Markham Valley & Finschhafen; (Scarlet Beach, Shaggy Ridge)

MARKHAM VALLEY AND FINSCHHAFEN

The 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion, "B" Company of the Papuan Infantry Battalion, and later, elements of the 503rd U.S. Paratroop Infantry Regiment,  had been patrolling the area  north and west of Nadzab. Except for one patrol clash near Boana no enemy had been encountered until the 15th of September. During that day the 3rd Battalion of the 503rd U.S. Paratroop Infantry Regiment came in contact with a strong enemy force on the Bumbu River. The enemy was in greater strength than at first thought.

That same day the 21st Australian Infantry Brigade was flown to Nadzab, the 2/16th Australian Infantry Battalion moving forthwith to the Bumbu area while the 2/14th Battalion was disposed in the Boana area to intercept any further Jap withdrawal through that locality. The 2/16th Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion of the 503rd U.S. Paratroop Infantry Regiment but the enemy had already dispersed under cover of darkness. No further contact was made. The 2/14th Battalion, moving along the track to Boana, located a Jap force at the junction of the Busip and Bunzok rivers. Attempts to encircle the enemy by crossing the Busip and Bunzok failed because of the flooded rivers.

The 21st Brigade battalions, the 2/14th and 2/16th, were ordered to withdraw to Nadzab in preparation for future operations westward.

Before attacking Kaiapit, the 2/6th Australian Commando Squadron, in an air-borne  operation, the second incursion  of its kind into enemy territory, was flown to a position on the west bank of the Leron River. This area of flat kunai country, which had been burnt some weeks previously, made an excellent emergency landing ground. One plane was damaged while landing, but there were
no casualties.

Immediately it landed on the 7th of September, the 2/6th Commando Squadron pushed on to Sangan - the second step in the capture of Kaiapit airstrip. At Sangan the squadron joined "B" Company Papuan Infantry Battalion, which had tramped overland from Chivasing. Together they moved on Kaiapit, reaching their objective on the 19th of September, just before the leading elements of a Jap force, estimated at a hundred strong. The Japs quickly fanned out, concealing themselves in the tall kunai. But, almost as quickly, a section of the squadron took advantage of the only high ground in the area, which gave them a bird's-eye view of the enemy. From this vantage point the section pointed out targets to the remainder of the squadron. As one of the lads later remarked: "It was just like duck-shooting." Swift vigorous action soon put the enemy to flight, leaving twenty dead, and one of the three villages at Kaiapit in our hands.

A defensive perimeter was established before nightfall and booby traps cunningly set. During the night the enemy twice attacked this perimeter. He ran into the booby traps, warning our force, which repulsed both attacks.

At daybreak he again attacked, this time in superior force-both in numbers and firepower. In the comparatively open spaces of three native villages, and in the close denseness of eight-foot kunai, a fierce battle raged. Finally, when ammunition was running dangerously low, the Australians charged with the bayonet, sending the Japs screaming into the kunai and killing 161. The three villages and the Lutheran Mission at Kaiapit fell into our hands by To a.m. The final count of Jap bodies in the Kaiapit area totalled 198. Ten of our men were killed and twenty-six wounded.

The old Lutheran Mission, on a plateau TOO feet above the plain of the three Kaiapit villages, became the main defensive position of the 2/6th Commando Squadron. From here one could see far up the valley. The day after the battle, transport aircraft were bringing men of the 21st Brigade to the new airstrip close by. Fighting patrols were fanning out into the wide valley of the Markham - exploiting as far forward as the Umi River. Papuan native patrols of "B" Company P.I.B., led by whites, were branching into the foothills. In the distance was Marawassa, the next objective. Brigadier Ivan Dougherty, 21st Brigade commander, had assumed control of the area.

Flown direct from Moresby, the third battalion of the 21st Brigade, the 2/27th. landed at Kaiapit to relieve the 2/6th Commando Squadron of the defence of Kaiapit. The squadron resumed its patrolling to the north, making only light contact with Japs on the Yafats River. The enemy had withdrawn to the west of Kaiapit. Little was known of this terrain, but native carriers recruited in the area were able to supply valuable information.

Hot on the heels of the retreating Japs, the 2/16th Battalion was held up by the wide and deep, swiftly flowing Umi River. By the 24th of September the battalion had completed this difficult crossing, forward patrols overtaking rear elements of the Jap near Sagerak. The 2/16th Battalion launched an attack from high ground overlooking Sagerak to the south. After a fierce fight the Jap withdrew and Sagerak fell to the 2/i6th Battalion on the 25th of September.

Information gained at Kaiapit indicated the Jap intention to attack Nadzab with a force commanded by Major-General Nakai. This force, known as Nakai Force, consisted of a regiment of infantry (equivalent to one of our infantry brigades) plus a battalion of artillery, and a detachment of engineers. Nakai Force was to move from an assembly point on the Mindjim River down the Ramu Valley to the Kaiapit-Marawassa area where it expected to join elements of the Lae force, which had retreated via Boana, then move on to Nadzab. It was the advance guard of Nakai Force which 2/6th Commando Squadron had smashed at Kaiapit on the 20th of September.

With this plan in mind, and in view of enemy movement near the Yafats River, it was decided to await the arrival of the 2.5th Brigade at Kaiapit before making a major move westward. Brigadier Dougherty therefore withdrew the main body of the 2/16th Battalion back across the Umi River, leaving only a standing patrol on the high ground overlooking Sagerak.

We were short of troops. It was hoped that the enemy would attack. This would give us a chance to reduce his numbers. But he did not attack. Instead he continued to fall back.

During the 27th, 28th, and 29th of September, troops of the 25th Brigade were flown from Nadzab to Kaiapit. The 21st Brigade, based at Kaiapit, actively patrolled the area till sufficient troops of the 25th Brigade had arrived to secure its defence. Then the chase was resumed. On the afternoon of the 28th of September two companies of the 2/16th Battalion again crossed the Umi.

Engineers of the 2/6th Australian Field Company rapidly constructed a crossing device over the Umi River similar to the auxiliary ferry crossing over the Markham-a chain of rubber boats, suspended from a cable, was hauled by man-power in Volga boatman style.

During the night the whole of the 21st Brigade followed the 2/16th Battalion across the Umi River, concentrating near Sagerak next day, in preparation for the advance at Marawassa. By nightfall the 2/14th Battalion had occupied the village.

