Chapter 11 Campaign in Papua; Tropical Illusions; Niche for Sol

CAMPAIGN IN PAPUA

THE ENEMY.

When the Japanese have been driven, not only from New Guinea, but from all the islands north of Australia, and the threat of their power to endanger this country is for ever removed, lit will be possible to assess the Papuan campaign at its true worth.

The full story is one of high courage and human endurance; a story of unbelievably difficult conditions, of nerves and stamina strained to breaking point, of an enemy whose fanatical resistance was equalled only by his barbarism. It is a story of drama, but not of dramatics.

Much has been written of atrocities alleged to have been committed by the Japanese. Some of this was propaganda, but it has been established beyond doubt that the Japanese committed barbaric acts against our troops which brand them as the lowest order of savages. Evidence of specific cases of enemy atrocities exists, as does evidence of their barbarism. This is now being fully investigated officially.

Japanese savagery also manifested itself in the shooting of their own troops attempting to surrender, and the shooting of wounded who could not be evacuated. Japanese have posed as dead and have shot those of our men about to give honourable burial to the enemy dead.

To-day any history of this dour fight must be conditioned by very live considerations of censorship, and by the difficulty of fitting any unfinished work into its true perspective. There is, however, much that can be told now.

It was easy and understandable when the Japanese triumph was at its height, and when the threat to Australia was most grave and imminent, to regard the Japanese as a super soldier. Just so Europe regarded the German when Hitler's jack-booted legions stormed across prostrate countries to the Baltic Sea, the English Channel, and the Atlantic Ocean. Of the Japanese soldier it has been said, though not in these words, that he was the nearest thing in human form to a bush animal. That is very true. Coupled with treachery, quick cunning, and a standard of living lower than that of most domesticated animals was a slavish obedience to his superiors, an ability to withstand conditions that would appall a European, and an ideology which preferred death to surrender or capture.

But he was no superman and he was no match for Australian and American soldiers who could be trained, as he was, in the wiles and strategy of jungle warfare. If the Papuan campaign proved anything, it proved that.

PLAN TO TAKE MORESBY.

To recount this slight history of the campaign as concisely as possible, it is necessary to recapitulate, briefly, facts relevant to the commencement of hostilities. The enemy planned to capture Port Moresby by the third or fourth week in September 1942 with a triple offensive movement-from Milne Bay along the south-western coast, by naval assault of the south coast, and through the Owen Stanley Ranges.

Australians smashed the Japanese landing forces at Milne Bay, American naval forces had a decisive victory in the Coral Sea in May 1942, and the battle of the Owen Stanley Ranges followed by the battle of the beachheads completed the enemy debacle in Papua.

BATTLE FOR MILNE BAY

On the 24th of August 1942 the Milne Bay garrison consisted of two infantry brigades, one CALF. and the other, which had just arrived. A.I.F. In addition there were a few 1,2,e units. two squadrons of R.A.A.F. fighters 2n~ ;i detachment of R.A.A.F. bombers.

The garrison was commanded by Major General C. A. Clowes, who had assumed command on the 21st of August.

On the afternoon of the 24th of August, coast-watchers sighted seven Jap barges moving west of Porlock Harbour and on the morning of the 25th of August they were reported to have landed troops on the southwest coast of Goodenough Island. Our fighters took off in bad weather and during the afternoon destroyed all the barges drawn up on the beach. This left a party of about three or four hundred enemy marooned on the island to be dealt with later.

However, this was only portion of the enemy's force, for on the morning of the 25th of August a reconnaissance aircraft had sighted a fleet of nine vessels including warships steaming at full speed southwards. It soon became evident that the fleet was heading for Milne Bay and final preparations were made to defeat the attack.

JAPS LAND.

The enemy landed by barges on the north shore of Milne Bay near KB Mission in the early hours of the 26th of August. Our bombers attacked the enemy force during the landing operations and although they sank one ship and inflicted other damage, the majority of the Japs got ashore.

Two platoons of the 61st Battalion who were returning by ketch to Gili Gili from the north-east coast of Milne Bay, ran into a concentration of enemy landing barges about this time. Troops on the leading ketch opened fire and inflicted casualties on the enemy but their craft was soon sunk. The second ketch was able to escape in the darkness.

One company of the 61st Battalion at KB Mission was in action soon after the initial Jap landing and at dawn was still holding the enemy east of the Mission. The Japs had landed light tanks and one of these broke through our position during the night. It was immediately attacked with hand grenades and was forced to withdraw.

Next day another company of the 61st Battalion moved forward, and in the afternoon an attack by both companies, supported by artillery and aircraft, was launched. The attack made some progress but was eventually halted.

FIGHTERS ATTACK.

From dawn on the 26th of August and thereafter, our fighter aircraft were busy, ground strafing enemy concentrations, destroying enemy dumps and supporting our forward troops. The thick jungle prevented the pilots from observing enemy movements but it was evident that their attacks were both costly and demoralizing to the Japs.

A further enemy convoy of about six ships landed more troops and supplies on the night of the 26th/27th of August and towards dawn our troops were pushed back to Rabi, about one and a half miles west of KB Mission. At dawn, however, the enemy withdrew eastward and the 2/10th Battalion moved forward to KB Mission which was reached late that afternoon without opposition.

The enemy heavily attacked the2/10th Battalion with tanks, equipped with brilliant headlamps, on the night of the 27th/z8th of August. The battalion held for about two hours until the Japanese, using their tanks as a spearhead, forced their way down the track, cutting the battalion in two. Our troops withdrew to the rear of No- 3 Strip, where Brigadier J. Field, with the 25th and 61st Battalions, had organized a strong defensive position. Driving on to this strip the Japs were halted by the murderous belt of fire put down by the two battalions. Several attacks were made on our position, but all were held at great cost to the enemy, and by nightfall of the 28th of August, the position remained unchanged. Great credit is due to the 25th and 61st Battalions for their steadiness and coolness in their first action. At no time did the enemy appear to get the better of them.

