Chapter 4 9th Division in the Breakthrough at el Alamein;

NINTH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION in the BREAK-THROUGH at ALAMEIN

The

CHANGE IN SITUATION.

The month of July saw a change in the pattern of war. The arrival of the Australian and New Zealand Divisions fresh from training in Northern Syria had enabled the initiative again to pass to us. By the end of July the Ninth Division had participated in four actions and a wedge had been driven between the enemy flank and the sea. Thousands of prisoners had been taken and heavy losses inflicted in killed and wounded. The front had been stabilized and from offence the enemy had reverted to defence. A period of marking time ensued. Close to it's main supply bases the Eighth Army was quickly building up its strength in men and materials. Convoys of fresh troops were arriving from the United Kingdom, and at Suez and Port Said steamers were discharging their cargoes of new and powerful armour and weapons.

Previous campaigns had demonstrated that the human element in battle alone was not sufficient. Supply lines were a deciding factor, and the opposing armies were grimly competing for supremacy, but under vastly different conditions. The Eighth Army had withdrawn close to its bases while Rommel's lines of communication h-.d become attenuated and hazardous. Hundreds of miles from his main bases, the ports of Mersa Matruh and Tobruk were suffering damage from the pounding of the Navy and Allied Air Forces. Although he had three means of reinforcement none of these was capable of carrying safely the vast quantity of material needed for the maintenance of his armies.

Since the Army of the Nile under General Wavell had first crossed the barren waste of Cyrenaica, a railway had been completed to Tobruk, linking that port with Mersa Matruh, but the single line was an easy and vulnerable target to our Air Force and its use for moving materials was consequently limited.

It was not possible to cut entirely sea communications between Italy, Tripoli, and the forward bases of Matruh and Sollum, but only a fraction of enemy shipping was surviving our constant sea and air attacks.

Mussolini's much vaunted "Victory Highway" was now badly pitted and scarred from the constant passage of heavy convoys and frequent visits of the R.A.F.

The Allied Air Forces, once a pitiful handful of obsolete aircraft, had expanded into a finely-tempered striking weapon and for the first time we had aerial supremacy. The aerial "blitz" had now become an established feature of our offensive strategy. Heavy bombers were ranging far out to sea and plastering ports and concentration points as far back as Benghazi. In Egypt, the visits by Boston Bombers of the South African Air Force to enemy supply points behind the lines were so

regular that the Italians spoke of them as "The 18 Imperturbables", while the use of fighter-bombers had reached a high standard of efficiency.

On the ground the enemy was expanding and strengthening his positions. Day and night Australian patrols were probing and harassing his outposts. That these were effective was shown by captured documents outlining precautions to be taken for countering our intruder raids.

FAMILIAR CONDITIONS.

Conditions to the Ninth Division were a familiar reminder of the months spent defending the perimeter of Tobruk. Patrol and harass was the normal routine, augmented by the ceaseless battering of our 25-pounders. Italian morale, never notably high, was becoming increasingly shaky. So marked was their propensity to surrender at the least opposition that General Bastico described it as a "tactical rule". Mussolini's "Brave Warriors of the Glorious Roman Empire" were fast becoming a liability to their German allies and to prevent a break-through in Italian-held defences. Italian infantry were, where possible, sandwiched between localities held by German troops.

With some faint hope of depressing Australian morale our lines were made the target of propaganda raids by Italian aircraft. Pamphlets were dropped reading:

"YOU ARE DEFENDING THE ALAMEIN BOX.

WHAT ABOUT DARWIN?"

and

"THE YANKS ARE HAVING A GOOD

TIME IN YOUR COUNTRY.

YOU?"

These were greatly appreciated by Australians as they possessed a high souvenir value.

Early in August General Sir Harold Alexander was appointed Commander-in-Chief Middle East and the command of the Eighth Army passed to General Montgomery. To meet the changed conditions of warfare the Eighth Army was reorganized and a policy of intensive training in co-operation between infantry and armour was adopted.

QUIET PERIOD ENDS.

