed this on to the colonel, who in turn passed it on to the brigadier. 

The brigadier replied that there were no Indians in the vicinity, and that the men must be Japs.

This was passed on to the company commander, who then ordered his men to open fire-which they did with some effect.

Then came an air blitz on headquarters. A number of enemy planes dropped their bombs and machine-gunned Lieut.-Colonel Galleghan's headquarters, damaging his car and destroying his wireless truck. Quickly headquarters moved a few hundred yards farther back.

At this stage, Colonel Galleghan sent for Captain Melville, the commander of D Company, and ordered him to launch a counter-attack on the enemy through the young rubber into the old rubber where, according to reports just received from our patrols, the enemy had been concentrating.

Before the attack was launched, B Company, which had taken part in the ambush and most of which had returned, were ordered to take the place of D Company, while D Company withdrew for a meal of bully beef. The company commander then stripped his men of all unnecessary equipment. They had rifles and bandoliers of ammunition only, while the No. 2 gunners of the Bren and Tommy guns carried extra drums of ammunition in their shirts. Gas-masks had been discarded prior to the battle and were left in the transport lines well to the rear of the position. The company moved through its old position into the attack. For about 100 yards it had to pass through open country where the young rubber-trees stood only two or three feet high. It met heavy fire, but casualties were comparatively light (6 killed and 24 wounded).
One platoon moved along the railway on the left flank, another platoon moved straight ahead, and
the remainder were in the hands of the company commander following the second platoon.

Ultimately, they reached the thick belt of old rubber-trees. When they had penetrated 100 yards into the plantation, they discovered a comparatively large Japanese force with the strength of about two companies lined up ready to launch an attack against their old position. 

The Japanese had four light tanks with their infantry on this starting line. Immediately the Australians charged with the bayonet. 

They went through the Japs in a hand to hand fight, killing 120 with bayonets and grenades. The remainder of the Japanese ran. 

Three of the four tanks were destroyed with Mills grenades. The other tank swung sharply to the left and disappeared into the rubber on the farther side of the road.

According to its arrangements, the company then swung to the left across the railway line to withdraw to the rear of the main position.

Many incidents of unusual bravery were seen during this hand to hand fight. One of our men, a big corporal who had served in the Grenadier Guards in the last Great War, was severely wounded in the chest by machine-gun fire. After putting a dressing on his wound, he filled his pockets with grenades and went back to the battle. He reached one tank, lifted the cover and dropped in a grenade, and then passed on to another tank and did the same. After this, he carried four wounded men back to the regimental aid post. There were dozens of similar incidents showing courage, a strong spirit of determination, and a total disregard for personal safety.

After this attack, D Company came back and took up a position in the rear of battalion headquarters. About 1.30 p.m. reports were received from our patrols that the enemy was massing in great strength ready for another attack. It was estimated that at least one brigade was forming up. Heavy artillery and mortar fire was opened on our position while their aeroplanes began to bomb our posts, paying particular attention to battalion headquarters. 

The battalion commander had carried out his allotted task of ambushing the enemy and inflicting heavy casualties. He realized that to stand on his present position against such a strong attack would result in unnecessary losses with little hope of any gain. He therefore decided to withdraw to the main position at Batu Anam.

Throughout the battle, the regimental medical officer, Captain Taylor, had been supervising the collection of wounded in his aid post. Owing to enemy pressure, especially on the left flank, the evacuation of our casualties was difficult. Ultimately, the doctor decided to take the risk of bringing his ambulance wagons forward to his position, and sending them back along the road in full view of the enemy, relying on the Red Cross to give the necessary protection. 
The scheme worked, and all the wounded who had been collected were evacuated. The Japanese gained the respect of Australians for their humane act.

During the enemy bombardment, the battalion commander's car was severely damaged, so Colonel Galleghan made his way back with his troops on foot. A party of officers, all of them wounded, decided to use the car to get back if they could persuade it to go. Finding that the engine was all right, they crowded into the car, leaving an whose foot was wounded standing on the running board to give warning of aerial attack. Thus they made their way back, chased by an aeroplane which fired frequent bursts at the car, one of which penetrated the roof and again wounded one of the occupants. Captain Melville, though seriously wounded himself, throughout the journey kept pressure on the severed artery of one of the party and thus saved his life. 

Soon after this withdrawal, the enemy launched his attack. It was abortive, since the position had been vacated and he found nothing there. 

That night the enemy established himself in the area. During the night, the party that had been sent forward to contact the enemy at the break in the telephone wire on the main road withdrew after some hectic fighting. 

On its way back, it passed close to the enemy lines where the Japanese were sitting around small fires cooking their evening meal, jabbering and making a lot of noise. 