A third enemy naval force arrived in Milne Bay on the night of the 29th/30th of August. Although some of our positions were shelled it is not clear whether more troops were landed. On the 30th of August, patrols from the 61st Battalion moved forward from No. 3 Strip, reaching KB Mission. During that night the enemy again attacked No. 3 Strip, again without success.

WE ADVANCE.

Brigadier G. F. Wootten now commenced our advance by pushing the 2/12th Battalion east towards KB Mission on the morning of the 31st of August. Overcoming considerable opposition with much hand-to-hand fighting, the battalion surged forward and reached KB Mission by afternoon and took up positions for the night. A strong enemy counter-attack on the rear companies of the 2/I2th Battalion which had been reinforced by a company of the 2/9th Battalion, was driven off in the early hours of the following morning and during that day our forces consolidated their positions.

The advance continued against stiffening opposition on the 2nd of September and about one thousand yards were gained. That night more enemy warships arrived in Milne Bay but they took no apparent offensive action. During the night the 2/12th Battalion repulsed further strong counter attacks.

The 2/9th Battalion now moved forward through the 2/I2th Battalion and on the 3rd of September launched a strong attack with artillery and air support. The opposition held until late afternoon, when our troops smashed through to gain a further six hundred yards, and on the following day fought their way past Gorom, two miles cast of KB Mission. On the 5th of September Waga Waga was reached and the main enemy opposition encountered. Our attack was held.

Enemy warships were in Milne Bay during the night of the 3rd/4th of September, and again on the night of the 5th/6th of September when, it is believed, elements of the Jap force were embarked. From this time all strong enemy resistance ceased, and on the 6th of September the 2/9th Battalion pushed forward, capturing considerable enemy store dumps but striking no organized opposition.

One of our supply ships was sunk at Gili Gili wharf, and our positions shelled by enemy naval forces in Milne Bay on the night of the 7th/8th of September. This was, however, the last appearance of the Jap Navy in the area and was probably intended as a parting gesture.

END OF CAMPAIGN.

For weeks afterwards scattered parties of Japs roamed the hills on the north arm of Milne Bay, living on the country and attempting to avoid our patrols. These parties were apparently trying to reach their forces at Buna, but the majority was either killed or captured by our patrols, or died of starvation and exposure.

It is difficult to estimate the enemy casualties in this campaign but at a conservative figure more than seven hundred Japs were killed by our ground action. To this must be added the wounded who apparently embarked on the night of the 5th/6th of September and the casualties, reported to exceed three hundred, inflicted in the sinking of the Jap troopship by air action on the 26th of August.

What was far more important was that the enemy attack on Milne Bay, first phase of the plan to take Papua, was utterly smashed, and left the enemy without the convenient air base from which he could support his attack on Port Moresby.

FIRST C.M.F. ACTION.

This campaign was the first occasion on which C.M.F. troops had gone into action. They acquitted themselves brilliantly and their fighting bore the mark of sound leadership and careful training. The
A.I.F. troops engaged were veterans of the Western Desert, and they adapted themselves to jungle fighting with the same skill and dash as they had shown in the Middle East. It was a hard fight but the issue was never in doubt.

THE BATTLE OF THE RANGES

JAPS MOVE, JULY, 1942.

Before the Coral Sea battle, the Australian garrison in Port Moresby was a solitary infantry brigade. This was augmented by another brigade after the battle. The principal object of the defenders at that time was the protection of Port Moresby. Little if any consideration was given to defending the Papuan north coast. The Owen Stanley Ranges, it was considered, offered an impassable barrier to large numbers of troops.

Japan's first step in the move to take Port Moresby through the Owen Stanley Ranges was in July 1942 when troops landed in the Gona-Buna area. Immediate action was necessary to arrest infiltration towards Moresby. First one and later a second company of the 39th Battalion was sent over the range to the Kokoda area. The Japs advanced in strength, employing all the tactics of bushcraft and cunning that had characterized their earlier land battles. They moved on towards Kokoda.

Meanwhile an A.I.F. infantry brigade commanded by Brigadier A. W. Potts had arrived at Port Moresby, and was sent forthwith to reinforce the for-ward troops. But the reinforcing brigade was unable to advance as a whole and, attacking desperately in units, was overrun and thrown back. The Japanese moved on relentlessly.

Then in August, Headquarters First Australian Corps, under command of Lieut.-General Rowell, moved to New Guinea. Lieut. General Rowell assumed control of operations on the 15th of August.

JAPS HALTED.

At Ioribaiwa, only forty air miles from Port Moresby, the enemy was brought to a halt by another A.I.F. brigade commanded by Brigadier K. W. Eather who, after effecting a highly successful ambush, took up a strong position on Imita Ridge. The enemy, now that his advance was halted, commenced feverishly to construct elaborate and extensive positions on the southern slopes of Ioribaiwa Ridge, considerably hampered by our active and aggressive patrols.

Here ended the second phase of the Papuan campaign with the September days quickly passing.

ALLIES TAKE OFFENSIVE

BLAMEY IN COMMAND

General Blamey in command, 23rd September, 1942. The Allied Forces in New Guinea abandoned their defensive role on the 23rd of September, when General Sir Thomas Blarney assumed personal command of the combined land forces. It was obvious to him that the limited capacity to supply forces over the roadless Owen Stanley Ranges would make it impossible to develop sufficient strength by this route to defeat the Japs. The difficulties of moving large bodies of troops over a roadless jungle country forced other means. With Brigadier-General Walker, commanding Fifth Air Force temporarily in the absence of General Whitehead, he immediately explored the possibility of using air transport to bring forces on to the enemy's southern flank.

The first experiment was the flight of the 2/10th Australian Battalion from Milne Bay to Wanigela, a hop of about one hundred and twenty miles. It was completely successful and remained secret from the Japs for a long time. It was a bold stroke; the beginning of the master plan. From this beginning the close cooperation of Land and Air Force was to be developed to a degree of co-operation in movement and in supply that has been an outstanding feature in this unusual campaign.

By this means the American forces were brought on to the left flank of the Japanese at the same time as the Australian troops were prepared to attack his front and right, after their arduous mountain campaign.