The period of comparative quiet was broken before dawn on the 3 1st of August when the enemy flung four armoured columns against the southern flank of the Eighth Army. The attack had been expected and was met by a carefully co-ordinated plan of defence. Constantly harassed by our mobile forces and met by screens of skilfully sited anti-tank guns, the drive lost momentum and by the 2nd of September had ceased. Blasted unmercifully by the R.A.F., the attack proved disastrous for the enemy's armour and he commenced to withdraw.

Meanwhile on the northern sector a diversionary blow was struck by the 2/I5th Battalion early on the morning of the ist of September. Supported by tanks the battalion raided and penetrated the enemy defences inflicting severe casualties and taking more than one hundred prisoners before finally withdrawing. The Axis thrust proved abortive and costly. By the 5th of September eighty-odd German and Italian tanks and scores of destroyed and abandoned vehicles scattered over the battlefields were the only evidence of what Berlin Radio called a "minor encounter of reconnaissance forces".

PLANNING THE ATTACK.

By October the Eighth Army had been built up and strengthened. Plans for a major British offensive were taking shape. To ensure the greatest possible surprise every precaution was taken to maintain a normal front to the enemy. Artillery tasks and infantry patrols were fixed at normal tempo and deceptive action was taken to cover all movements and concentrations. It was clear that the forward concentration of vehicles would be too great to be hidden from the enemy, and to maintain' secrecy of the direction and time of attack, all available transport and dummies were used to simulate a concentration of the density expected on the day of attack. Formations and units having operational roles were required to maintain normal radio signal traffic to the latest possible time and to pass dummy deceptive messages during the normal traffic periods.

Some days before the commencement of operations all ranks were informed of the coming action and its significance on the whole of the Allied position in North Africa. From this date onwards all movements from the Eighth Army area were forbidden unless specially authorized.

Three years of war had proved that it was not enough to drive back an enemy, conquering ground and leaving his armies intact for further battles. To effect a decisive victory his forces must be utterly destroyed or captured. The object of the Army Commander was the complete destruction of the Axis Forces in the positions they held and so to avoid having to fight a series of battles all the way to Tripoli.

PLAN OF BATTLE.

Broadly, the plan was for simultaneous attacks to be staged in the north and south, with the decisive blow in the north. The attacks were designed to gain possession of the enemy defences including minefields and field-gun areas, to facilitate the passage of the armoured forces through the main enemy positions. Following this phase the attacking forces would squeeze out the enemy infantry holding the centre of the line and depending on the results in this area would also isolate the enemy forces between the northern flank and the sea.

In the north, Thirtieth Corps was to attack with four infantry divisions which were, from the coast running south: Ninth Australian, Fifty-first Highland, Second New Zealand, and First South African Divisions, and to seize the area of the Miteiriya Ridge and the ground 7,000 yards to the north and hold this area running through the enemy defences and gun areas, thus establishing a bridgehead through which the British armour could pass.

In the southern sector a Free French Force was to attack and capture Himeimat, thus securing the left flank of the main attack in the south, which would be made by Seventh Armoured Division, with the twofold object of containing the Twenty-first Panzer Division and misleading the enemy as to the area of the main attack.

On the Ninth Divisional flank, 24th Brigade was given the task of defending the Division's own defence lines in the coastal sector and carrying out a diversionary operation designed to draw the enemy attention and fire. In addition a force composed of cavalry, machine-guns, anti-tank guns and portion of the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion, was to be available for the protection of the northern flank of the attack.

Zero hour was set at 2200 hours on the 23 rd of October to permit full use being made of the hours of darkness to capture the bridgehead and pass the armour through.

THE BATTLE OPENS.

The heaviest artillery concentration yet seen in Africa opened the Eighth Army offensive on the night of the 23rd. Ranged along the whole front, 8oo Allied guns opened fire on the enemy lines. On the Corps front the night was brilliant with gun flashes and the ground shuddered to the tremendous concussion as the 400 guns of the Corps shelled known enemy gun positions. Twenty minutes later the barrage came down on his defended positions. Coincident with this our infantry advance commenced, and by 0100 hours the 2/24th, 2/17th and 2/15th Battalions which had participated in the initial attack, had reached and were firmly holding their first objective. Opposition was light with the exception of one grimly held position on the 24th Battalion front, but this was finally overcome.

