Global War; Australia, an island; Turn of the Tide

Rear Admiral V A C Crutchley, VC DSC. The portrait is that of Rear Admiral V. A. C. Crutchley, VC, DSC, who hoisted his flag as Rear-Admiral Commanding Australian Squadron on the 13th June, 1942.

1. GLOBAL WAR

This map shows the areas controlled by the Axis forces marked in black.

At that time the western coast of Europe, from North Cape to the Pyrenees, was in German hands. Similarly, the northern Mediterranean coastline from the Pyrenees to the Dardanelles was held by Germany and Italy, while they were in possession of the southern coastline from the Tunisian border eastwards to Tobruk. Farther east, Germany had overrun the western and northern Black Sea coasts to the Sea of Azov. But despite her encirclement eastwards, Britain still stood secure on her firm base of sea power, and was saved from defeat from the air by the spirit of her people and the gallant efforts and epoch-making success of the Royal Air Force.

Britain's sea lines of communication remained unbroken. By them she had been able to save herself and assist her Allies. By them she had been able to stop the German and Italian Drang Nach Osten through the Mediterranean, Egypt and Syria. By them she had been able to assist Russia in stopping that more northerly drive to the east which, had it been successful, would have opened the prospect of an overland road for Germany to Iran, Iraq. Syria, Palestine and Egypt; would have given Germany oil, and visions of the sea at the Persian 6ulf and of a nearby Indian Empire.

But three-fifths of the earth's surface is water. All the land masses are contained by water. And British sea power gave to Britain main control of that containing element. Her exterior lines of communication enabled her, where she could not go through, to go around. Thus, although the strength of Axis air power in the narrow waters prevented Britain's, free use of the Mediterranean as a line of communication with Egypt, her convoys via the Cape of Good Hope enabled her to build up and maintain her powerful Middle East armies; thus, although she was denied the use of the Baltic route to Russia, her Murmansk convoys enabled her to maintain a steady flow of war supplies to that country. 

With those countries not under Axis domination, Britain was enabled by sea power to maintain communication, to keep up the flow of trade, to carry on the movement of troops and war supplies. The most that the Axis was able to do was to harry the lines of communication. And although that harrying was severe, and inflicted heavy losses, it could not sever the lines.

The sphere of Japanese domination resulting from that country's successful southward drive between December 1941 and May 1942 did not vitally alter the general situation.

Japan made a rich haul in raw materials. But her territorial gains, although large in extent, are local. The area of her occupation includes many thousands of square miles of sea, but that area is itself contained by the wider oceans that embrace it. Her lines of communication remain interior lines within that area. The Allies hold the exterior lines by that world-wide sea power which gives worldwide communication.

The accompanying world-map illustrates the ocean-encirclement-and the ocean-division-of the Axis Powers. It illustrates also the world-wide freedom of movement conferred on the Allied democracies by their control of the seas. It is this control of the sea that has, at long last, transferred the initiative from the Axis to the Allies, and is allowing the Allied navies and air forces to perform their function of transporting, concentrating, supporting and maintaining the land troops where and when they are required in the growing world-wide offensive of the Democracies.

In helping to maintain this control of the sea, the Royal Australian Navy has played a useful part. Throughout the lean periods of 194o and 1941, when the White Ensign held the seas practically single-handed, various units of the fleet were overseas, and the R.A.N. was represented in a number of actions in the Mediterranean, in the Somaliland and Persian Gulf campaigns, at Dakar, and in other theatres. With the growing tension in the Pacific towards the end of 1941, however, ships were recalled from overseas, and when Japan launched her attack, the main Australian force was in eastern waters.

Actually in Australian ports or waters were the cruisers H.M.A.Ss Canberra, Perth, Adelaide; the armed merchant cruiser Westralia; the sloops Warrego and Swan; and the destroyers Stuart and Voyager. Two other cruisers, H.M.A.Ss Australia and Hobart were in the Indian Ocean; the sloop Yarra was in the Red Sea; and the armed merchant cruisers Kanimbla and Manoora, with the destroyers Vendetta and Vampire, were at Singapore.

Most of these ships had already seen over two years of war, and practically all of them had been in action on a number of occasions.

Australia had entered the war in September 1939 with a fleet of six cruisers, five destroyers and two sloops, the three armed merchant cruisers being added shortly afterwards. In two years of hostilities enemy action had deprived her of one cruiser, one sloop, and one destroyer, H.M.A.Ss Sydney, Parramatta (which had been completed and commissioned after the outbreak of war) and Waterhen. She entered the second phase of the war with her original fleet depleted by these losses, but increased by building, and by ships made available for Australian manning by the Admiralty.

Local building had strengthened the Royal Australian Navy with a number of handy little ships which were to prove their worth in the strenuous days ahead. A number of these Australian minesweeping vessels-"corvettes", as they are popularly known-were in commission by December 1941, and four of them, Bendigo, Burnie, Goulburn and Maryborough, were in Malayan waters when Japan struck. Three others, Ballarat, Toowoomba and Wollongong, joined them in the following month. Others of the class were engaged on their lawful occasions in Australian waters.