It was shortly after, on the ist of October, that Lieut.-General E. F. Herring was placed in command of the forces taking part in the ground operations. General Sir Thomas Blamey remained in command of all the combined land forces.

Direction of the combined scheme was retained by General MacArthur who later moved his headquarters to New Guinea for this purpose. Lieut.-General Kenney of the U.S. Forces took command of the Allied Air Force.

ALLIES STRIKE BACK.

Two days after General Sir Thomas Blarney assumed command, the Allied Forces struck back at the Japs. The offensive was a limited one, planned beforehand by Major-General A. S. Allen, but was *incorporated in the general offensive plan. Previously our patrols had been thrusting forward north of the Imita Range, scanning the terrain and probing the enemy's considerable defences.

Although our men had reduced by one-fifth the enemy forces that swarmed over the Owen Stanley Ranges, they were still outnumbered, even with reinforcements of A.I.F. men, trained in jungle warfare. But compensation lay in the knowledge that the enemy for the first time was feeling the effects of disease, and was hampered by long lines of communication and scant supplies. Up to this stage the advantages in communications had been markedly in his favour. He had brought native carriers from Rabaul, coolies from territories adjoining Japan, and was able to use pack-animals in a way denied to us.

It was evident that the Japanese had had no thought of being displaced from the strong and In many cases elaborate positions they had constructed on the ridge. They were entrenched in depth with defences guarded by barricades of tree trunks and alarm devices. On the eastern side of the ridge, positions had been dug in a fairly thin line until the creek was crossed. Here they thickened considerably, stretching to the south and covering the full length of the watercourse.

One-man pits were common and platforms about fourteen feet by sixteen feet had been cut into the hillside among them, apparently for sleeping accommodation although they were sited with the general defence plan. Tracks linked pits together but heavy overhead timbering prevented observation from the air. A bush fence four feet high was erected across the area. Outside was an alarm wire about ankle high with meat tins attached at five-feet intervals.

On either side of the track on the razor-like ridge along which runs the pass to Nauro were fairly comfortable living quarters. These were cut into the sides of the ridges and averaged about sixteen feet by nine feet. The floors ,Nere of barked bush poles, and the framework and superstructure of small timber lashed with vines, wire or rope. Most of these dug-outs were fitted with shelves and stands made of bush timber and had ample head room for small men. Skillion roofs, running back into the hills were covered with bush leaves and pieces of Australian tent canvas. In short, a naturally strong position had been so improved and camouflaged as to seem almost impregnable.

ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

To the curtain of machine-gun, mountain-gun and mortar fire which they raised on our advancing troops, the Japanese may well have thought there was no answer. This time, however we had a it secret" weapon. Two 25-pounder field-guns dismantled and manhandled up the track from Port Moresby, poured nearly seven hundred rounds into the enemy. The wild screaming and yelling from the enemy positions bore adequate testimony to the accuracy of the fire, coolly directed by an observation officer only three hundred yards from the target area.

It is pertinent here to pay tribute to the work of the artillerymen whose efforts in getting those guns up the oozing, tangled, backbreaking ranges was a highlight in a campaign marked by the mastery of the impossible.

JAPS FALL BACK

27th SEPTEMBER, 1942. On the 25th of September fighting patrols from the 2/25th Battalion penetrated the enemy's defences in the neighbourhood of the main track, and on the 27th of September our troops commenced their offensive. The 2/25th Battalion attacked frontally while the 2/3ist and 2/33rd Battalions carried out outflanking moves and after severe fighting drove the Jap from Ioribaiwa Ridge. The enemy retreat had begun. Down the track they had ascended so confidently the Japs retreated, refusing to give battle.

Stores and equipment, even his unburied dead, were abandoned by the fleeing enemy. Our attack was now part of the general offensive and became a drive on Kokoda and from there to the north coast. Our troops pressed on, regaining Nauro, Menari, Efogi, Myola and Kagi.

Our forces were fighting in appalling conditions. The rarefied air at six thousand feet dragged at their lungs; their feet were as lead in the morass resulting from incessant tropical rain. But the enemy was in worst plight. Buna, his base, was constantly bombed; his supply organization was disrupted by bombing and strafing. His dead lay along the track in scores. Enemy troops were starving, were dropping with dysentery, and were dying of malnutrition. Evidence showed that many Japanese had eaten roots, grass and jungle fruits and berries, some of which were poisonous and were given them by natives they had impressed into service.

Natives, too, were dying. The Japs were looting their food, bayoneting them and carrying off their women.

As the Japanese neared their base, food difficulties eased, while our supply lines lengthened across the most difficult country in which Australian troops had fought hitherto in this war. Supply problems were relieved when food, ammunition and medical stores were dropped from the air. An attempt was made to land planes at Myola and a few of the more badly wounded, hitherto carried by native porters in the most extreme discomfort, were taken out quickly and comfortably by this means. For other wounded it was necessary to use ten carriers to lift a single stretcher along parts of the nightmare track.

KOKODA-FIRST OBJECTIVE.

Because of its strategic position and its useful aerodrome, Kokoda was named as the first major objective in the offensive. With a strong Japanese force concentrated there, stiff resistance was expected. At Templeton's Crossing south of Kokoda, that expectation was realized, the enemy fighting bitterly and stubbornly. Our losses were heavy, his heavier.

The enemy had established himself on both sides of the wide Eora Creek Valley in three main defensive localities. These were highly developed, consisting of numbers of mutually supporting localities generally placed on crests and well sited to command all approaches.

BATTLE OF TEMPLETON'S CROSSING.

On the 15th of October, the 2/25th Battalion again assaulted frontally while the 2/33rd and 3rd Battalions carried out outflanking attacks. The 3rd Battalion succeeded in cutting the main track in rear of the advanced enemy locality, and this, combined with continued pressure from the other two battalions, forced the Jap to evacuate his positions in front of the 2/25th Battalion with heavy losses.

On the 18th of October the second enemy locality was attacked but held firm in the face of repeated and bitter assaults. Two days later Brigadier J. E. Lloyd, with a fresh A.I.F. brigade, took over the fight.