The second phase commenced at 0055 hours with the advance of the 2/48th and 2/13th Battalions. On the right the 2/48th Battalion advanced steadily for 1500 yards and then ran into strongly wired posts protected by minefields and anti-personnel mines, but after hard fighting its objective was finally gained. Behind the 2/48th Battalion the 2/24th Battalion was reorganizing and the tireless sappers were clearing a way through a series of seven minefields which lay between the starting line and the brigade objective. In spite of these fields, the depth and number of which were beyond all expectation, gaps were made in time for support weapons and essential stores to be brought up before dawn.

On the left the 2/13th Battalion, which was to have advanced with supporting tanks from the 4oth Royal Tank Regiment, advanced unsupported when the armour was held up by minefields. After advancing about 1,700 yards against minor resistance the battalion ran into strongly held German positions but took them and gained its first objective. Against fierce opposition the infantry continued forward and succeeded in taking several more posts, but casualties were heavy and the advance was slowed down until the arrival of the tanks at 0515 hours. However, with the approach of dawn it became necessary to reorganize and the battalion dug in 1,000 yards short of its objective.

While this fighting was in progress the diversionary operation from the coastal sector by the 24th Brigade had been successfully carried out and the composite force had advanced to occupy and secure a gap between the 24th Brigade and the northern flank of the attack. Artillery fire was simulated by heavy mortar concentrations, and successful raids by the 2/28th and 2/43rd Battalions had penetrated the enemy positions and taken prisoners. Prisoners of war taken in this sector later firmly believed that they had defeated a portion of the main attack.

In the grey light of dawn a touch of the ludicrous was introduced when an Italian officer wearing white underpants in lieu of a flag of truce walked into one of our positions and asked a company commander whether he would accept prisoners. On obtaining consent of the commander he went out under escort and returned with four more prisoners.

Meanwhile the Highland, New Zealand, and South African Divisions, had succeeded in gaining portion but not all of their objectives. On the southern sector Seventh Armoured Division had launched an attack but because of time lost in negotiating a minefield the advance had to be discontinued until the following night. Throughout the day our and enemy artillery pounded opposing positions. Several times counter-attacks by infantry and tanks developed against our newly-won defences but these were all successfully repulsed. So far we had taken 399 prisoners and during the fighting the enemy had suffered heavy casualties in killed and wounded.

During the night of the 24th/25th of October the 2/13th and 2/17th Battalions attacked without artillery support and taking the enemy by surprise reached their objective with little opposition.

Simultaneously, the Highland, South African and New Zealand Divisions were mopping up and attempting to squeeze out the Axis infantry on the central front. The position of the main British armour was obscure, but it was clear that there had been heavy losses without definite penetration of the enemy positions.

The enemy mounted attack after attack throughout the day in an attempt to recover his lost ground, but although tanks and lorried infantry were flung in lavishly, all attacks were broken up and at least seventeen of his tanks were destroyed.

TRIG 29 ATTACKED.

Before the battle considerable thought had been given to the tactical value of a flattened spur known as Trig 2- 9. Although not more than twenty feet higher than the surrounding desert it commanded die area of the initial attack and the lower ground northwards to the railway, and plans were now prepared to attack northwards and secure this vital feature. The 2/48th Battalion was to attack astride the track leading co Trig 29 and capture the spur. An interesting feature of the battalion's plan was the forming of a mobile company with carriers supported by anti-tank guns. Following this, the 2/24th Battalion was to attack north-east to capture the area known as Fig Garden.

The advance of the 2/48th Battalion commenced at midnight on the 25th of October. Supported by timed artillery concentrations the battalion rapidly reached and cleared the intermediate objective. The mobile company then swept forward and under cover of the noise of the artillery reached and completely surprised a large enemy force on the spur. A short fierce hand-to-hand encounter followed and the spur was captured. While the 2/48th was exploiting, the 2/24th Battalion launched its attack at 040o hours.

After an advance of 800 yards enemy resistance became stubborn and the battalion had to fight its way through a series of strong posts before reaching its first objectives. Due to enemy resistance in the first advance, the timing of the infantry attack had fallen behind that of the artillery concentrations, but although without close artillery support, the two companies finally completed their advance and reached the Fig Garden. Although they were firmly holding their objective, both companies were subjected to intense fire from enemy posts on the flanks and shortly afterwards orders were received for their withdrawal to the area of the first objectives.