Two 25-pounder guns, to support the advance, had been ferried across the Umi. The roads were badly formed, and boggy, but the incredible jeep, aided by the determined gunners, hauled the guns slowly forward through this harsh country.

The 21st Brigade maintained its rapid advance during the 3oth of September. By nightfall leading elements of the 2/16th Battalion had reached the south bank of the Gusap River, with still no sign of the fast retreating enemy.

To guard the brigade's right flank during this advance, the 2/6th Commando Squadron moved along the Jap lines of communication on the northern side of the valley. It was a strenuous period. Continually expecting contact with the Jap, the troops moved in a series of sweeps, crossing the valley at the end of each sweep to pick up rations. The squadron had to cover much greater distances than the brigade and yet keep up with it.

The advance along the Markham Valley was made in a series of bounds-from airstrip to airstrip or to prospective emergency landing ground. The position was occupied, and work on the airstrip commenced-one battalion clearing the tall kunai with bayonets and machetes, while the next filed through to make further advances.

Such was the scene at Gusap. While the 2/16th Battalion patrolled along the Gusap River, the remainder of the 21st Brigade, based near Arifagan Creek, spent the ist of October constructing an airstrip at Gusap. That afternoon Major-General Vasey arrived in the first transport plane to land, and the Headquarters of the Seventh Australian Division was established there.

At the same time the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion, with the 54th Battery of the 2/4th Field Regiment under command, arrived at Kaiapit to relieve the 25th Brigade of its defensive task in that area. The 25th Brigade immediately commenced to move forward. In an attempt to catch the main Jap force the 21st Brigade pushed straight ahead ignoring small pockets of enemy and stragglers, who were mopped up by the 25th Brigade.

To the north-west of the 21st Brigade lay our next objective-the large airstrip at  Dumpu. Directly in front the 12 -knot Gusap River, with its 15-foot bank on one side and its shelving beach on the other, formed a natural obstacle to our advance. To effect a crossing, the 2/i6th Battalion moved by night along the river's southern bank as far as Punantei. The most suitable spot was a point where the Markham Valley leads into the Ramu Valley and the Gusap flows into the Ramu River. Here a rope was secured on either bank of the Gusap. Supported by this life-line, troops of the 2/16th Battalion waded the swiftly flowing river. Though it was only waist-deep, the current was so strong that boulders on the river's rocky bottom hurtled with it into the Ramu, knocking many of the wading men off their feet.

Having crossed the Gusap, the 2/16th Battalion advanced on Dumpu with all speed. Over the river a solid bridge, hewn from local timber, was soon constructed by the engineers. Leaving two companies of the 2/27th Battalion to protect the airstrip, the remainder of the 21st Brigade crossed this bridge and concentrated in the Bum Bum area, prior to advancing on Dumpu.

The 2/16th Battalion had moved directly to Dumpu, encountering only a small party of Japs on the 4th of October. This party was quickly dispersed, and Dumpu fell to the leading company of the 2/16th Battalion. But the 2/14th Battalion, advancing along the northern side of the Ramu Valley, encountered rear elements of the Jap force at Wampun, approximately ten miles south-east of Dumpu. A fierce fight ensued. The enemy dispersed, but during the engagement Lieut.Colonel R. Honner, commanding the battalion, was wounded.

To the west of Wampun, the remainder of the 21st Brigade was based at Kaigulan. The 25th Brigade, now only a couple of days in rear of the 21st Brigade, was rapidly catching up. On the arrival of the 25th Brigade at Kaigulan on the 5th of October, this body of the 21st Brigade moved forward to join the 2/16th Battalion at Dumpu, and by nightfall had taken up defensive positions in that area.

Meanwhile units of the Ninth Division had acted vigorously in the coastal sector  in their bid for Finschhafen.

The 20th Brigade, which had been first ashore at Red Beach, was selected for the new task. It was arranged that the force should leave G Beach, at the mouth of the Burep River, on the evening of the 21st of September and land at Scarlet Beach on the following morning.

These beaches were named according to a system of colour names, markers of the same colour being set up by the beach groups of the 532nd U.S. Boat and Shore Regiment on the respective beaches. Actually Scarlet Beach was marked with a red marker, but it was described as "scarlet" to avoid confusion with the Red Beach of the Lae landing.

Various estimates had been made of enemy strength in the area, the maximum being 4,000. However the enemy was known to have considerable forces along the coast up to and including Madang, and the operation was hurried forward to forestall any move to reinforce the Finschhafen area.

The terrain in the area from Scarlet Beach to Finschhafen consisted of a narrow coastal strip varying from three-quarters of a mile to 300-400 yards in width, then rising steeply to the mountainous and difficult country of the Kreutberg Range. The creeks and rivers were fordable, but generally ran between steep banks, thus providing good defensive positions for the enemy. Scarlet Beach was a sandy beach about 900 yards in length, and thirty to forty feet wide. It lay in a small indentation in the coast, making a well defined bay with distinct headlands. At the northern end of the beach the Song River entered the sea, and at the southern end the Siki River.

On the afternoon of the 21st of September, the attacking force was embarked at G and Red Beaches, and was under way at 7.30 p.m. Enemy aircraft attempted to bomb the embarkation beaches, but were driven off by our fighters and dropped their bombs in the sea.

After a preliminary bombardment of the beach area by destroyers, the first wave of troops went in at 4.45 a.m. on the 22nd of September.  It consisted of two companies each from the 2/13th and 2/17th Battalions.  Enemy fire came from well-constructed bunkers on the fringe of the jungle, causing casualties to the troops both in the craft and as they waded ashore.

It had been intended that the landing should take place within the confines of Scarlet beach. Though some craft beached at the northern end near the mouth of the Song River, the greater portion landed well to the left of the appointed area, the majority beaching in Siki Cove and others towards the northern headland of Arndt Point.

Moving with the first wave were amphibious scouts of the 532nd U.S. Boat and Shore Regiment whose duties included the erection of range-lights and beach signs for the guidance of succeeding waves into the correct beach. In consequence of their landing at Siki Cove these signs were not erected for some time, and most of the second wave also beached too far south and in Siki Cove.

The third wave was the first to land in the appointed place, and, though some casualties occurred, the beach was cleared of enemy by the time all troops were ashore.

By 10 a.m. it was clear that the enemy had retired to strong defensive positions at Katika, about half a mile from Scarlet Beach. They resisted strongly, and it was not until 4 p.m that they were finally driven from the position. By dusk on that first day the 2/17th Battalion was holding the beachhead area; the 2/15th Battalion was in the Katika area, and the 2/13th Battalion had driven south to the vicinity of Heldsbach. Our foothold was secure.