Meanwhile the Admiralty had made available four of the "Javelin" Class destroyers, Napier, Nestor, Nizam and Norman. These ships had been commissioned as His Majesty's Australian Ships with Australian complements, and were representing the Royal Australian Navy in the Mediterranean and Atlantic when the war with Japan opened.

Thus, in the two major theatres of war involving British and Australian troops in December 1941, the Royal Australian Navy was, in a position to lend its support. In the Middle East, on the i 8th November, 194 1, the British Army had struck westwards from the Egyptian frontier against the Axis forces in the Western Desert, and by the end of December the British drive had crossed Cyrenaica to, Agedabia, investing the enemy in his Halfaya, Sollum, and Bardia defences on the way. Australian "N" Class destroyers participated in, this campaign, H.M.A.Ss Napier and Nestor being on the screen of the heavy ships which bombarded Bardia as a preliminary to its capture by the Eighth Army on the 2nd January, 1942.

In the Far East, while H.M.A. ships and seamen were playing their part in stopping the Axis from driving eastwards in the Mediterranean, other H.M.A. ships and men were facing the full flood of the southward Japanese drive in the Western Pacific..

In each theatre the outcome of the struggle was vital to Australia. In each theatre the deciding factor was sea power.  Had either Germany or Japan succeeded in breaking through that encirclement, which is completed and maintained beyond sight from the land on the wide oceans, Australia would have been isolated and her fate sealed

But the line held. The flow of shipping along the long route from Britain to the Middle East round the Cape of Good Hope continued; the sea line along which alone the necessary equipment and reinforcements could reach New Guinea from Australia, remained unbroken. And in the work they did with the Allied navies in maintaining control of the seas, the ships of the Royal Australian Navy, in the Middle East and in the Far East, were taking an equal part in the immediate defence of the Commonwealth.

II. AUSTRALIA; AN ISLAND

And it was there, or in the eastern area, that she had to keep her main naval strength in order to contain the Pacific naval forces of her enemies. For it is in the cast that lies Japan's naval Achilles' heel. The Pacific War is in the first place a naval-air war. The naval threat to Japan lies mainly in the east and south-east, and it was against that threat that she had to concentrate her major naval strength.

The task of the Royal Australian Navy was, therefore, to use her larger fleet units in collaboration with the British and United States Fleets in such a way as would best serve the interests of sea power in its wider aspects, while at the same time ensuring the integrity of 'immediate Australian waters by, in cooperation with the Royal Australian Air Force, patrolling and protecting the long Australian coastline, maintaining the coastal and approach shipping routes, and safeguarding the all-important sea supply lines to New Guinea, the Torres Strait islands, and Darwin. 

That is to say, to exercise the unchanging function of sea power to keep c6ntrol of the sea, to make freely available its use to our own ships carrying our own soldiers, our own war materials and supplies, our own life-giving imports and exports, and to deny such use to the ships of the enemy.

This latter was a task which, in narrow waters open to enemy air attack, was one to be shared by the Navy and the Air Force. Past experience had shown that the Navy alone suffered too great a disadvantage when operating without air support in narrow waters under enemy air dominance. The job could be done by ships alone when air support was lacking if the need exceeded all other considerations, all considerations of losses of ships and men. It was done at Greece and at Crete, and the convoys which enabled Malta to hold out were fought through in similar circumstances. 

As a result, the Middle East was saved, air power was built up, and North Africa was won and Italy defeated, with the Mediterranean reopened as an Empire life line. The importance of sea power, without which none of these things could have been done, was again made apparent. But Britain's lack of Mediterranean air power in those days of 1940 and 1941 made the odds heavy and the cost high. Let us see how it worked out here.

In the Archipelagos through which the Japanese drove in their southward advance from December 1941 to May 1942 the odds were all in their favour. As had the Axis Powers in the Mediterranean during 19401941, they had overwhelming air power, operating both from carriers and from land bases on the islands. In addition, they had absolute naval superiority, so that their control of the sea within the Archipelagos was complete, and they could move their invasion armies as and when they were needed with little and largely ineffective opposition.

Their advance was rapid. The part the Royal Australian Navy took in assisting our American and Dutch Allies in the vain attempt to stem that advance has been told in H.M.A.S. It cost Australia the cruiser H.M.A.S. Perth and the sloop Yarra. Yet the advance, although rapid, was not speedy enough. Singapore and the Philippines were lost to Britain and the United States, but theirs was not a dead loss. The Allied gain in the time it took the Japanese finally to remove these possible threats to their flanks was little enough. But, as it turned out, it sufficed.