Taking a leaf from our book the enemy had brought up 37-mm. and 75-mm. guns, using them for the first time in this area in the battle for Eora village. The fighting there was bloody and exhausting. The Japanese now at bay were not the hungry, under-nourished troops forced out of the mountains. They were physically fit and well armed, supported by an easy supply line through hospitable country.

Enemy defences in the country beyond Eora included light artillery and cleverly placed snipers, hard to dislodge. To bring forward the 25-pounders which smashed the Japs at Ioribaiwa was physically impossible. Our only counter to the Japanese artillery was the light mortar and air attack.

In spite of appalling losses the enemy held his positions until on the 22nd of October the 2/2nd Battalion got to close grips with the bayonet and annihilated the defenders.

The enemy's last position Just north of Alola finally fell to the 2/ist and 2/3rd Battalions after several days' hard fighting and by the 3oth of October Alola was in our hands and the Japs were again in retreat.

Major-General G. A. Vasey, who had now assumed command of the attacking forces, pressed on the advance with great vigour, one brigade making for Kokoda whilst the other brigade pressed on to Oivi by an easterly track.

KOKODA OCCUPIED.

On the 2nd of November Kokoda fell without opposition and within twenty-four hours the airfield was ready for the landing of the first transport planes. Ammunition supplies and even jeeps were brought in by air, relieving the acute supply problem.

Meanwhile on the 4th of November the 2/3rd Battalion had struck opposition at Oivi hill. The enemy held this area in great depth with his forward localities at Oivi and his rear defences just south of Gorari. The Japs used many machine-guns and mortars with a stiffening of mountain guns to increase their fire power and for a time our advance was halted.

BATTLE OF OIVI-GORARI.

The 2/1st Battalion was despatched on the 6th of November to carry out an encircling move to the south, and then cut the track near Gorari. Next day the brigade from Kokoda moved forward on the same mission.

Until the 10th of November the fight raged with our troops making limited advances with great cost to each side. That day the enemy at Oivi broke in the face of our attacks and scattered northwards, while at Gorari a determined bayonet attack annihilated the last enemy resistance.

Their withdrawal had now turned into a rout, and the enemy east of the Kumusi River now ceased to exist as an effective fighting force.

Enemy casualties were heavy, known losses being five officers and five hundred other ranks killed, while two mountain guns and large numbers of small arms weapons and ammunition fell into our hands.

ADVANCE TO WAIROPE.

Our forces pressed on to Wairope on the Kumusi River, eliminating minor enemy opposition at Illimo without difficulty. Wairope is the native pronunciation of "wire rope" and originally the river had been spanned at this point by a wire rope bridge. Allied bombing had demolished the bridge some time previously, and our troops were now faced with the problem of crossing a swiftly flowing unfordable river more than three hundred feet wide.

Strangely enough, the Japanese failed to hold the eastern bank and in the first few hours twenty strong swimmers crossed and established a patrol on the far side. Engineers immediately commenced to construct new bridges, using materials from the old site and stores dropped by our aircraft. Eventually three flying-foxes and two wire-rope bridges were in operation.

On the 16th of November, one brigade was across and advancing on Gona, while twenty-four hours later the second brigade was over the river and moving towards Sanananda.

By now the remnants of the Jap force were in full retreat, the bulk retreating towards Buna and Gona with scattered bands attempting to escape down the Kumusi River towards its mouth.

Our forces pressed on, and the 2/3 ist Battalion on the west entered Gona village on the 2oth of November. However, the speed of our advance and unbelievably bad flying weather prevented supplies arriving and, what was more important, ammunition from reaching the forward troops, and the 2/3ist Battalion was forced to withdraw. The brigade then took up a position two miles south of Gona.

On the east our forces overcame opposition at Soputa and were finally held up on the Sanananda track about three miles north of that village.

THE BATTLES FOR THE BEACH-HEADS

It has been convenient to divide the Papuan campaign into three phases. The first phase ended when the enemy was smashed in Milne Bay. The second ended when the Japanese advance over the Owen Stanley Ranges was stopped forty miles from Moresby, and an A.I.F. division comprising two A.I.F. infantry brigade and two C.M.F. battalions drove the enemy from the ranges, overcame country that must be seen to be believed, forced him from seeming secure positions Along Eora Creek, smashed him at Olvi and Gorari, and drove him in confusion toward the coast.

BUNA-SANANANDA-GONA.

The third and final phase covered the fighting for the enemy, beach-heads at Buna, Sanananda and Gona, this phase began on the 20th of November and continued until the 22nd of January it called for the highest qualities of leadership, for courage to equal the fanatical ardour of the Japanese, for complete Allied co-operation on land and in the air, and for a strategy which aimed a direct blow at the heart of the Japanese resistance.

General Sir Thomas Blamey had realized all these things. He personally surveyed the country over which Allied troops must fight. He had evolved a comprehensive, far-seeing, forceful plan, which embraced full use of American troops, and the transport, by air and with the utmost secrecy, of Australian troops for the first time in Australian military history. He provided for the use of carriers and tanks and for increased artillery firepower. He charged Lieut.-General E. F. Herring with the responsibility to carry out the plan. To this plan General MacArthur had given his blessing.

On the 28th of November Lieut.-General Herring, established his advanced headquarters at Popondetta to control the operations. On the 17th of December he transferred his head-quarters to Dobodura where he was later joined by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major-General F. H. Berryman, who acted as his chief of staff.

While an Australian division was pressing forward from the Kumusi towards Sanananda and Gona, elements of an American division commanded by Major-General Harding had been directed on Buna from the south. It had arrived in two ways. One battalion had marched around the south-east shoulder of the Owen Stanley Ranges, and the others had flown to various landing strips on the north side of New Guinea, and had either marched or been transported by water to Mendaropu, twenty miles south-east of Buna. From here they pressed forward to the beach-heads, encountering at first no opposition.

But the enemy was waiting at his beachheads with cunningly prepared defences which he regarded as impregnable.

DIFFICULT TERRAIN.

To understand the stages of the battle for the beach-heads it is necessary to know something of the terrain close to the coast where the enemy made his stand. Because of it, the struggle developed into what were virtually three separate battles. First there was the battle for Buna. This was double-pointed because of the two lines of approach. one along the coast, and one by a corduroy road from the south that led through swamps to the Government Gardens and the Buna Mission.