GERMAN REACTION.

The German reaction to the loss of Trig 29 and the valuable switch-line of the enemy defences to Fig Garden was violent. On the 26th of October he shelled 26th Brigade heavily while attacking 26th Brigade with tanks and infantry. A tank and infantry attack was driven off by 2/13th Battalion aided by artillery fire. The same battalion later reported great activity of tanks and lorried infantry and these made an excellent target for effective bombing and shelling.

The next day, the 27th of October, the enemy launched a strong attack with tanks and armoured troop carriers against the 2/13th Battalion. Enemy infantry attempted to dig in but were prevented from doing so and finally were driven off with the assistance of our supporting tanks. Later a heavy attack was mounted against the 2/17th Battalion positions but this too was repulsed and heavy losses were inflicted. The Axis command was making desperate efforts to retrieve the vital ground. On the 26th Brigade front simultaneous attacks were made against the 2/48th and 2/24th Battalions but after reaching our wire were driven back. Enemy counterattacks had been pressed with great determination and from observation of our fire, and the movement of enemy stretcher bearers and statements of prisoners, it is certain that he suffered very heavy casualties.

To appreciate conditions under which the Division was fighting it is necessary to visualize an undulating, hard., stony, gradually rising desert broken by occasional swells and low ridges. The only vegetation consists of a low, scrubby, prickly bush commonly known as Camel Thorn, which grows in the shallow, barren soil.

Distances between opposing defence lines were frequently thousands of yards and to advance without being observed during daylight was impossible. The smallest hump or declivity provides the site for a defence position. The so-called line of defence is really a series of small heavily manned strongpoints generally sited behind barbed wire entanglements and protected by individual minefield& Protecting the whole series of strongpoints which constitute the line are large, carefully sited and laid minefields frequently hundreds of yards in depth.

For the infantry to reach an objective it is often necessary to advance two or three thousand yards across open country before reaching the belt of minefields through which gape must be quickly prepared by sappers before tanks and vehicles carrying supporting weapons and consolidation stores can be moved forward and the advance continued finally to come to grips with the enemy. During the advance the attacking force is subject to all the concentrated fire power which a modern army can bring to bear. The task is not completed even when the objective is finally reached and taken. The attacking force must then be able to exploit through the area surrounding the position to clear the enemy from nearby points which may command or menace the ground taken.

The featureless terrain provides almost no landmarks. A burnt out vehicle, a rude stone cairn or the remains of a mud wall of an ancient Arab building, may constitute the only guiding points during an advance. To describe an objective in geographical terms is generally impossible. It is purely an objective-a pocket of enemy dug into the ground and strongly protected by weapons and mines.

Much of the credit for frustrating the desperate enemy counter-attacks must go to the artillery whose accurate concentrated fire plan rapidly smashed enemy concentrations preventing, their forming up to attack.

Overhead, the Luftwaffe was fast becoming a spent force. A few spasmodic raids were made along -the front but it was evident that the Axis Forces were not able to provide sufficient aerial support for direct co-operation with their ground attacks. Co-operation between Allied air and ground forces had been brought to a high pitch of efficiency. Calls for aerial support from commanders would bring bombers and fighter-bombers to harass the enemy positions and sap his morale. Overhead our fighters and bombers moved backwards and forwards ceaselessly in a systematic plan of blasting his defences and disrupting his organization.

A feature of the quick consolidation of captured positions was the speed with which protective minefields were sown thus preventing enemy tank penetration into the captured areas.

THRUSTS TO THE NORTH.

At this stage the Army Commander began to feel the need for more infantry and it was therefore decided that

(a) 152nd Highland Brigade would relieve 2oth Brigade which in turn would release 26th Brigade enabling it to stage a second attack northwards.

(b) The First South African Division would relieve the Second New Zealand Division allowing the latter to move into reserve.

(c) The Thirteenth Corps would cease attacking in the south, and hold the front as lightly as possible, thus releasing Seventh Armoured Division and as many infantry brigades as possible for the battle in the north.