Among the early Australian moves were the garrisoning and reinforcement of Allied islands which acted as a protective screen to the north of the continent. An Australian garrison had previously been established at Rabaul, and a few days after Japan's entry into the war the R.A.N. was actively cooperating with our Dutch Allies in the transport of A.I.F. troops to Dutch Timor and to Ambon, the movements being carried out in Australian and Dutch transports, with naval escorts of H.M.A. ships. Shortly before this, Australia had experienced her first air alarm. This was at 2200 local time at Darwin, on the 11th December, 1941, when the Port War Signal Station reported having heard aircraft. A message had been received earlier from Ambon reporting eight aircraft flying south, and these aircraft could have arrived over Darwin at the time of the report. No raid developed, and "All clear" was sounded at 2330.

The first large-scale reinforcement on the eastern side of the island screen took place in January 1942. A number of troop transports, including one of the world's largest passenger liners, took troops and equipment from Australia to Port Moresby under the ocean escort of the Royal Australian Navy.

Thus did Port Moresby blossom as a large scale base in the present war, although as a naval establishment it had been In the picture since the opening of hostilities with Germany in September 1939. Earlier in that year, Port Moresby had been the headquarters of the New Guinea Naval Survey party which had been operating under Lieutenant-Commander R. B. A. Hunt, R.A.N., and this officer was appointed Naval Officer-in-Charge, Port Moresby, when it became apparent that war with Germany was imminent. The first duty of N.O.I.C. Port Moresby was to establish Port War Signal Station, Examination Service, and Naval Control Service, using personnel of the New Guinea Survey party.

With the outbreak of war, however, additional personnel was sent to the establishment from the mainland, and in this connection Base Staff Port Moresby claims that:

"The original two officers and eighteen ratings, all R.A.N.R. personnel, drawn from Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane depots, were the first R.A.N.R. personnel to leave the shores of Australia proper after the outbreak of war. In fact it seems probable that they were the first representatives of any of the defence services to leave Australia after commencement of hostilities. Further the Base Staff at Port Moresby was the first Australian Naval Staff established away from the Australian Coast."

At about this period the "N" Class destroyers had representation in the eastern war theatre. During January 1942, H.M.A.Ss Napier, Nizam and Nestor were off the coast of Java, when they formed part of a British force which brought out aircraft reinforcements for the hard-pressed land forces in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. Theirs was only a fleeting visit, however, and urgent duties elsewhere called them to the westward and later to the Mediterranean, where the three ships were in company-with

the addition of their sister Norman-when Nestor was sunk as a result of damage suffered in an air attack on the 16th June, 1942. But that is another story.

Meanwhile the Japanese southward drive -continued rapidly. In the west, the enemy landed at Balikpapan in Borneo on the 23rd January, and the same day he took Rabaul in the east, overwhelming the small Australian garrison by sheer weight of numbers. His advance was bringing him within bombing , in range of Australia's "Near North", and Port ~Moresby had first of a number of experiences of such attacks during the night of the 2nd-3rd February, when a number of bombs was dropped at about 0330, only slight damage resulting. On this occasion the R.A.N. suffered its first casualty in New Guinea, when several bombs were dropped not far from the naval quarters, and a rating in an open slit trench was injured by a flying stone fragment.

The first enemy raid on the Australian mainland was far more severe. This was at Darwin, on the 19th February, and resulted in considerable damage and some shipping losses, and a long casualty list with many killed, including Royal Australian Navy and United States Navy personnel, Royal Australian Air Force personnel, merchant seamen and civilians.

This Darwin attack was the culmination of a series of attacks carried out by Japanese aircraft on shipping in the Arafura and Timor seas, the heaviest of these being on the 16th February, when a convoy bound from Darwin to Dutch Timor, escorted by the United States cruiser Houston and the destroyer Peary, and the two R.A.N. sloops Warrego and Swan, was heavily bombed by thirty-five Japanese heavy bombers and nine four-engined flying boats. The majority of the attacks were made on the U.S.S. Houston, and observers speak of the magnificent fight she put up. Despite the strength of the enemy attack, no hits were scored on the ships, and the convoy returned to Darwin undamaged.

H.M.A. ships - of which a number were in Darwin during the raid of the 19th February - were fortunate in that they suffered no material losses apart from a lugger, which was sunk, though practically all the ships were heavily machine-gunned-some suffering casualties-as well as being bombed. Of the other ships sunk was the United States destroyer Peary, which went down fighting her guns to the last in a manner which is spoken of with the highest admiration. One or two H.M.A. ships suffered slight damage, but not sufficient to put them out of action. R.A.N. casualties during this raid were five killed and thirty-six wounded.

In the northern areas now the smaller vessels of the Royal Australian Navy-the A.M.S. vessels-were coming into their own and doing valuable and arduous work. Seven of them-as has been told in H.M.A.S. were at this period operating with success in the Malayan Archipelago. And at this stage of the story it is as well to advance the claim of Wollongong to have been the last R.A.N. ship to have left Singapore before the capitulation, it having been stated in H.M.A.S. that Ballarat had that distinction. In all respect, of value and high standard, however, the work of all these little ships bearing the names of Australian towns, wherever they were employed, was similar. They were to shoulder heavy tasks in the months to come, and carry them out with distinction and success, as were many other smaller- sisters who carried on the Australian naval tradition in tasks which by their nature denied them any current public recognition.