The advance towards Finschhafen continued on the following day. First contact with the enemy was made at the mouth of the Bumi River where strong defences south of the river delayed the advance. Two companies of the 2/15th Battalion moved inland to approach the Bumi down the ridge parallel with the coast, and on the morning of the 24th of September met enemy opposition on the Bumi River. One company crossed the river and established a bridgehead against opposition shortly after midday. Later four platoons of the 2/13th Battalion also crossed, and enlarged the bridgehead.

On the 25th of September one company of the 2/17th Battalion occupied Jivevaneng village on the Satelberg, Road, a patrol having found Satelberg occupied in too great strength for one company to attack. South of the Bumi River enemy resistance continued, and the dav was spent patrolling and building up supplies. Engineers had cut a jeep-track along low ground from the bridgehead to the coast track for supply and the evacuation of casualties.

The following day three companies of the 2/13th Battalion crossed the Bumi, leaving one company to hold the dominating ground south of the river. BY 4 p.m- two companies of the 2/15th Battalion were south of the Bumi, and an attack was launched against enemy positions on the high ground in the direction of the coast - a commanding crest which overlooked the enemy defences in the Salankaua Plantation and Kakakog. The approach was over a gradient of about one in two, and in places the men had to climb upwards on hands and knees. The attack was pressed with great vigour, and despite the difficulty of approach, was completely successful. The enemy left behind fifty dead, equipment and weapons. In the Satelberg road area small parties of Japanese made several attacks on the position at Jivevaneng occupied by one company of the 2/17th Battalion.

On the 27th of September the 2/13th Battalion made some advance against opposition and the remaining company crossed the Bumi. The battalion (less one company which was left in a position astride the track to Tirimoro to secure the right flank) moved south to a position from which an attempt could be made to capture Kakakog by coming down the spur behind it.

Enemy activity in the Satelberg and Scarlet Beach areas increased this day, and the commander of the 20th Brigade requested the Ninth Division to send an additional battalion to guard the beachhead so that he could concentrate his force for the capture of Finschhafen.

On the following day the 2/13th Battalion attempted to continue the approach from the west to the strong enemy position at Kakakog. Artillery harassing fire was laid down during the approach, but heavy rain, the necessity for cutting a track through heavy undergrowth, and the rugged country impeded progress and created great difficulties in carrying supplies. The attempt was abandoned on the afternoon of the 29th of September, when it was seen that surprise had been lost and the enemy had made preparations to meet a thrust in this direction.

Meanwhile patrols from the 2/15th Battalion had found that the enemy had withdrawn from positions west of Ilebbe Creek; but any attempt to move into Salankaua Plantation was met with fire from the direction of Kakakog. The 2/43rd Battalion which, in answer to the brigade commander's request, had been sent for-ward from Lae, landed that night and took over the defence of the beachhead and the outpost position of Jivevaneng.

Kakakog still remained in enemy hands, and on the 3oth of September three companies of the 2/13th Battalion began movement to a forming-up place for an attack from the north-west. Two companies of the 2/15th Battalion advanced to the line of Ilebbe Creek and dug in on a knoll facing strong enemy defences. This move confined the enemy to the cast side of the creek in that area, and made it possible to use The Ford and to extend the jeep head south of the river.

The stage was set, and a heavy air strike was carried out on the Finschhafen area on the ist of October. Following intensive artillery preparation the 2/13th Battalion attacked Kakakog at midday, and bitter fighting ensued throughout the afternoon. A small spur ioo yards north of Kakakog was occupied and 8o to too Japanese killed. Our casualties were to killed and 70 wounded.

In the meantime enemy opposition to the 2/43rd Battalion on the 8atelberg Road had increased. While moving up the road to reinforce the company at Jivevaneng the battalion, less two companies, met the enemy who had occupied a position astride the road. Our troops attacked, but at the end of the day the position was not cleared and the company at Jivevaneng was isolated.

In the morning of the 2nd of October, it was found that the enemy had withdrawn from Kakakog, and from the positions in the plantation near the Bumi mouth. The 2/17th Battalion crossed the Bumi, and advanced through Salankaua, meeting only minor opposition. By 11.4o a.m. forward elements had reached Langemak Bay. By late afternoon Finschhafen was cleared, and contact made with a patrol of the 22nd Battalion on the south bank of the Mape River.

On the day of the Scarlet Beach landing the 22nd Battalion, one of the 4th Australian  Infantry Brigade battalions  which had come under command of the Ninth Division, had begun its advance east along the coast from Hopoi. Its object was to liquidate any enemy stragglers or small posts on the south coast of the peninsula, and its progress was so good that ultimately it was instructed to link up with the 20th Brigade. Contact was made with the enemy on several occasions, but interference was never
sufficient to check the advance to any extent, and on the 1st of October the battalion had secured Dreger Harbour, fifty-one miles from Hopoi.

The coastal track followed was narrow, and in parts so rugged that it was impracticable to develop a jeep-track. The battalion was therefore maintained throughout its advance by craft of the 532nd U.S. Boat and Shore Regiment operating from Red Beach, and native carrier parties operating from forward beaches as they were established.

Thus Finschhafen and the Dreger Harbour areas had been cleared of the enemy, and a new phase began in the campaign on the Huon Peninsula. In order to carry out the maturing plans of the high command the newly captured area had to be developed as a base sub-area, with airstrips and harbour installations for the handling of Liberty ships.

These tasks fell to American and Australian engineers, but, before they could be carried out in their entirety as at Lae, further heavy fighting was to take place in the area.

During the 2oth Brigade advance on Finschhafen, the enemy had been withdrawing his forces from the area south of the Mape River via an inland track to Satelberg. By the time our occupation of Finschhafen had been completed, this move had also been concluded, and with the naval garrison which had been withdrawn from Finschhafen, the total enemy strength in the Satelberg area was estimated at 4,500

At the same time substantial reinforcements were moved down the coast by sea and overland to the Satelberg-Wareo area. This force totalled 6,200. All advances on Satelberg were strongly resisted at this stage. The enemy's intention was apparently to increase his strength in preparation for a counteroffensive aimed at the recapture of Finschhafen.

The importance of the early capture of Satelberg had been stressed by the divisional commander before the fall of Finschhafen. It was apparent to the brigade commander that this task was too great for one battalion - the 2/43rd Battalion - in the northern sector. The enemy was digging in on the Satelberg Road and to attempt to force that route seemed unwise.