On the night of the 26th/27th of October the reliefs by the 152nd Highland and the 20th Australian Brigades took place. The major object of the attack :was the cutting off and capture of a section of the enemy between the northern flank of Thirtieth Corps and the sea. The Ninth Division was to attack northward capturing the area including the main coast road, keeping pressure on the enemy, and opening up the tracks south of this area for more direct maintenance of the division. For the operation the division had under command British armour and New Zealand and British artillery and anti-tank guns.

The attack commenced before midnight on the 28th of October and by the early hours of the morning 2/13th and 2/i5th Battalions had gained and were holding their objective, but the 2/23rd Battalion, supported by tanks, had met strong and unexpected resistance shortly after crossing the start line. Although this was overcome the delay caused prevented the continuance of the plan that night, and the completion of the final phase was postponed until the following night and subsequently to the night of the 3oth/3 1st of October. The fighting had been hard and bloody, the attacking forces encountering extremely heavy small arms fire supported by intense artillery fire. During the following day the enemy sought to reduce our gains by launching counter-attacks with tanks and infantry but these were repulsed.

During the same period the "dog fight" was continuing to the west in an effort to secure a passage for the armoured divisions but no decisive result had been achieved.

The third northward attack by the Ninth Division took place on the night of the 30th/ 31st of October to complete the previous advance and to cut off the enemy by establishing a line northward to the coast. The advance commenced before midnight and the 2/32nd Battalion rapidly reached the area of the railway and main road. The 2/24th and 2/48th Battalions commenced their advance southeast while the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion attacked northward. Both attacks were pushed through with heavy casualties, but as they had not sufficient strength to hold the areas gained, the battalions withdrew to the area occupied by 2/32nd Battalion.

With the series of actions during the preceding days the enemy forces had been partially split and he had been forced to employ most of his reserves of German troops on the coastal sector as our advance was threatening to isolate portion of his forces. In desperate attempts to break our line attacks were launched from the north, north-west and west, but our positions were held. On the night of the 31st of October/1st of November 24th Brigade relieved 26th Brigade (less 2/23rd Battalion which remained under command of 24th Brigade) on the northern flank thus strengthening this flank, while 26th Brigade took over the 24th Brigade defences in the coastal sector.

The decision to effect this relief saved the flank and probably saved the battle, for even with these fresh units, great difficulty was experienced in maintaining this position against German counter-attacks of the next forty eight hours. One unit alone (the 2/43rd Battalion) took 147 casualties in maintaining its position in this area.

Violent German counter-attacks continued throughout the ist of November. The enemy repeatedly formed up and battered our positions with tanks and artillery, but again his frenzied attempts to regain the lost ground failed, although the division was suffering heavy casualties.

THE BREAK-THROUGH.

Meanwhile British Forces had advanced and the Army Commander decided to stage a further infantry attack finally to penetrate the enemy defences. The attack was made on the night of the 1st/2nd of November by two British brigades under command of the New Zealand Division, and by British armour. Throughout the day the battle of armour raged but gradually the tide was turning in our favour.

On the night of the 2nd of November all battalions Of 24th Brigade mounted strong raids against the enemy positions. The fighting was bitter and casualties were suffered by our own and enemy forces. Fourteen prisoners were taken. Our sharp return to the offensive came as an unexpected shock to the enemy.

By the 3rd of November the intense pressure against the hard pressed flank of the division began to case. On the night of the 3rd/4th of November the 5th Indian Brigade staged a successful attack and so finally forced a gap in the Axis defences. It is interesting to note that it was the 5th Indian Brigade who fought by the side of the Australian troops at the capture of Damascus in Syria, when with two battalions, it penetrated eight miles through the French defences to capture Mezze.

A break-through had been finally effected and on the 4th of November Tenth Armoured Corps passed through in pursuit of the Axis armies. On the same day Ninth Australian Cavalry Regiment with Australian Engineers assisting, cleared the road and tracks between the sea and the railway to the enemy defences in the west. That night the 24th Brigade established a line to the sea. On the following day carrier patrols and a mobile company of the 2/15th Battalion pushed out to Sidi Abd el Rahman where the last company of withdrawing Germans was captured.