During February the Japanese grip closed and tightened on Australia's northern island screen. On the eighteenth of the month the enemy occupied Finschhafen, to the north of Huon Gulf, New Guinea. The day following the raid on Darwin, he took Koepang and Dilli, in Timor. Thus began the Navy's association with the Timor "guerrillas", which was to continue until the evacuation of that force in early 1943, after it had harried and pestered, and harmed the Japanese not a little over a period of nearly twelve months.

Port Moresby experienced its second raid on the night of the 4th/5th February, again at about 033o, and on the 24th February had its first daylight raid. This was the commencement of a period during which both Darwin to the west and Port Moresby to the east were to become familiar with Japanese aircraft. Darwin's introduction was harsher than Port Moresby's, but familiarity, though it did not breed contempt, did breed nicknames. As one report from the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Darwin, stated inter alia:

"Enemy aircraft reconnaissance in the Timor Sea by four-engined flying boats has been fairly extensive. The flying boat which regularly appeared in the western approaches to Darwin was known to the A.M.S. vessels on which 'visiting car s were dropped, as 'Recco Joe'. The Jap has locally been nicknamed 'Merv'."

Koepang and Dilli were occupied on the 20th February. On the 2nd March Japanese aircraft bombed Wyndham and Broome. On the 8th March the enemy occupied Lae and Salamaua, in the Huon Gulf, New Guinea. The pincers were creeping closer to the north of Australia itself. There still remained, however, the Timor Sea and the Torres Strait to cross before an invader could set foot on the land. Bombing itself was not sufficient. 

Nor, for that matter, was the bombing all on one side. In the west a number of raids were carried out during February by aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force on objectives in Timor and Tanimbar Islands, and during March Allied air power began to grow in New Guinea, and to return the compliment to the enemy by carrying out heavy raids on his positions at Lae and Salamaua.

Meanwhile, the Malayan Archipelago had fallen entirely into Japanese hands with the enemy's conquest of Java, which was completed early in March. He was now in possession of dominating sea power and air power within the chain of islands forming the north-eastern boundary of the Indian Ocean, and this power extended right across the north of Australia, reaching down to the nearest islands screening the continent, and continuing to the eastward to include the northern Solomons, the Japanese having occupied Buka Island and established themselves on Bougainville and Faisi during March.

Away over to the west, toward the Bay of Bengal, Japanese penetration was also proceeding. The British forces were having to withdraw in Burma, and on the 23rd March the enemy occupied the Andaman Islands, opening his way for naval and air attacks in the Bay of Bengal. These were not long in coming. India had its first taste of air attack with the enemy's bombing of Cocanada and Vizagapatam on the north-east coast on the 6th April. 

The aircraft came from a Japanese naval force, including carriers, which carried out a raid into the Bay of Bengal. Three days later Trincomalee and Colombo, in Ceylon, were bombed, an operation which cost the enemy heavily in aircraft. The Japanese naval force in the Bay of Bengal during these attacks was reported as consisting of at least three battleships, five carriers, heavy and light cruisers and destroyer flotillas. No surface action developed, all enemy action being confined to air attacks, in which we lost the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Hermes, the cruisers H.M.S. Dorsetshire and Cornwall, and the Australian destroyer H.M.A.S. Vampire.

In spite of the Japanese strength, however, this excursion did not develop beyond the dimensions of a raid, and the enemy force withdrew from the area within a few days. The British retained control of the Indian Ocean, a fact which was made clear by the safe arrival in Australia during March of units of the A.I.F., which were brought back from the Middle East. The convoy in which they came had a quite uneventful passage, with no sight nor sign of the enemy.

At this stage it might be as well to take a wider survey of the general world operations.

In the west, the Battle of the Atlantic was still in full swing, with the Allies holding their own against the U-boats. Britain had long before this taken on an additional maritime liability in the shape of the Arctic convoys she was fighting through to Russia. It was about the time of the Japanese raid into the Bay of Bengal that the British Navy and Merchant Service were fighting one of those all out battles against German surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft, which became a feature of the Murmansk convoy operations. This particular occasion was that on which large convoy, whose escorts included an aircraft carrier and the cruiser H.M.S. Trinidad, survived three combined attacks, during which at least one German destroyer was sunk, and three U-boats severely damaged, if not sunk.

In Russia itself the opposing armies were poised for the coming German offensive. The Russians still held Sebastopol - the fortress was to fall at the beginning of July, after an eight months' siege - but the Germans were to take the Crimea and drive well to the eastward before the northern summer was over.