Impenetrable swamps varying in depth with the tides lay between these two approaches for more than a mile, effectively isolating one from the other.

West from Buna more swamps and the Girua River separate the approaches to Buna and Sanananda. Across the Girua River a narrow sand strip, not more than a few yards wide in places, runs along the coast to Giruwa and Sanananda Point. Inland from the strip is more difficult sago country. From Sanananda Point an inland road runs past Soputa to and beyond Popondetta. For two miles through the sago swamps it is corduroy; thereafter it is built on a sandy strip, flanked by swamps.

It was on this sandy strip where the road joins a track to Cape Killerton that the Japanese built their defences to protect Sanananda beach-head. Here a second battle, distinct from that of Buna, was fought.

To the west, across more swamps actively affected by rains and tides lay Gona. When our troops first approached Gona they said the march across this swamp area was the hardest going they had encountered. From men who had traversed the ranges this was saying something! Because of the swamps the battle for Gona in its turn involved a third battle distinct from those for Buna and Sanananda.

The Japanese sited their defences to cover each of the two approaches to Buna, the approach to Sanananda, and to safeguard Gona which controlled the bay where their troops were landed. At each of these places they showed complete tactical skill in the disposition and lay-out of their fortifications, and when our troops approached they were confronted by defences cleverly prepared and manned by an enemy ready and determined to fight till every man was killed.

Until late in December when United States P.T. boats came to our aid, the Japanese moved men and stores in their landing craft up and down the coast by night. Our Air Force had virtually stopped barge traffic by day nearly a month before.

Japanese attempts during October and November to reinforce their troops pinned down in the Buna-Gona area proved a costly failure. Of the three warships employed, one light cruiser and a destroyer were sunk and the other destroyer was possibly damaged. The movements of these warships south of Gasmata had been reported by our reconnaissance planes and as the convoy approached the coast it was closely shadowed. On the night of the 19th/2oth of November our heavy bombers attacked the enemy ships. The light cruiser was left in flames after repeated heavy explosions on board, while the destroyer split amidships and sank. Many small boats ferrying men were strafed and many Japanese were killed.

On the 2oth of November contact was made on the whole front. On the extreme right U.S. troops were engaged on the coastal road just south of the new Buna airfield while on the approach to Buna Mission along the road leading to the Government Gardens more Americans were in action. On the far side of the Girua River on the Sanananda track was Seventh Australian Division with a small U.S. force under command and on the extreme left, another A.I.F. brigade with a C.M.F. battalion containing Gona.

THE BATTLE FOR BUNA

U.S. FORCES IN ACTION.

The battle for Buna commenced when U.S. troops made contact on the left near Ango and on the right about four thousand yards south of Cape Endaiadere. This was the first time these troops had been in action. The troops on the right later became known as the Warren Force, those on the left as the Urbana Force.

Two battalions attacked with artillery support on the 24th of November, but were held by heavy machine-gun fire and wire. During the next few days further attacks were launched with some success until on the 6th of December a detachment of one of the U.S. battalions reached the coast east of Buna village and successfully repulsed several subsequent counter-attacks. The other U.S. battalion by this time had reached Entrance Creek. Here U.S. troops were finally halted and could make no further advance against the strong enemy opposition.

On the east, U.S. troops pushed for-ward until they were halted on the southern edge of the New Strip, a dummy aerodrome which had been constructed by the Japs some time previously.

Many attacks were launched by our troops but the enemy held his strongly constructed bunker positions and no further gain was made.

At this stage Lieut.-General Eichelberger, a U.S. Commander, arrived in the area with his staff and took over command of the forces east of the Girua River, under Lieut.-General Herring. Brigadier-General Waldron took over command of the U.S. troops but he was wounded almost immediately and his successor, Brigadier-General Byers, suffered the same fate a few days later. From then on Lieut.-General Eichelberger personally controlled the U.S. forces.

It was now apparent that a deadlock had been reached, and General Sir Thomas Blarney decided to concentrate his reserves on the Buna-Cape Endaiadere front, and to strike strongly at the enemy in that sector, while holding the Jap with minimum forces in the Sanananda track area.

An A.I.F. brigade was brought by sea from Milne Bay and together with tanks was landed in the Oro Bay-Hariko area, while a fresh U.S. regiment was flown from Port Moresby to Popondetta and Dobodura airfields.

On the 11th of December a battalion of a new U.S. regiment commenced to relieve other U.S. troops, and on the 14th of December launched a strong attack against Buna village. The attack was pressed with great vigour, and by nightfall the village was in our hands with the surviving enemy retreating to Buna Mission.

Meanwhile the fresh A.I.F. brigade was landing on the east coast and its commander, Brigadier G. F. Wootten was given command of Warren Force on the 17th of December.

CAPE ENDAIADERE FALLS.

On the 18th of December the 2/9th Battalion with eight tanks of the 2/6th Armoured Regiment began the attack against the enemy positions north of Cape Endaiadere. Moving forward with the greatest risk on a limited front they smashed through the enemy resistance, which had held up all attempts to advance for several weeks, and by noon had reached Cape Endaiadere. Here the 2/9th Battalion turned west towards Buna Mission. Casualties both to men and tanks were heavy, but despite this, the initial momentum of the attack was never lost, The advance made on this day was a magnificent piece of work, overcoming as it did strong enemy pillboxes mutually supporting and carefully concealed.

American troops followed up the attack, mopping up as they went, and in the latter stages, when a nest of bunkers at the east end of the New Strip held them up, the tanks turned back to help in overcoming this resistance.

The 2/9th Battalion fought magnificently during the next three days, moving west from Cape Endaiadere. By the evening of the fourth day it had cleared the whole area north and east of Simemi Creek, a poisonous stream little better than a brackish swamp and varying in depth with the tides and the inland rainfall.

Meanwhile our forces following on were by the 2oth of December attempting to cross

Simemi Creek in the face of stubborn resistance from the far bank.