The brigade commander therefore decided to capture the Kumawa area with the 2/17th Battalion, firstly to cut the track through Gurunkor-Kumawa-Sisi-Satelberg thus disorganizing the enemy's retreat, and secondly to bring pressure on Sisi to secure the road junction there and assist an advance on the Satelberg Road. It was also decided that, after capturing Kumawa, the 2/17th Battalion should push onto the Sisi Road junction, and that, when it had gained that area, the 2/43rd Battalion could be withdrawn from Jivevaneng. In the meantime the 2/43rd Battalion was to close the gap of about 400 yards between it and the company isolated in the village, preferably by reaching it, but, if necessary, by the company fighting its way back to the main body. The plan was to be put into execution immediately, beginning early in the morning of the 3rd of October.

Enemy activity north of the Song River had increased, and an enemy party reached a position astride the coastal track about 6oo yards north of the river.

The 2/17th Battalion moved from Kolem to the track junction, by route-march. and in all the three-ton trucks available. From there it was to be led by native guides over a jeep-track to Klasawa One, and then by 2 native pad through Klasawa Two to Kumawa. This route was subsequently known as Easy Street-satirically and officially.

By the time the 2/I7th Battalion reached the Easy Street junction, knowledge of the situation north of the Song River caused ; new decision to be taken. The 2/13th Battalion was too distant to be an effective reserve for use in the Scarlet Beach area.  Consideration was given to moving it by E.S.B craft, but there was considerable risk of enemy air strafing of daylight moves. The brigade commander wished to avoid any postponement of the move to Kumawa as this seemed the most likely place in which to regain contact with the retreating enemy.

Wrecked Jap Barges-Scarlet Beach, Finschhafen

It was therefore decided to detach "A" and "B" Companies of the 2/17th Battalion, with a separate headquarters and known as "McLarn's detachment", to brigade reserve in the Scarlet Beach area. The 2/17th Battalion, less McLarn's detachment, to continue the advance to Kumawa. This was done, and by dusk the 2/17th Battalion had reached Kiasawa One. After patrolling and much artillery preparation during the day of the 3rd of October one company of the 2/43rd Battalion attacked again in a the afternoon in an attempt to reach its company at Jivevaneng. The enemy position was strongly placed- and thick bamboo made our approach difficult. The attack was a gallant effort, but the company remained isolated.

Next day the enemy, pressed by elements of the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion, withdrew from close contact with our defended localities north of the Song River, but continued intermittently to engage our positions with fire from farther north.

An officer went in a barge from Scarlet Beach to offshore at Gusika to reconnoitre the enemy positions from seaward. He drew fire from positions about 900 yards north of the Song River, but no farther north. It was decided to attempt to surround the enemy position by a move through North Hill, and McLarn's detachment moved across the Song to an assembly area for the move next day.

Boomerangs of Four A.C. Squadron of the R.A.A.F. dropped ammunition and supplies for "A" Company, 2/43rd Battalion, isolated at Jivevaneng, and later a message ordering this company to withdraw and rejoin the main body of the battalion. The company withdrew at 1.30 P.m. on the 4th of October, rejoining its main body by a detour round the former enemy position. During the period it held the village it had inflicted numerous casualties on the enemy. On the same day the 2/17th Battalion (less McLarn's detachment) reached the track junction near Kumawa village.

On the 5th of October McLarn's detachment moved along the high ground west of the enemy position on the coastal track and encircled it; but when after heavy going the track was reached, it was found that the enemy had withdrawn. It soon appeared that the enemy was not in full retreat, but was apparently intending some offensive action. Two companies of the 2/43rd Battalion occupied the Jivevaneng position where its "A" Company had been; and the 2/17th Battalion captured Kumawa village after a brief skirmish.

At Kumawa the enemy became active on the following day and parties coming along the track from Finschhafen began to close in on the 2/I7th Battalion positions. Contact in the area was continuous and close. It became apparent that if the 2/17th Battalion were to vacate the Kumawa position, the track junction there would be occupied by the enemy. And, the battalion was not strong enough, with
two companies away, to hold this vital junction and also to continue to advance.

This situation caused a change in the plan to send the 2/17th Battalion from Kumawa through Sisi. While adhering to the intention of eventually concentrating the 2/17th Battalion on the Satelberg Road, the brigade Commander decided that it (less McLarn's detachment) should retain control of Kumaw2 until the 2/15th Battalion arrived there, and keep open the Easy Street route. Meantime the forward companies of the 2/43rd Battalion would be relieved at Jivevaneng by McLarn's detachment of the 2/17th Battalion.

At Kumawa on the night of the 6th/7th of October the enemy pressed even closer to the 2/17th Battalion, which was heavily engaged and in danger of being surrounded. Heavy rain had been falling for several nights, and on the 8th of October Easy Street became impassable to jeeps, while floods destroyed the bridge which our engineers had thrown across the Song River.

In the Jivevaneng area McLarn's detachment of the 2/17th Battalion made a surprise flank attack on a feature named "The Knoll" on the 9th of October, and captured it by assault. This gave us possession of the dominating ground on the Satelberg Road east of the Sisi Road junction, and secured our position at Jivevaneng. During the afternoon and night the enemy made four separate and determined counter-attacks on our positions on The Knoll, but all were repulsed with heavy casualties.

It was decided to concentrate the 2/17th Battalion in the Jivevaneng area, if possible, by a move from Kumawa around the east  flank of the enemy position at Sisi to join McLarn's detachment; and to build up a reserve of supplies and ammunition for operations against Satelberg; the 2h5th Battalion to operate from Kumawa, and the 2/17th Battalion from Jivevaneng.

The remainder (two companies) of the 2/15th Battalion arrived at Kumawa on the 9th of October. The enemy continued to be active in the area, and the maintenance of our force there was becoming precarious because of the very bad track in wet weather, and the risk of the enemy cutting it. Engineers were working hard to improve the track, but the jeephead extended to Kiasawa Two only in dry weather. A few native porters had been recruited, and they, with two companies of troops, were employed in carrying ammunition and supplies to Kumawa. In the Finschhafen area the 2/13th Battalion patrols up the Mape River found the enemy still in that area

When Advanced Headquarters of the Ninth Division opened at Finschhafen on the 10th of October the 2/43rd Battalion was widely dispersed in the Scarlet Beach-North Hill area. A strong detachment controlled the track junction near Bonga. Patrols were making contact with the enemy near Gusika. The 2/3 rd Pioneer Battalion was holding the Katika track, with one company engaged in carrying on Easy Street. The 2/17th Battalion was in contact with enemy strongly dug in astride the Satelberg Road in front of Jivevaneng, the 2/15th Battalion was in contact with strong enemy positions near Kumawa, and the 2/13th Battalion had one company in contact at Tirimoro and another in contact on the Mape River.