Further south in Libya, the Axis forces were also gaining the upper hand. Christmas 1941 had seen the British drive to the west reach Benghazi, but the following weeks had seen the tide of war change and sweep eastwards again. We lost Tobruk in June, and in the same month the advancing Germans and Italians crossed the Egyptian frontier, causing the British to retire from Mersa Matruh. Shortly afterwards the British line was established from El Alamein to the Qattara Depression, and only seventy miles westward of Alexandria.

Another British maritime commitment. Three hundred British merchant ships were continuously employed on the long passage from Britain round the Cape of Good Hope to Egypt and the Middle East, to keep the armies supplied and enable them to hold the El Alamein line, and prepare for the subsequent westward drive which was to come.

In India the situation was far from bright. The Cripps Mission, which had sought to find a solution of the differences splitting the country, had failed in its endeavours. Mahatma Gandhi's draft motion for the All India Congress Committee demanded British withdrawal from India, stating inter alia: "If India were freed her first step would probably be to negotiate with Japan. Congress is of opinion that if the British withdrew, India would be able to defend herself in the event of the Japanese or any other aggressor attacking India." Akyab, the last port held by the British in Burma, was lost, and early in May the Japanese were on the Indian border and within bombing range of Indian cities with land based aircraft, Chittagong, chief city of the Bengal Presidency, being bombed on the 8th May.

To the Axis Powers, to Germany and Italy in the west, and to Japan in the east, it must have appeared that their respective eastward and westward drives promised well, and that their claim that control of the Indian Ocean had passed from the British Navy had some foundation in near-future fact. The prospects of a link between West and East Axis must have appeared bright.

British sea power was such, however, that further commitments could be undertaken to place a spoke in the Axis wheel. On the 6th May a British naval force escorting troop transports arrived at the Indian Ocean island of Madagascar (hitherto under Vichy French administration) off the south-east African coast, and occupied the port and naval base of Diego Suarez, thus forestalling any Japanese moves in that direction, giving Britain additional naval bases, and strengthening the security of the Indian Ocean route to the Middle East and India.

Sea power, then, was keeping the situation under control in the main oceans, and maintaining the various lines of communication. By its means Russia was being supported with an increasing flow of vital war supplies, the Middle East armies were being built up for the decisive westward push, and India was being reinforced to an extent which denied Japanese aspirations regarding that country, and stopped the enemy's westward drive. Now sea power was about to be manifested in the Pacific with results peculiarly important to Australia.

Short as had been the period of the Japanese advance to the limits of the Western Pacific Archipelagos, it had not been short enough. The time involved had permitted expression to be given to the amazing recuperative powers of the United States. By the time the Japanese were established on the Akyab Northern Solomons line, our American allies had largely repaired the damage done to their naval power at Pearl Harbour, and had been enabled so to reinforce and dispose their naval forces in the south-western Pacific as to be ready for eventualities.

Indeed, they did not await eventualities, but by a well-planned use of that additional range given to naval power by carrier-borne aircraft, carried out an operation which must have caused the enemy concern as to the safety of his own home waters. On the 18th April, Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe were bombed by aircraft from the U.S. carrier Hornet, which flew off sixteen bombers eight hundred miles from the main Japanese islands. The attack, which took the enemy completely by surprise, was successful.

But the Japanese were fully seized with the importance to them of Port Moresby, and early in May 1942, they made an attempt to launch an attack on the base by sea. The Battle of the Coral Sea was the result.

This battle took place in a series of engagements over a wide area during the period the 4th May to the 8th May, and was the first -"carrier battle" in history, in which powerful opposing surface forces never came within of each other, and all the damage was done by aircraft. It was an example of how naval power is extended by air power in the exercise of sea power.

The actual Battle of the Coral Sea began on the 4th May in Tulagi Harbour, Solomon Islands (where Japanese southward penetration had continued) when aircraft from carriers with a United States task force under the command of Rear-Admiral Frank Fletcher, U.S.N., surprised and smashed a Japanese invasion force which was part of a force intended for the Port Moresby operation. Twelve Japanese vessels, naval and transport, were sunk or damaged. United States losses were three aircraft. On the 7th May, Rear Admiral Fletcher's aircraft struck the main body of the Japanese force in the Louisiade Archipelago off Misima Island. 

In this attack the new Japanese aircraft carrier Rykoku and a heavy cruiser were sunk, and more than twenty-five enemy aircraft were shot down. The following day the same task force succeeded in seriously damaging a second Japanese carrier, the Shokaku, with bomb and torpedo hits. During this engagement the enemy counter-attacked with aircraft on U.S.S. Lexington, which suffered torpedo and bomb hits and subsequently sank.

Meanwhile, in the western Coral Sea, a task force under the command of the Rear Admiral Commanding the Australian Squadron, Rear-Admiral J. G. Crace, C.B., and including the Australian cruisers H.M.A.Ss Australia (Flag) and Hobart, was screening Port Moresby. This force withstood without loss or damage, and without air support, a heavy enemy attack by high-level and torpedo bombers on the 7th May, shooting down three of the enemy aircraft.