The corporal passed within 10 yards of a Japanese sentry without being seen.

This battle accounted for over 1,000 enemy dead with at least 10 enemy tanks destroyed. Our casualties were less than 100, with only 12 being killed.

During the morning of January 20 the following alarming messages from the Bakri force were received at A.I.F. headquarters at Labis:

45 hrs. Situation very grave(.) will need maximum assistance to extricate force(.) 2/29 Bn. were mauled(.) enemy rd. block valley 7 miles(.) Max. air support throughout area essential(.) Force perimeter about 100 miles. Sulong Same day at 1005 hrs. Trying force 982L mile enemy road block. Same day at 1145 firs. Continuous air support required(.) Bomb Bakri 846o(.) Recce road x EAST Of M.S-97 and submit report(.) Machine gun both sides same road.

On hearing this information General Percival offered to arrange that our air force should drop food and ammunition to the beleaguered troops. Immediately a wireless message was sent asking if they needed this help and telling them to destroy everything on wheels and escape. In their reply, they reaffirmed their decision to try to break through the enemy who was hemming them in, and asked if there were any enemy beyond the causeway on which the road blocks had been placed. 

A reply was prepared saying that there were no enemy beyond the block; but before the message was sent Brigadier Fawcett, of the 3rd Indian Corps, called with the information that the Norfolk Regiment holding Parit Sulong bridge and Bukit Payong had been attacked and driven out of their position, two of their companies being scuppered. This made the escape of the Bakri force almost impossible. The reply to Lieut.-Colonel Anderson was altered to tell him of this new unfortunate development. The news must have been a severe shock to him.

During the night of January 21, all wireless touch with the Bakri force faded out, but was restored faintly soon after daylight. The wireless batteries had evidently become weak. A message from Colonel Anderson gave his position. He had forced his way  through the road blocks and had arrived at a point one mile west of Parit Sulong, suffering severe casualties in the effort. His message asked
for food, morphia and field dressings.

The break through seven miles of road blocks had been no easy task. After the position had been reconnoitred, several abortive attempts were made by infantry to force their way through by bayonet charges.

Their losses were very heavy. The enemy had thrown some rubber-trees across the road and had taken up positions covering the block with machine-guns. A house a few yards back from the road had been converted into a strong point, containing 20 to 30 men and a number of machineguns which were fired from the windows. Ultimately one of our 25-pounder field guns was pushed round the bend of the road till fire could be brought to bear on the block. The crew was immediately peppered with machine-gun fire. 

They carried on and opened rapid fire on the block. Although suffering severely, they stuck to their gun. Ultimately the trees were shattered and blown off the road. Immediately a machine-gun carrier was rushed forward to deal with the machine-gun nest. The carrier was helped by mortars, and after a tough fight succeeded in subduing the opposition.

The column then formed up and moved on-infantry leading, followed by guns, trucks and ambulance wagons containing wounded, with all fit men moving along the side of the road ready for any emergency. Soon a second block held them up. Volunteers hastily came forward, armed with axes collected from their trucks. Machine-guns and mortars provided covering fire while the men rushed forward to chop and hack and pull at the obstinate trees till they were moved aside. They suffered severe casualties. The medical officer did great work. As the men fell, he and his stretcher-bearers rushed forward to attend to them and bring them back to the already overcrowded transport.

This type of fighting continued till all the blocks were dislodged and the Japs protecting them were killed.

During the day the Bakri force continued their advance to the Parit Sulong bridge. Colonel Anderson was not certain whether the troops holding the bridge were friends or foes. Seeing a well dressed Malay near by, he asked him who held the bridge. His reply was "Johore Military Forces". These Colonel Anderson knew to be friendly; still he suspected the Malay and, taking him by the hand, advanced towards the bridge. As a precaution he ordered his men to move up close behind him, to be at hand if the Malay proved false. As they turned round the corner into the village they came within sight of the bridge and were fired on by troops who were obviously Japanese. In the excitement of the moment, the Malay broke free and escaped. Colonel Anderson ordered his companies to move towards the bridge, but they were stopped by fire too heavy to permit further advance. Here they formed another perimeter to protect themselves against the Japanese attacks which they knew would follow.

In response to their appeal for food and medical stores, arrangements were made through Malaya Command for our air force to drop parcels during the night. The request that a flare or fire be lighted to guide the planes to the right spot was passed on to Colonel Anderson.

It was imperative that these men should be helped. They had performed a remarkable feat in forcing their way through the stubborn enemy opposition. Malaya Command then arranged for the 2nd Loyal Regiment to launch an attack to recapture the high ground at Bukit Payong. The attack was timed for 2 p.m.