This concluded twelve days of intensive fighting on the divisional front. The enemy resistance had been crushed and his efforts were now directed at extricating as much of his battered force as possible. His main defences had been broken and his armies were being rapidly swept back along the coastal road by the advancing tanks and guns of the Eighth Army. It was estimated that the Germans had now fewer than 70 of their original 270 tanks and the Italians had only 100 of the 290 previously operating. The long push that was ultimately to end in the capture of the whole of the Axis armies at the tip of the Tunisian Peninsula had now begun.

The importance of the divisional role in relation to that of the Eighth Army was based largely on the defensive strategy which it had been assumed that the enemy would, and in fact did, adopt. It was obvious that he meant to resist any advance along the coastal sector, and when the division attacked in the north at various stages of the battle, portions of each of the four German divisions comprising the Afrika Korps were concentrated to prevent a break-through. So effective had been the succession of assaults that he was forced to use the bulk of his effective reserves in countering them, and so great was the pressure against his northern front that he was unable to hold sufficient forces to protect his positions in the centre and to the south. The factor finally resulting in victory was the achievement of holding the position we had won on the right flank in spite of his insistent counter blows. Had the enemy regained his lost ground, the right flank of the Eighth Army would have been exposed, and Thirtieth Corps advancing to the west, unprotected on the northern flank.

Of this fighting the British official report on the Battle of Alamein states: "The Ninth Australian Division put up a magnificent effort. They fought themselves and the enemy to a standstill, till flesh and blood could stand no more. Then they went on fighting."

LAST AUSTRALIAN ACTION

This was the last action in which Australians fought in the Middle East, and it was fitting that the Ninth Division should participate in the final victory. Probably no other body of the Eighth Army was so well versed in desert warfare, and when the full history of Alamein is written, another splendid chapter will be added to the record of the A.I.F.

Early in 1941 the division had moved into Cyrenaica to complete its training, and had experienced the bitterness of having to make a long retreat in the face of the first advance of the Afrika Korps. From this had come the epic story of Tobruk; the story of an eight months' siege within the perimeter surrounding the most bombed town in North Africa; of a long and weary fight not only against the Axis but against the desolate forces of nature.

Eight months after their relief, they received the bitter news of the loss of the fortress and the advance of the panzer armies to the gates of Alexandria. A few days later they were rushed from their defensive positions in the mountains of northern Syria to Alamein in a last minute effort to stem the tide of the advancing enemy. After the successful actions of July came a lull in which British strength was built up for the final smashing blow three months later at Alamein.

To tell the full story would be to recount the achievements of the division and of the Eighth An-ny unit by unit, but the story of the achievements of one is the story of all, each within its respective sphere. The lessons of previous campaigns had been fully learned. The highly specialized war in the desert demonstrates clearly the functions of an army not of individual units, but as a composite and closely welded whole. Boundless, open, featureless country provides for the maximum of high speed, and fluid movement, and co-operation between various arms and services is of paramount importance in obtaining decisive results. Our forces became one smoothly cooperating unit which formed an efficient and deadly fighting machine.

An epilogue may be written in the words spoken by General Sir Harold Alexander, C.-in-C. Middle East, when on the 22nd of December he reviewed a divisional parade at Gaza in Palestine: "The battle of El Alamein will make history and you are in the proud position of having taken a major part in that great victory.

"Your reputation as fighters has always been famous, but I do not believe that you have ever fought with greater bravery or distinction than you did during that battle, when you broke the German and Italian armies in the western desert.

"Now you have added fresh lustre to your already illustrious name. Your losses have been heavy indeed but war is a hard and bloody affair, and great victories cannot be won without much sacrifice.

"The fortunes of war have turned in our favour. We have now the initiative and we will strike when and where we will. It is we who will choose the future battlegrounds and we will choose them where and when we can hit the enemy hardest. There is a hard and bitter struggle ahead before final victory. There is much hard fighting to be done, but wherever you may be, my thoughts will always go with you and I shall follow your fortunes with interest, and your successes with admiration. There is one thought I shall cherish above all others - under my command fought the Ninth Australian Division."

"VX15174"