The final result of the Coral Sea battle was that this Japanese attempt on Port Moresby was frustrated, the enemy suffering a defeat in which he lost one aircraft carrier, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, two destroyers and several transports and small vessels, and sustaining severe damage to more than twenty ships, including an aircraft carrier. Of the damaged ships, a cruiser and destroyer probably sank. The United States Navy lost the carrier Lexington, the destroyer Sims, and the tender Neosho.

Having suffered this set-back, the next Japanese major move was directed to the north, their naval operations south of the Equator apart from such as were connected with the transport and gradual penetration of their land forces in the islands north and north-east of Australia-being confined to attempts to cut the Allied lines of communication by submarine attacks. On the night of the 31st May and the 1st June, midget submarine attacks were carried out on points so far apart as the harbours of Diego Suarez in Madagascar, and Sydney, New South Wales. In neither case was the attack successful. Little damage was suffered by the Allies, and the Japanese lost midget submarines in both places, at least three being destroyed by harbour defence vessels at Sydney.

The Sydney Harbour raid was the precursor of a submarine campaign against shipping off the east coast of Australia, a number of vessels being torpedoed and sunk during June and July, not without loss to the Japanese submarines themselves. Such enemy activity occurred intermittently subsequent to May, 1942, and is described in greater detail in a later chapter of this book.

The Japanese northern thrust, which occurred in early June, was a two-pronged attack, one directed at Attu and Kiska islands in the Aleutians, and the other at Midway Island. Each of these objectives lies at the western extremity of a chain of islands leading to an important base, in the case of Attu and Kiska that of Dutch Harbour on Unalaska Island; in the case of Midway that of Pearl Harbour, on Oahu. Success would have achieved a double object, first to remove potential threats to Japan itself, second to establish footholds and air bases-for attack on key American positions.

The immediate Aleutian objectives were secured by Japan, both Attu and Kiska being occupied without opposition. In the Midway operation, however, the Japanese suffered~ their second defeat, and one even heavier than that of the Coral Sea.

At about 0900 on the 3rd June, United States naval reconnaissance aircraft reported a strong enemy force about seven hundred miles off Midway Island, proceeding eastward. This force was attacked by aircraft from Midway Island, and hits were scored on one cruiser and one transport. This attack was followed up by a moonlight attack by Catalinas during the night, two torpedo hits being scored on large ships, one of which is believed to have sunk.

Early the next morning, United States medium and heavy bombers, dive bombers and torpedo aircraft attacked the enemy force, causing considerable damage. The enemy countered with a bombing attack on Midway Island, but could not disable it as an airfield, and failed to catch any United States aircraft grounded. Meanwhile, United States naval forces were brought into position, and carrier borne aircraft were launched and throughout the day carried out a number of attacks which, by nightfall, had completely defeated the Japanese.

The situation at sundown on the 4th June was that the United States forces had gained mastery of the air in the Midway region, and had sunk or so severely damaged that they sank later four Japanese aircraft carriers, damaged two battleships-one severely-sunk a destroyer, and damaged several other ships. At dawn next day the United States forces returned to the attack on the enemy, who was, now retiring to the westward, and scored further bomb hits on enemy cruisers. The chase continued throughout the day and following night, and on the next day, the 6th June, between 0930 and 1000, carrier-borne United States aircraft scored direct hits on the heavy cruisers Mogami and Mikuma, and sank one of the screening destroyers.

The United States had suffered its heaviest naval loss of the battle on the 4th June, when the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Yorktown was disabled by enemy aircraft, and subsequently sank. Now, on the 6th June, the last day of the battle, it sustained its second, and lesser loss, when the destroyer Hamman was torpedoed and sunk by a Japanese submarine. Apart from these two ship losses, the United States forces lost a considerable number of aircraft.

The Japanese, however, suffered out of all proportion. Their expedition was a complete failure, and cost them four aircraft carriers, Kaga, Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu sunk; three battleships damaged by bomb and torpedo hits; one cruiser, Mikuma, sunk; four heavy cruisers damaged; one light cruiser damaged; three destroyers sunk and several damaged; and a number of transports damaged and/or sunk. In addition, the Japanese lost nearly two hundred aircraft, and suffered a heavy casualty list in killed or drowned.

The 6rh June ended the Battle of Midway. The enemy was in full retreat to the westward, and repeated attempts by the United States forces to re-establish contact were fruitless. Midway was another occasion on which a major sea battle was fought without opposing surface forces being engaged one with another. This time all the damage to surface forces was done by aircraft and submarines.

Severe as the Coral Sea and Midway defeats were to Japan, she still continued to press forward. Indeed, she could not do otherwise. While the Allies retained footholds in the islands to the north and east of Australia, not only was Australia sheltered but Japanese domination of the Archipelagos was menaced with the potential threat of growing Allied naval and air power, and Japan had to endeavour to deny the Allies advanced bases from which to exercise that power. She therefore continued her southward penetration of the Solomon Islands and determined-since the attempt to take Moresby by sea had been frustrated-to land on the northern coast of Papua, where she had air power which gave her a large measure of sea control-and attack Moresby from the landward side.