While it was necessary to strengthen the Australian force at Finschhafen, its size was governed by the capacity of the craft available for supply. During the period 6th/15th of October the whole of the 24th Brigade and the 2/2nd Machine Gun Battalion (less "C" Company) were brought in, "C' Company of the Machine Gun Battalion, having served with the 2oth Brigade throughout the operation.

It was appreciated that the vital ground in the area was the Satelberg mountain feature, and the long narrow ridge running west from Gusika on the coast to Wareo. Along a track which followed the crest of this ridge, the enemy conveyed inland the supplies which had been brought down the coast in barges. Possession of the ridge would cut this supply route to his troops in the Wareo-Satelberg area as well as denying him excellent observation of the coastline as far south as Dreger Harbour.

Wareo, at the western edge of the ridge, was on a 26oo-foot plateau which dominated the entire Song River valley and the country inland from Scarlet Beach to Satelberg. It was also the junction point of many important tracks, all supply routes for the enemy forces in the area, and of access to the enemy to attack our forces in the Scarlet Beach and Finschhafen areas. Capture of the Gusika-Wareo line therefore would both secure the Finschhafen area and provide the ground from which an offensive could be launched to drive the Japanese from the east coast of the peninsula. While the enemy held Satelberg, however, the left flank of a drive for the Gusika-Wareo line would be open to attack.

The plan therefore envisaged two preliminary moves before the advance to Wareo: (a) capture of Satelberg; and (b) control of the track junctions in the coastal area at Bonga, thus cutting the enemy supply-line from the coast, and opening the Wareo feature to attack from the east by a move along the spur from the direction of Gusika.

While the force was being reorganized and other preparations made to execute this plan, evidence from numerous sources indicated strongly that an enemy attack was imminent. The divisional commander had hoped to anticipate the enemy in resuming the offensive, but as this did not appear possible, orders were issued on the 15th of October laying down the policy for the defence of Finschhafen against attack from land and sea.

In the meantime the Seventh Australian Division was pushing through the Ramu Valley to the Finisterre Range.

The Importance of the Ramu Valley lay in the fact that it offered the only suitable land approach by which a large enemy force could be moved against Lae. The Japanese had built a motor road from Madang along the coast to Bogadjim, thence inland following the general course of the Mindjim River to Yokopi; from Yokopi a mule-track led through the valley of the Faria River into the head of the Ramu Valley. Any land movement against Lae, from the main enemy concentration area in the Madang-Wewak area, must necessarily, approach along this rough motor road.

The Ramu Valley is almost entirely covered in kunai grass. Growing two to six feet in height over most of the low foothills, it follows along spurs to the tops of ridges to meet the jungle fringe. It has such a hold on the country that it is slowly strangling all other vegetation. The natives call this valley "The Valley of Death", Ramu meaning death.

Near Dumpu the Ramu Valley widens. Immediately to the north are precipitous mountains-rugged, almost continuously covered with rain clouds, they frown down on Dumpu. These are the Finisterres-the principal obstacle to our advance in the Ramu Valley. Here the enemy's defences gave him observation down the entire valley.

The Ramu River itself keeps mainly to the southern side of the valley. Just forward of Dumpu two rivers flow in a southerly direction to join the Ramu-the Uria and Faria. Between the Uria and Faria Rivers the foothills of the Finisterres rise to some 5,000 feet -the Uria-Faria Divide. Cliffs rise sheer from the bed of the rumbling Faria River to the clouds. Little was known of this crazily moulded terrain.

Some of the toughest fighting yet encountered in New Guinea took place in the Finisterres. Isolated ridges, rearing thousands of feet into the air, unnamed since time began, became battlegrounds and took the names of men who fought there - some who died.

While the main body of the 21st Brigade was engaged in clearing the airstrip and ensuring the defence of Dumpu, the 2/27th Battalion pushed on towards these rugged mountains. In the foothills of the Finisterres, at Kumbarum, the 2/27th Battalion regained contact with the enemy. The battalion attacked. The Japanese withdrew. During the attack enemy were observed on a prominent hill to the west. The Japanese withdrew from this feature as our troops occupied Kumbarum. The 15th platoon of the 2/27th Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Gordon King, established an observation post on this hill; it commanded an excellent view of the Ramu, Faria and Uria valleys, taking the name of the platoon's commander - King's Hill.

'While the main body of the 2/27th Battalion remained in the Kumbarum area, "D" Company, commanded by Captain Guy Fawcett, pushed forward a day's march to establish a patrol base. Following the Uria River for a short distance, the company crossed 2 low saddle into the Faria Valley along which they tramped till nightfall. Nearing midnight a Japanese patrol stumbled upon our bivouacked company-three Japs were killed for the loss of one Australian. Next morning "D" Company withdrew to a small village on a plateau overlooking the Faria River. This village and locality became known as Guy's Post.

The following day the 2/6th Commando Squadron occupied King's Hill, allowing the 2/27th Battalion to move forward. Pushing along the Faria River valley the battalion probed the precipitous hills on either side as far as Guy's Post.

Advancing deeper into the Faria Valley, on the 9th of October the 2/27th Battalion clashed with a Jap patrol; during this scrap Private Beveridge of "D" Company was wounded. A standing patrol was left in this position, which became known as Beveridge Post, while the remainder of the battalion moved back to the high ground cast of the Faria River. While the battalion was moving into this position on the high ground, Lieutenant Trevor Martin was killed by a Jap sniper. This feature was mapped as Trevor's Ridge.

The lines of communication to the 2/27th Battalion were, by this time, well strung out and open to attack by the enemy. The 2/14th Battalion was sent forward in a protective role to assist the 2/27th Battalion. En route the 9th Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant N. Pallier, encountered a party of Japs on the west bank of the Uria River. During the sharp engagement which ensued, twenty-five Japs were killed and the position from which our attack had been launched became known as Pallier's Post.