At the same time Captain Lloyd and 10 of our trained guerrillas were sent from the main position to work around enemy opposition and come in behind the enemy holding up Colonel Anderson at Parit Sulong bridge. A wireless message was sent to Colonel Anderson telling him this.
That evening 30 men from the force at Parit Sulong bridge reached our lines. They had been cut off in one of the many enemy attacks and had found their way back through the jungle and swamp to Yong Peng. On the way they were given food and beds and were guided by a Chinese. They reported that the enemy on the Muar front were the 1st Japanese Guards Division.

A message was received from Colonel Anderson saying that he was endeavouring to arrange with the Japanese to send his seriously wounded men by ambulance through their lines back to our position.

He selected some seriously wounded men, and under Lieutenant Austin, of the 2/19th Battalion, sent them in an ambulance to the Japanese post at the top of the Parit Sulong bridge-a Chinese bridge built with a steep rise to the centre. The enemy allowed them to approach to the top of the bridge unmolested and, after a parley, agreed to let them through provided the remainder of the force surrendered. The wounded refused to accept this condition, whereupon the Japanese told them that the ambulance must remain on the bridge as a road block. Soon after dark, Lieutenant Austin, who had been seriously wounded by a bullet which penetrated his throat and came out through his shoulder blade silently crept from his stretcher into the driver's seat, released the brake and set the wagon quietly running back to our position.

The attack by the Loyals, which was to have taken place at 2 p.m., had to be postponed till dawn on the following day. This made the position of our troops at Parit Sulong bridge appear very serious, especially since part of the Indian line was withdrawing farther and enemy air activity growing stronger. 
In addition to his daily bombing of Singapore, he bombed the Parit Sulong force mercilessly and beat up the main road, especially near Yong Peng. Our small air force dealt with targets in the Muar area as well as rear installations as far afield as Kuala Lumpur and Kuantan, where enemy aerodromes received attention.

At 0750 hours on January 22 our planes dropped the food and medical supplies to Colonel Anderson's troops at Parit Sulong. The counter-attack was again postponed and finally it became impossible. During the night more men from Parit Sulong trickled back, including several Indians. All were exhausted after their tough, heart-rending fight followed by the long struggle through jungle and swamp to our lines.

As there was now no hope of saving Colonel Anderson's band of heroes, the following message was sent at 1100 hours:

Regret that there is little prospect any success of attack 78 in to 8 in to help you(.) Lloyds party if successful should have appeared before this(.) 20 your men and many Indians have already returned via river to mine, then track to road, which is at present in our possession 78m(.) You may at your discretion leave wounded with volunteers, destroy heavy equipment, and escape(.) Sorry unable help after your heroic effort(.) Good luck.

This was a sad ending to a brilliant fight. It looked almost impossible for them to escape. They were hemmed in on all sides. They were being attacked constantly, day and night, with powerful enemy forces supported by tanks. Yet they refused to surrender.

The problem of escaping through the cordon was great, and above that the difficulty of finding their way back over the dozens of miles of uninviting jungle with its tough vines tripping them at every step, and through the deep oozing swamps which were frequent in this district, seemed too much for these battle-scarred and exhausted men.

At A.I.F. headquarters it was not known whether the order to escape had got through, since the wireless was very faint. It later transpired that the signallers operating the wireless transmitter had been through a hectic time. Their truck was destroyed by enemy fire. Two of the team of three still working the set were wounded, the rest being killed. These men salvaged parts from several damaged sets and constructed a new one. Their key had burnt out, so they continued sending their messages by striking ,he two loose ends of the terminals together as they spelt their dash-dots to the outside world. The devotion of these men was typical of that of every man in that team of fighting men so ably led by Colonel Anderson.

All night long parties of the men from Parit Sulong were returning. Lieut.-Colonel Anderson and his Intelligence officer, Lieutenant Burt, left with the last party, and on
reaching our line, immediately called at A.I.F. headquarters. Some of the earlier parties had not yet come in. On his return, the first thing Colonel Anderson did-before he washed or fed-was to give a full report on the whole action. He talked as if the whole battle was merely a training exercise.

The men who came back, including the wounded, were cheerful and confident that they were better than the Japanese. After a meal and a sleep, Colonel Anderson went back to Johore Bahru to form another battalion on the remnants of the old. He had 240 men left, but what men! The 2/29th Battalion was less fortunate; it returned with only 120 men and with very few officers. Its commander was lost, and Major Pond, who had been Brigade Major of the 27th Brigade, took over its command and commenced at once to re-form the unit.

 
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