Early in July, therefore, she extended her control in the Solomons to the occupation of the island of Guadalcanal, and commenced building an airstrip at Lunga. Three weeks later her troops landed in strength at Buna and Gona, and the enemy began his overland march to Port Moresby. Two days after the landing he was at Awala, twenty-six miles west-south-west of Buna; on the 28th July he occupied Kokoda.

Meanwhile, in the west, he was occupying areas already within his sphere of influence and under his control. During July his forces landed on Tanimbar, Aru, Kei and Bunda islands in the Arafura Sea, and at the end of the month his aircraft carried out a raid on Port Hedland, Western Australia. Concurrently with these moves, he was further extending his penetration in the Solomons, and made landings on Malaita Island.

But the example of the celestial sun pursuing his southern declination, was not long to be followed by those who had taken "Old Jamaica" as their symbol. For the people of the south the sun was now rising, and soon they would be able to say, "Lo, the winter is past." The nadir was not quite yet, but the turning point lay close ahead when, from defence and retreat, our policy was to follow that line of attack and advance for which the victories of the Coral Sea and Midway had paved the road.

III. THE TURN OF THE TIDE

On the seas the battle for supremacy over the submarine continued, with the odds slowly rising on the side of the Allies, while the British Mediterranean Fleet-including Australian destroyers-still fought the convoys through to Malta, enabling that fortress to withstand the heaviest air attacks the Italians and Germans could inflict upon it. In the south-west comer of the Pacific, the Japanese were advancing across New Guinea, over the Owen Stanley Ranges from Buna towards Port Moresby, and extending their occupation of the Solomon Islands. But it was in the South-west Pacific that the first sign of the turning tide was to become manifest.

On the 22nd July, 1942, Buna and Gona were occupied by the Japanese in force. But some time previous to this an Australian force had been established in a strong strategic position at Milne Bay, on the south-east tip of New Guinea. The establishment of Milne Bay as an operational base was an offensive, not a defensive move, and it was to fill an increasingly important role in the story of the South-west Pacific area as the Allied offensive developed. The story of the naval development and function of Milne Bay is told in outline in "The R.A.N. at Papua", in the later pages of this book.

Navy, Army and Air Force all participated in the establishment and development of Milne Bay. For the Royal Australian Navy, Milne Bay meant an extension of its activities in the routeing and escorting of ships carrying troops, equipment, and supplies; and in the setting up of a Base Staff comprising Communications, Signal Stations, Naval Control Service, Intelligence, and other sections. Out here in the South-west Pacific was to be reenacted something of the work of the Navy along the Egyptian and Libyan coasts during the time of the "Tobruk Ferry". 

Milne Bay was to be the Mersa Matruh from which the little ships of the R.A.N.-more especially the corvettes"-were to carry the Allied advance along the jungle-covered northern coast of New Guinea, with its serrated spine of the Owen Stanleys and chocolate box sunsets, its smooth seas hiding dangerous coral reefs, its too-bright moon or sun when the lack of air support made the always present threat of enemy air attack-and of submarine attack more menacing. These little ships, and the merchant ships - among which those of our Dutch Allies were always on the job-performed invaluable work during those weeks which preceded the fall of Buna, and, then and since, contributed largely to the success of the Allied operations.

The Royal Australian Naval Reserve was well to the fore in all operations and operational bases in both eastern and western areas to the north of Australia. Reserve personnel preponderated in the "corvettes"-most of which had Reserve officers in command as well as being manned largely by Reservists and the Base Staffs also were to a greater extent made up of "Wavy Navy" officers and ratings, while for various periods at this stage of the war, Royal Australian Naval Reserve officers held the appointments of naval officers-in-charge at Thursday Island and Milne Bay. Milne Bay experienced its first air raid on Tuesday, the 4th August. 

This was a daylight raid shortly after noon, in which five Zero fighters made a ground strafing attack. Such attacks-with the addition of more determined attempts to meet this growing threat at the south-east tip of the island-were made in increasing strength by the Japanese, but they could not stop the development of the base. It was, within the next few weeks, to see some piquant situations, as that of its bay being used simultaneously by both our own and enemy ships. But it was to grow steadily in importance as an advanced base and transshipment port, and in those early months of its development it became very familiar to various types of smaller ships of the Royal Australian Navy-the destroyers, the sloops, and the "corvettes", which, first employed in safeguarding the sea communications on which Milne Bay was built up, were later to extend those communications along the island's northern coast as the attack was pressed against the Japanese invader. 