On the 1 2th of October a Jap force, later determined at a battalion plus a company, attacked an outpost of the 2/27th Battalion in the Uria-Faria Divide near Trevor's Ridge. Enemy interference with lines of communication during the previous day had caused an acute shortage of ammunition. In spite of this the 5th Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Bob Johns, held the outpost against numerous enemy attacks. The enemy, after failing to dislodge Lieutenant Johns's platoon, retired leaving 140 Japs behind to be buried. The position where this gallant stand had been made became known as Johns's Knoll.

The company followed the narrow track-a one-man track with some parts a sheer drop of thousands of feet on either side - which followed the knife edge of this ridge till a wire fence halted their advance. On the other side of this wire fence, the Japs, chattering like galahs, were carrying out their routine duties, building up defences and going about their daily chores, completely unaware of our party's presence. For many days Lieutenant Clampett and his company remained in position near the wire fence, keeping the enemy under observation - not only those on the ridge but also their lines of communication, and even barge traffic in Madang Harbour, about forty miles distant, could be observed from this vantage point.

Shaggy Ridge formed a natural, formidable fortress on which the Japs were firmly en trenched. In the months that followed this rugged, difficult terrain became one of the best known battlegrounds of our operations in New Guinea. It will always be remembered as Shaggy Ridge - the one-man front.

The main body of the 2/27th Battalion had remained in position at Guy's Post. To protect the battalion's left flank "B" Company occupied a position on the western slopes of Shaggy Ridge. The forward platoon, the 12th, commanded by Lieutenant Don McRae, established a patrol base which became known as Don's Post.

The 10th Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant Bert Sutton, manned an outpost on the left flank of the same company, which commanded an excellent view of the Ramu Valley and ground west of Shaggy Ridge. This outpost position was later mapped as Bert's Post. Unopposed, the 2/14th Battalion occupied the high ground east of the 2/27th Battalion, overlooking the Uria River. From this position patrols were sent out to reconnoitre the Jap lines of communication in this area. During the reconnaissance two more posts took the names of the 2/14th Battalion patrol leaders-Young's Post (Lieutenant N. Young) and Levett's Post (Lieutenant P. M. I. Levett). 

The 2/27th Battalion then pushed forward from Guy's Post to Beveridge Post. This infantry activity was carried out to the tune of intermittent artillery shelling, air strafing and bombardment. Jap guns were laying down harassing fire on our positions - this was countered by the 54th Battery of the 2/4th Australian Field Regiment.

During the night of 11th/12th of October an enemy patrol attempted to put our guns out of action. The enemy reached to within fifty yards of the artillery perimeter. Fortunately the head-lights of a passing jeep revealed a Jap forward scout crossing the road and the alarm was given. A fierce fight ensued in which the gunners beat off the attack, soon putting the Jap to flight, and teaching the enemy that, in hand-to-hand fighting, the Australian gunner is as tough as the Australian infantryman.

It was found that the mule-track from Yokopi, which was the Jap line of communication, forked at a point north of Shaggy Ridge; one branch followed the Faria River while the other carried on through Surinam to Wampun. It was decided to hold these two tracks.

The 25th Brigade, based at Kaigulan, had been patrolling as far forward as the foothills of the Finisterres. Patrols were probing along the Gusap River and in the area of the Surinam River. Near Surinam village, the 2/33rd Battalion encountered a party of Japs firmly

entrenched on a knife-edge spur. With the aid of unofficial air support, given by Boomerang aircraft of Four Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron and R.A.A.F. Kittyhawks, the Jap was dislodged from this position.

Here the 2/33rd Battalion was relieved by the 2/31st who pushed forward along the Jap mule - track as far as the Uria River, then following the eastern bank - to this river rejoined the 25th Brigade, which, in the interim, had moved down the Ramu Valley to the vicinity of the Mene River, which flows south into the Ramu forward of Dumpu. The 25th Brigade had moved to this area to allow the 21st Brigade to concentrate its whole force in the Faria-Uria sector.

Forward of the Mene River, in the Kesawai area, another Jap track entered the valley from its junction with the main motor road at Yaula. In this area the 2/6th and 2/7th Australian Commando Squadrons were endeavouring to keep the enemy under observation. The 2/7th had established an observation post at Yaula and the 2/6th were patrolling towards Yokopi.

About this time the Ninth Division was preparing to meet a counter-attack. In the Finschhafen area the principal enemy concentrations were astride the track Palanko- Katika, astride the Satelberg
track west of Jivevaneng, on the Sisi track north of Kumawa, and in the Satelberg area.
It was learned that the enemy had planned three co-ordinated attacks-(a) a diversion in the north; (b) a sea-borne attack; and (c) the main landward attack, one regiment attacking eastward astride the Satelberg Road to capture Heldsbach, and another farther north, to move eastward to capture Scarlet Beach and Katika areas.

There was little waiting, for, at 5 a.m. on the 16th of October, the day after Division's defensive orders were issued, the 2/17th Battalion near Jivevaneng was heavily attacked. The enemy was repulsed with heavy losses. Fighting continued all day, but all enemy efforts, including a two-company attack supported by a 70-mm- gun landed in the late afternoon, were unsuccessful and costly.

The "diversion" from the north in the coastal sector consisted of what were considered patrol clashes near Gusika on the same day.

Early next morning a heavy, hour-long bombing raid on Finschhafen area heralded the sea-borne attack. Shortly after 4 a.m. three barges approached Scarlet Beach, gliding in with muffled motors close to the northern cape. In the rain, darkness and roaring surf, they were not detected until near the mouth of the Song River. They were then engaged by Bofors of the 2/4th Light A.A. Regiment, Bren guns and rifles of the 2/28th Battalion, and a 37-mm gun and 50-calibre machine guns of the 532nd U.S. Boat and Shore Regiment. Two of the barges were disabled on the sand spit at the river mouth, and the third was hit, but managed to withdraw north. The wailing coming from it testified eloquently to the presence of casualties. Of the enemy who landed 39 were killed on the beach, and 36 escaped across the mouth of the river, where they were mopped up by day patrols of the 2/43rd Battalion.

The main enemy landward attack began from the west the same day.

It is now clear that on the previous day the enemy had been passing a large force, probably the whole of a regimental group, between the widely dispersed forward companies of the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion, into a concentration area about one mile west of Katika. Patrols from the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion had had several clashes with small enemy parties on the 16th of October, indicating increased enemy activity in this sector, but it was not possible to assess accurately the strength involved. It was reasonably clear, however, that the enemy patrols encountered were probably advance and flank guards screening the east-ward movement of a considerable force. Concentrated enemy thrusts along the axis of the Satelberg Road and from the west towards Scarlet Beach were thus indicated.