On the night of the 21st of December the 2/10th Battalion, under cover of a feint attack at the creek mouth, managed to establish a bridgehead, pushing a strong patrol across through thick undergrowth and nine feet of water.

The bridgehead thus established had the most important bearing on movement across the bridge connecting the Old and New Strips. Enemy pillboxes covered the approaches to this bridge and had been holding up all forward movement. But with the establishment of the bridgehead in rear of this enemy position, the Japs vacated their pillboxes without further fighting and the lower end of the Old Strip was occupied by the 2/10th Battalion and a U.S. unit. The bridge was quickly repaired and strengthened and the four remaining tanks were brought across.

The 2/10th Battalion with one U.S. battalion, and later a second U.S. battalion, and artillery support, continued to fight over open ground up the Old Strip against a withering fire from pillboxes and numerous tank attack guns sighted down the clear ground. The infantry worked their way forward despite the opposition. The tanks had been knocked out early, and the only support to the infantry was a 25-pounder which was brought up near the bridge over Simemi Creel~ and fired at enemy positions at pointblank range.

NORTH COAST REACHED.

Further advance was again held up at the end of the Old Strip where dispersal bays afforded very adequate defensive positions for the enemy. But towards the end of December the 2/12th Battalion was brought in.

On New Year's Day this fresh battalion, with two tanks, attacked towards the coast on a narrow front. The fighting was again hard and casualties heavy, but by evening the coast had been reached and the area thus gained consolidated. The following day scattered remnants of the enemy were mopped up and contact was made with Urbana Force, which had been operating further west.

BUNA MISSION FALLS.

Urbana Force, which had already taken Buna village on the 14th of December, had as its next objective Buna Mission further to the east. But a very strongly defended locality known as the Triangle, south of Bunn Mission, resisted all attempts to overrun it. Eventually, however, it was by-passed by one U.S. battalion which crossed Entrance' Creek and formed a bridgehead while another U.S. battalion moved over. Some heavy fighting followed and the line was pushed forward inch by inch.

The Triangle fell to U.S. troops on the 28th of December, and on the following day more U.S. forces drove northwards to the sea, isolating Buna Mission.

On the 2nd of January the final attack on Buna Mission began from the south-east. Companies from two U.S. regiments pushed forward slowly, suffering severely from crossfire from enemy bunkers but making steady progress. The Jap resistance was overrun in the final assault, and one U.S. battalion turned west and drove through to Giropa Point where contact was made with the 2/12th Battalion.

All enemy resistance east of Buna was now at an end and the stage was set for the capture of Sanananda. The U.S. battalions had fought hard and well in their first encounter, and while some commenced to garrison the newly captured area, others moved westward along the coast from Buna to eliminate the enemy forces still left between Buna and Sanananda.

For the A.I.F. battalions and the tanks of the 2/6th Armoured Regiment there was a new task, the fight for Sanananda.

COMPLETION OF OPERATIONS.

Following our partially successful attack on the 7th of December our patrols continually harassed and pressed the enemy but no material progress resulted. However an easier and more secure route was found to the road block now named Huggens after the American commander who originally established it. About the middle of December the 2/7th Australian Cavalry Regiment and the 36th Battalion were flown in to strengthen our attacking forces.

On the 18th of December the 2 /7th Cavalry Regiment moved up to the Huggens road block, and then attacked northwards along the Sanananda track. It was the regiment's first battle action and, fighting as infantry, it pushed for-ward some distance before it was finally halted by more strong enemy positions. Further south a determined attack by the 36th Battalion was also repulsed and the position was once again static.

By the 22nd of December, the 39th Battalion, fresh from its successes in the Amboga River mouth area arrived at the Sanananda track together with the brigade headquarters from Gona, and moved to reinforce Huggens road block.

At this stage our own and enemy forces were disposed along either side of the Sanananda track with our southern brigade about three miles north of Soputa. Immediately north of these troops was a strong enemy defensive area and north again of the Japs was our road block position. Further enemy positions stretched from north of the road block to the coast. Offensive action by the southern brigade now cleared the east side of the track as far north as the road block but the main Jap positions still remained.

By late December it became apparent that the battle for Buna was nearly won and preparations to finish the Sanananda operations were commenced. A fresh U.S. regiment arrived on the ist of January and a regrouping of our forces then took place. This U.S. regiment took over the Huggens road block position from 2/7th Cavalry Regiment and 39th Battalion who moved back to relieve the 36th and 55/53rd Battalions who in turn were despatched to Gona to relieve the A.I.F. brigade which had taken Gona on the 8th of December.

The A.I.F. brigade which had taken a prominent part in the Buna operations also moved overland with four tanks of the 2/6th Armoured Regiment.

Our plan was for the A.I.F. brigade to smash the enemy locality south of the road block by a direct assault supported by aerial bombardment, artillery and tanks, and then to push northwards up the Cape Killerton track and attack the rear enemy positions of Sanananda Point from the west flank. The U.S. regiment was to push forward along the Sanananda track from the road block and eventually link up with the A.I.F. brigade.

On the 12th of January 1943, after a heavy artillery programme, the A.I.F. brigade commenced its attack. The thick jungle and soggy ground limited the movement of the tanks to the track, where they were subjected to heavy fire, and were all eventually knocked out.

Our infantry was held by the stubborn Jap defence and by nightfall a few enemy positions had been captured. We had, however, succeeded in almost encircling the enemy south of the road block, and next day we subjected this locality to an extremely heavy artillery and mortar bombardment.

The scale of the bombardment was too much for the Jap and he made an abortive attempt to evacuate his position on the night of the 13th/14th of January, an attempt which resulted in the destruction of the greater part of the withdrawing force.

At the same time a composite U.S. force was advancing westward from Buna to seize Giruwa which was believed to be the eastern flank of the Japs' main defensive system.

Following the capture of Buna, General MacArthur and General Sir Thomas Blarney returned to Australia and Lieut.-General Herring returned to Port Moresby, leaving Lieut.-General Eichelberger to conduct operations in the forward area with Major-General Berryman as his chief of staff. Major-General Vasey retained immediate command of the force operating along the Sanananda road.