At 11a.m. on the 7th of October the H.Q. of the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion on the high ground west of Katika was heavily attacked by a force of about one company. Although this attack was repulsed, spasmodic fighting continued throughout the day and a further strong attack, launched at nightfall, forced the H.Q. to withdraw into the 2/28th Battalion perimeter at Katika, leaving the three forward companies isolated farther west, without line communication and without a secure supply route. Each company had several days' supply of ammunition and rations. Further supplies and ammunition were dropped by Four A.C. Squadron of the R.A.A.F.

The commander of the 24th Brigade decided to employ part of his reserve - two companies of the 2/28th Battalion - to restore the situation. To replace this reserve the 2/43rd Battalion was ordered to withdraw its troops from the Gusika-Pino Hill area, and to hold two companies in reserve to move south of the Song River if required. These companies were withdrawn over very difficult country to arrive at the mouth of the Song by daybreak on the 1 8th of October.

At 10.20 a.m. on the 18th of October - ten minutes before its start-time as the 2/28th  Battalion was forming up on  the spur west of Katika for its counter-attack, the enemy launched a heavy and most determined attack. Fierce fighting continued for more than two hours, the enemy suffering very heavy casualties and making no headway. Similar direct frontal attacks were resumed several times during the afternoon with further heavy enemy losses.

Meanwhile the enemy, making probing attacks on each flank of his main drive, attacked light ack-ack gun positions south of the Song, and field-gun positions south of the Siki. Both attacks were repulsed, our guns firing over open sights at the oncoming troops. Another heavy attack on the gun-area was similarly thrown back.

The two companies of the 2/43rd Battalion previously in reserve were ordered to fill in the gap between the 2/28th Battalion and the Song. They arrived in time to meet and repel a heavy enemy attack on Scarlet Beach from the west. Fighting continued all afternoon, but all enemy attempts to penetrate were defeated. The Main Dressing Station of the 2/8th Australian Field Ambulance, near Scarlet Beach, came under heavy small-arms and mortar-fire, and it was evacuated by E.S.B. craft to the 2/3rd Casualty Clearing Station on Langemak Bay.

During the afternoon the enemy bypassed the 2/28th Battalion positions west of Katika, and by moving to the south along the bank of the Siki reached the sea at Siki Cove. The commander of the 24th Brigade withdrew the 2/28th Battalion from Katika into a perimeter extending from North Hill southwards with a depth of 400 to 500 yards, its southern flank resting on the promontory just north of Siki Cove. Line-communication between Divisional H.Q. and the 24th Brigade was then cut by the enemy; wireless and small craft of the 532nd U.S. Boat and Shore Regiment, which continued to run to Scarlet Beach, being the only means of communication.

By 6 p.m. the 2/28th Battalion had withdrawn, without interference, to the perimeter. There was now, however, an enemy wedge between the 24th and the 2oth Brigades, and the way was open for him to swing south from Katika, attack Heldsbach, and, continuing south, to cut off the 20th Brigade units on the Satelberg Road. To prevent any enemy penetration south of the Siki the 2/I3th Battalion less two companies was moved from the Finschhafen area to the mouth of the Siki River. One company of the 2/32nd Battalion was allotted from the already slender divisional reserve to come under command and reinforce the 2/13th Battalion for this purpose. During the night the 2413th Battalion, on the south of the Siki and immediately cast of its mouth, repulsed three enemy attacks.

Meanwhile further attacks were made on the 2/7th Battalion at Jivevaneng, and though one party of enemy on the night of the 18th/19th of October cut the Satelberg Road - principal supply route to the cast - an alternative route to the south was used. In the 2/15th Battalion sector at Kumawa all had been quiet. In the succeeding days the 2/15th Battalion offensive patrols successfully attacked several enemy posts in the Sisi area.

The three companies of the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion were still out of communication but had been located by aircraft of Four Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron R.A.A.F. Since they were no longer able to affect the course of the action they were instructed to withdraw. Contact was made with "D" Company, which withdrew southward to the Satelberg Road on the 19th of October. Orders were dropped by aircraft to the two remaining companies, which moved east through the enemy lines on the 2 1 St Of October. "B" Company had distinguished itself by beating off numerous enemy attacks, and killing more than sixty for the loss of two wounded.

During the night of the 18th/19th of October there was considerable enemy movement on  the entire 24th Brigade perimeter. Our artillery, which had been in action continually for two days, and was a big factor in breaking up all enemy attacks, brought down defensive fire on several occasions, evidently with damaging effect on the enemy. For the next three days he was unexpectedly inactive.

The 24th Brigade meanwhile had been ordered to re-establish contact with the 2oth Brigade, and in the afternoon of the 19th of October the 2/28th Battalion attacked with two companies and heavy mortar support, recapturing the high ground 200 yards west of Katika. Another company attempted to drive the enemy from Siki Cove next day, but was unsuccessful, though a fighting patrol later made contact with the 2/13th Battalion on the Siki River, and returned laying signal cable. Line communication between the Divisional H.Q. and the 24th Brigade was thus re-established.

The third and last of the division's brigades -the 26th Brigade- landed at Langemak Bay on the night of the 20th/21st of October, and arrangements were made to ferry the troops forward in E.S.B. craft to Launch Jetty.

The 2/32nd Battalion, then in divisional reserve, moved by sea to Scarlet Beach and ,came under command of the 24th Brigade. The 26th Brigade took over a sector from Siki Cove to the bend in the Satelberg Road north of Heldsbach, and relieved the 2/13th Battalion. The gap between the 24th Brigade perimeter, and the two companies of the 2/28th Battalion on the Katika Spur was closed on the 21st of October by "B" Company of the 2/32nd Battalion on its arrival at Scarlet Beach.

The only escape route then remaining to the enemy at Siki Cove lay along the bed of the Siki River itself. Throughout the 20th and the 21st of October the enemy pocket, whose strength was estimated at 200, was pounded by artillery and mortars, and ceaselessly sniped and harassed with machine guns and rifles from north and south. On the morning of the 22nd of October patrols from the 2/28th Battalion found that the enemy had evacuated during the night, leaving fifty dead and much equipment.

The enemy astride the Satelberg Road on the 2oth Brigade sector had been strongly reinforced, and was well dug in on a small feature overlooking the track. The position was consistently mortared and heavily shelled with several regimental concentrations, but a company of the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion failed to clear the position from the east.

Meanwhile arrangements had been made for "C" Squadron of 1st Australian Tank Battalion to be brought forward from Morobe, and on the night of the 20th/21st of October the squadron landed from three L.S.Ts in Langemak Bay.

Against only slight opposition the 2/28th Battalion advanced its forward localities 500 yards farther west of Katika on the 22nd of October. At 7.45 p.m. the enemy attacked strongly under cover of heavy machine-gun fire. The first assault was a massed charge straight down the Katika track.
This was most accommodating, and concentrated fire from artillery, mortars and automatic weapons repelled the attack with heavy casualties to the enemy. For several hours a series of unsuccessful infiltration attacks was launched. By midnight the enemy attacks had ceased.

Adjustments to the 24th Brigade on the following day were just completed when, at 6 p.m., the enemy returned to the attack against the 2/32nd Battalion astride and north of the Katika track. Our fire-power had been greatly strengthened in this area, and enemy casualties were particularly heavy. The Jap persisted in attacks of varying intensity during the greater part of the night, but without any success.

Daylight brought the resumption of his attacks, and he persisted throughout the day and night, coming in from the west and northwest to strike towards Katika. In all cases artillery, mortars and small-arms were effective in repelling him. During the night the Jap had brought up a 75-mm. gun along the Katika track to within seventy yards of our most forward weapon-pits. In the morning it was knocked out by an infantry 2-pounder specially brought forward after Vickers machine gunners had killed detachments of enemy gunners attempting to man it.

The enemy remained in close contact on the 24th Brigade front during the 25th of October, but his positions were under constant artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire. That night he finally abandoned his attempt to capture Finschhafen, and began to withdraw the way he had come.

It was a turning-point in the campaign. Both 24th and 26th Brigades pushed their lines farther west and constructed a solid defence line. Strong fighting patrols, including artillery observation officers with communication to their guns, harried the retreating enemy and inflicted many casualties. On every occasion he attempted to dig in on a new position, he was at once compelled to withdraw by the weight and intensity of our fire.

Enemy losses in this counter-offensive were extremely heavy. Counted dead were 679, many others had been buried, and many were probably never discovered. A conservative estimate of enemy battle casualties is 1,500. Our own battle casualties in the Ninth Division for the period 16th to 28th October were 228, including 3 officers and 46 other ranks killed.

Maintenance of supplies during the battle was not interrupted. When the 24th Brigade was isolated by land, E.S.B. craft continued to run supplies to Scarlet Beach and to evacuate casualties - sometimes under enemy machine-gun fire from Siki Cove. Engineers were endeavouring to construct the coastal road to take 3-ton trucks, but meanwhile the track was rough and muddy, and in wet weather passable only to jeeps. The mainstay of the supply organization was the E.S.B. craft, which did excellent work.

Seventh Division activities

The 21st Brigade of the Seventh Division had continued to advance through very difficult country up the Faria River, exerting pressure on the enemy and pushing him back on to Shaggy Ridge.

On the 29th of October, 8th Battery of the 2/4th Field Regiment arrived at Dumpu to assist 54th Battery in intensifying the artillery fire; 8th Battery moved forward to the area of the 21st Brigade while 54th Battery moved across to support the 25th Brigade on our left flank. The 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion had also been flown from Kaiapit to Dumpu and placed, under command of the 21st Brigade.

During the 7th/8th of November the 25th, Brigade relieved the 21st Brigade in the Faria-Uria sector while the 21st Brigade took up positions in the Mene River area. In the following weeks warfare in both sectors was static, but patrols were active and contact with the enemy was maintained. From a 2/33rd Battalion observation post on Shaggy Ridge,, Madang Harbour and the enemy lines of communication from Bogadjim were kept under close watch. Constant air observation was also, maintained over the Jap fines of communication, and our bombers were active. Many bridges were destroyed but almost as quickly the Jap rebuilt them. The 21st Brigade and long-range patrols by cavalry commando squadrons ensured that our left flank was safe.

During the 28th/29th of November the 21st Brigade relieved the 25th Brigade in the Shaggy Ridge area and maintained pressure, on the enemy. Occasionally the Jap attacked. Invariably these attacks were repulsed. Our patrols were active but, as will be related later, an attack in strength was not made till late in December.

To the west of Shaggy Ridge, Australian commando squadrons were protecting Allied Air Force installations and patrolling forward of the 25th Brigade, which was based in the Mene-Mosia River area. In the Kesawai area the 2 /6th Commando Squadron and "B" Company of the Papuan Infantry Battalion were endeavouring to keep the enemy under observation.

The enemy became aware of our patrol activity in this area and on the 8th of December a patrol of "B" Company was ambushed in the hills north-east of Kesawai Two. The Jap suffered heavy casualties before our patrol dispersed and withdrew. That night a considerable Jap force surrounded the headquarters of the 2/6th Commando Squadron, forcing it to withdraw.

It became apparent that a large-scale attack was imminent on this front. The 2/6th and "B" Company were ordered to withdraw to the 25th Brigade area, in the vicinity of the Mene River, while two companies of the 2/25th Battalion, with a section of artillery in support, moved forward to the Evapia. River to patrol that area.

In the very early hours of the 13th of December a strong Jap force attacked these two companies. For nearly six hours our troops held their ground-six hours of intense fighting against vastly superior numbers. Our small force, already reduced to half strength by malaria and battle casualties, smashed three successive attacks by an enemy force more than 400 strong. Featuring prominently in this stand was a Vickers medium machine gun. The raking fire of this gun was unceasing - as one gunner became a casualty another took his place. Our two companies were forced to withdraw slightly, leaving their area to be occupied by the Jap.

But the Jap did not exploit his gain in this area; he withdrew leaving the position unoccupied. It was learned later that he regarded the operation as a failure. When fighting patrols were pushed forward on the i4th/15th of December more than a hundred Japanese bodies were found in the area, and 04 weapon-pits were counted, many being two men pits. This area became known as Cam's Position, "Cam" being the nickname of Major A. C. Robertson, who commanded the two! companies during the action on the 13th of December.

Strong fighting patrols of the 25th Brigade were active throughout the area during the following days, but only isolated parties of Japs. were encountered. Patrols reconnoitered as far forward as the Solu River, finding many Jap dead scattered along the trail; but opposition was slight. The enemy had been harassed by our air attacks, and, apparently realizing that a large-scale attack was impending, he had withdrawn to bases farther back.

The next section is the Nine's New Offensive

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