On the 14th of January the brigade drove north to the coast. The 2/10th Battalion reached the coast east of Cape Killerton and then pushed east until it was halted near Wye Point, midway between Cape Killerton and Sanananda Point. The 2/12th Battalion cut across country reaching the main Sanananda track about one thousand yards south of the coast. It then turned north and attacked strongly up the track, taking locality after locality.

Meanwhile the 2/9th Battalion moved east towards the main track, and then north towards the coast on a line parallel to the main Sanananda track. Despite this difficult and arduous approach made through swamp, jungle and kunai, the battalion had driven in and taken Sanananda before noon, a magnificent achievement. Part of the battalion then moved west to assist the 2/10th Battalion coming down towards Wye Point, and part attacked south along the track to meet the 2/I2th Battalion which was coming up the main Sanananda track towards the sea. Patrols of the 2/9th Battalion also moved east towards Giruwa to make contact with the U.S. forces.

At the same time U.S. forces were heavily engaging the enemy, attacking northwards from the road block, while other U.S. troops completed mopping up south of that position. The whole force then concentrated its strength on the main enemy positions north of the road block and moved for-ward slowly and methodically, dealing heavy blows at the Jap defences and smashing pillbox after pillbox.

Another composite U.S. force was advancing westward from Buna. Enemy positions at Tarakena retarded it for a time but Colonel Howe, the commander, who had now assumed personal command, brought up 37-mm guns loaded with canister shot and blasted the Japs from his front. Further opposition was eliminated south of Giruwa and on the 21st of January contact was made with patrols of the 2/9th Battalion at Giruwa.

There now remained only isolated bands of enemy, either attempting to escape or surrounded and fighting for their lives.

All organized resistance ceased on the 22nd of January and the battle of the beach-heads was at an end.

It must not be thought that victory was won by other than hard, sustained fighting. The record of the 18th Australian Infantry Brigade, 2/9th, 2/10th, and 2/I2th Battalions, is typical of other brigades. The Buna and Sanananda fronts had been relatively static, but the arrival of this brigade imparted such an impetus to the attack and unleashed such pressure that enemy resistance was crushed. In five weeks' continuous fighting in swamp and fetid jungle this brigade lost ninety-six per cent of its strength through sickness, hardship and battle, absorbed one thousand reinforcements, and maintained continuous offensive power culminating in the brilliant capture of Sanananda. To achieve such results after losing practically one hundred per cent of its original strength is a record worthy of both the First and Second A.I.F. and one unsurpassed in the annals of war.

UNITS IN ACTION.

Many units played their part in the struggle-C.M.F. battalions, most of them inexperienced but to prove their worth when the time came; American battalions, also new to war but with the will to win, and A.I.F. units, veterans of the Middle East, proud of their traditions, determined and confident. With the infantry fought tanks and artillery. Supporting our attacks the Air Force protected our installations and smashed enemy convoys.

SUPPLY.

It is natural to think first of the efforts of the fighting forces, but it must not be forgotten that there was a vast organization to supply and care for them, and that the advance of for-ward troops was possible because supplies of food, ammunition and equipment were always available. An important if unspectacular link in the chain of supply was that of Ordnance. Climatic conditions had produced many problems in the servicing and maintenance of ordnance stores. But the work was done and a steady flow of essential equipment and ammunition was maintained to the forward troops.

Supply of front line units was a huge problem, which increased as lines of communication were extended. But the difficulties were overcome, partly by the use of native carriers, and partly by the use of more aircraft than had hitherto been envisaged in this theatre of war. Supply by air was always exceedingly hazardous. The planes had to contend with the treacherous weather over the Owen Stanleys, and supply-dropping grounds along the overland track were difficult to find and often weather bound. Despite this, supplies of all kinds were kept up. Later, in the coastal area, supplies were landed on quickly developed 'dromes in amazing quantities, to be carried forward by jeeps along the few tracks negotiable to that ubiquitous vehicle, and then forward by lines of native carriers.

The calls made on the supply resources were tremendous. They were working day and night and were called on to perform miracles.

COASTAL SUPPLY.

An organization was rapidly developed for a particular need-the co-ordination of base and supply activities of both U.S. Army and Air Force and the Australian Army. The supply of troops along the nor-them coast of New Guinea and at Buna soon became an urgent task. Details of the activities of this organization, however, may not be revealed for security reasons.

SIGNALS. Maintenance of channels of communication is of the utmost importance in any operations. This was true of the fighting over the Owen Stanleys and in the coastal belt around Buna. To maintain contact with advanced troops was essential in jungle country, for there was no other means of knowing how they were moving-the jungle and the terrain made observation impossible.

For all arms there were peculiar problems to be overcome. This was so for the signallers. They had to maintain existing communications, and had continually to be opening new channels. It necessitated working round the clock. But the jungle and the mountains, the mud and the sago swamps along the coast did not stop them. The work was always done.

ENGINEERS.

It has been rightly said that the war in New Guinea was a war of supply. This being so the flow of supply was limited only by the means for moving supplies forward. This in turn was dependent on either roads, dropping-grounds, or airfields, whose availability was dependent in the first place on the work of the engineers.

The first big task the engineers performed was the development of the road to Nauro so that Seventh Australian Division could be supplied from Moresby. Thereafter they were always well up with the infantry, preparing dropping-grounds in the Owen Stanleys as the troops advanced.

In the coastal area it was the engineers who enabled the first supplies to be brought in by air with the completion of the Popondetta strip. Thereafter other strips were rapidly developed, enabling the constant and increased use of aircraft for supply.

One of the greatest achievements by the engineers has been the development of the Wau-Bulldog road. This is one of the outstanding feats in the history of road construction, going as it does over some of the wildest and most mountainous country in New Guinea. It brought in its train the most exacting conditions in which the engineers have had to work, and may be regarded as their finest achievement.

THE MEDICAL SERVICES.

It is probable that the medical services have never functioned under such handicaps as in New Guinea. While our troops were moving through the mountains all medical equipment had to be carried, yet with improvisation and the alacrity of medical staffs to accept the challenge to overcome the material and physical drawbacks, our troops never lacked help when wounded or sick. On the coast around Buna it was the same story, with mud, heat and mosquitoes to add to their difficulties. From the front to the rear, the strain on all medical resources was tremendous. The work of the doctors, men and nurses, who cared for the sick and wounded from the regimental aid posts to the general hospital, on the hospital ships and in the base hospital, rightly deserves the highest praise.

THE NATIVES.

The story of the campaign across the Owen Stanleys to Buna is not complete without a tribute to the work of the natives. They worked willingly and loyally. They, too, suffered under the physical conditions, and at Buna and Sanananda went forward, risking their lives to take supplies to the infantry.

Their care for our wounded whom often they had to carry miles over rough mountain trails, is well enough known.

Over and above this the natives performed a variety of tasks, making roads, building bridges, clearing and preparing airfields. The part they played in the campaign was a material contribution to its successful conclusion.

INDEPENDENT COMPANIES.

While larger units were engaged in heavy fighting, a small war was being waged ceaselessly by the independent companies. Continually they harassed enemy communications, observing and reporting his movements. They developed marked mobility of movement through difficult country, and ability to live on the country.

One of many raids was carried out at Mubo by detachments of the 2/5th and 2/7th Independent Companies. Despite mortar and machine-gun fire, and an elaborate system of booby traps, they inflicted at least fifty casualties on the enemy including twenty-five killed.

Detachments of 2/6th Independent Company penetrated the enemy-held territory behind Kokoda long before our troops were there, and during the principal offensive were again in the area.

Throughout the fighting in New Guinea the independent companies played a vital part. Their story is one of hardships overcome and of damage inflicted on the enemy.

ISLAND ATTACKS.

Concurrent with the major offensive were subsidiary offensive operations carried out by Australian troops against adjacent islands which the enemy might have used as bases for possible counteroffensives. These involved clearing the enemy from Normanby Island which had become a refuge for large numbers of Japanese sailors who landed there after their destroyer had been sunk by aerial attack.

Most important was the recapture by Australian troops of Goodenough Island against fierce Japanese resistance. On the night of the 22nd/23rd of October Australian troops of the 2 /10th Battalion landed on the island during a heavy storm, which, delaying as it did our approach to the Japanese positions and dislocating communications between landing parties, adversely affected subsequent operations.

The principal objective was Kilia Mission on the south-western tip of the island. One party made two unsuccessful attacks on the Mission during the 23rd of October, and then established itself for the night of the 23rd/24th of October on a position a mile to the north. Another party was resisted in its movement west of the Mission, but did succeed in wiping out a medium machine-gun nest.

Using medium machine-guns and heavy mortars, the Japanese mounted heavy counter-attacks, assisted by Zero fighters which attempted to strafe the Australians while other aircraft attacked the small boats from which the troops had landed. In the fighting on the 23rd of October this party wiped out two medium and three light machine-guns. They had thoroughly disorganized the enemy, but were forced temporarily to withdraw. Early on the 24th of October, during the darkness, the main body of the enemy fled from the island, probably taking temporary refuge on Fergusson Island.

Their probable positions there were bombed and machine-gunned on the 27th of October, when information was received that another party of Japanese from Buna, who had been headed for Goodenough Island, were diverted by the presence of our troops to Fergusson Island.

AIR CO-OPERATION AND ARTILLERY

WORK OF R.A.A.F.

No history of the Papuan campaign would be complete without reference to the work done by Four A.C. Squadron of the R.A.A.F., and the artillery gunners, the fire of whose weapons was directed by observation carried out by the squadron on enemy targets in areas back from the front lines. Normally, artillery observation is practically impossible in heavy jungle. Aircraft alone can make it possible in such conditions. The task of ranging the guns on the anti-aircraft batteries and other important targets was most hazardous, but the pilots and observers of this squadron set an example of which the R.A.A.F. may well be proud. They carried out much tactical reconnaissance, often flying at tree-top level, and winning the admiration of all ground troops.

Something must be said too of the gunners, who responded wonderfully to all calls made upon them. Their shooting was both accurate and effective, as earlier references have shown.

The work of artillery officers was very heavy. We had only a few guns forward, and while dependent on air transport the amount of ammunition available was definitely limited. Later when supplies were moving by sea the position improved. The type of terrain was always a first-class artillery problem. A large number of forward observation officers had to be out all the time with the forward troops. All played a valuable part and one died in a bayonet charge which he led.

TRIBUTE TO FIFTH AIR FORCE.

Tribute must be paid to the sterling operations of the US Fifth Air Force. Throughout the campaign that Force was ever ready to assist ground troops, and did. There is no question that the bombing of Gona materially affected the battle there, but above all else was the operation of this force in the Solomons Sea.

In the early stages of the battle for the beach-heads, Japanese ships were still moving in the Gona area to unload men and stores. By the middle of December they dared not move south of the Mambare River to reinforce their hard-pressed forces, and from then on showed no inclination to enter the southern portion of the Solomons Sea at all.

When the convoy approached Lae in the early part of January, it was found that the Japanese were covering it with all the fighters available in the South-West Pacific area as well as fighters of one carrier. The fate of this convoy and its protecting fighters was such that it was nearly two months before the next convoy attempted to cross the Solomons Sea.

It is impossible to over-estimate the effect of these air operations on the campaign as a whole. The achievement was one deserving the greatest praise and was fittingly crowned later by the battle of the Bismarck Sea.

Not only was the work of the Fifth Air Force important in operations. Its transport service made the campaign a possibility. Until we developed a coastal route using small craft, to Oro Bay and points further on, our forces were entirely dependent on supplies carried by air. Even when the coastal route was operating, the difficulties of transportation through an area swept by frequent tropical storms made it essential that supplies should continue to travel by air. Not less important was the carriage of troops and evacuation of the wounded.

That, in brief, is the story of the campaign in New Guinea to date-an unfinished story that will close only when Allied offensive action has broken the Japanese military machine. It is a story of complete self-sacrifice by men who have struggled and endured, and fought as men have rarely fought before. It is the opening chapter in the story of the decline and fall of the Japanese Empire.

"VX21257"