Meanwhile, farther to the eastward in the Solomon Islands, a heavy blow against the Japanese was in the making, and in the delivery of this blow the Royal Australian Navy was to take a leading part with our American ally. In June 1942 Rear-Admiral J. G. Crace, -who had been Rear-Admiral Commanding the Australian Squadron from the 1st November, 1939, when he had relieved the Commodore Commanding the Australian Squadron, Commodore Wilfred Rupert Patterson, C.V.O. hauled down his flag on his return to the Royal Navy. 

He was succeeded by Rear Admiral V. A. C. Crutchley, V.C., D.S.C., who hoisted his flag as R.A.C.A.S. on the 13th June, 1942. Two months later his flagship, H.M.A.S. Australia (Captain H. B. Farncomb, M.V.0., R.A.N.), with H.M.A.S. Canberra (Captain F. E. Getting, R.A.N.), and H.M.A.S. Hobart (Captain H. A. Showers, R.A.N.), formed part of the Allied naval force that dealt the first heavy attack on the Japanese which resulted in the recapture of Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the Solomon Islands.

The attack on the Solomon Islands was delivered by an amphibious force, strongly escorted by cruisers and destroyers, and supported by carrier-borne aircraft. The assault convoy, including the transports carrying the U.S. Marines who were to make the landings, approached the area during the night of the 6th/7th August. Approaching from the westward, the force split into two off Savo Island -a small island lying in the western entrance to the channel between Tulagi and Guadalcanal-one section, including H.M.A.S. Canberra, proceeding to the westward of Savo Island to Tulagi, the other, including H.M.A.Ss Australia and Hobart, proceeding to the southward of Savo to Guadalcanal. In both cases the approach was made without the enemy's knowledge, and the naval bombardment of his positions which preceded the landings at both Tulagi and Guadalcanal, took him completely by surprise.

The first official communiqué' giving details of this opening phase of the Solomons operations was issued by the United States Navy Department, Washington, ten days later. It states: "The attacks were a complete surprise to the enemy, and eighteen seaplanes were destroyed before the Japanese could get into action. Transport-borne amphibious forces of the United States Marine Corps made several landings on the islands in the Guadalcanal and Tulagi area. Vigorous enemy resistance was rapidly overcome and a number of Japanese prisoners was taken. Shore positions taken by the United States forces since have been developed and are now well established. During these landing operations, cruisers and destroyers were so disposed as to protect transports and cargo, ships as they unloaded troops and equipment. 

While thus engaged on the 7th and 8th August our forces were attacked by enemy land based aircraft. These attacks were driven off, and at least eighteen more enemy planes were destroyed, while only minor damage was suffered by our forces. During the night of the 8th/9th of August an enemy force of cruisers and destroyers attempted to attack our transports, cargo ships and supporting forces. This enemy force was intercepted and engaged by our cruisers and destroyers. Heavy fighting which followed resulted in the enemy being forced to retreat before reaching the vessels engaged in the landing operations. 

Close-range fighting during this night engagement resulted in damage both to the enemy and to our forces. This night action is the only engagement between surface forces which has been fought to date in the Solomon Islands. It is impossible, in a night engagement, to determine accurately the damage inflicted on the opposing force. No further statement is made at this time of the extent of the damage to our forces because of the obvious value of such information to the enemy."

Previous to the issue of this Washington communiqué', it had been announced in Australia that H.M.A.S. Canberra had been lost in the night engagement of the 8th/9th August. A communiqué issued from Washington on the 13th October gave details of that night engagement and of the losses then suffered by the Allies. It stated: "It was imperative that these operations"-the unloading of transport and supply ships -"be successfully completed". To this end, screening groups of Allied cruisers and destroyers were placed on both sides of Savo Island to guard the western entrances to the transport area. An additional screening force was stationed near the transports to provide close coverage within the harbour. 

At about 1.45 a.m. on the night of the 8th/9th August, enemy aircraft dropped flares over the transports and supply ships. Simultaneously a force of enemy cruisers and destroyers skirted the south coast of Savo Island at high speed, and headed in the direction of the transports and supply ships, which were silhouetted in the illuminated area. The rapidly moving enemy sighted the covering unit located south-east of Savo, and opened fire immediately with guns and torpedoes, seriously damaging and setting the Australian cruiser Canberra on fire. 

It later became necessary to abandon Canberra, and she sank the following morning, as already announced. Following a brief engagement, without the south-eastern screen, the Japanese altered their course to proceed through the passage north-east of Savo Island. Here the Japanese forces encountered our north-east screen of cruisers and destroyers, and a battle at close range resulted. The action was fought with guns and torpedoes, with the targets illuminated by searchlights and star shells. The enemy fire was heavy and accurate, and the United States cruisers Quincy and Vincenne5 were hit repeatedly, and sank during the night. A third cruiser, Astoria, was badly damaged, and burned throughout the night. She sank the following morning."

As was told in H.M.A.S., Captain F. E. Getting, Commanding Officer of H.M.A.S. Canberra, died of wounds the day following the engagement. Two fine gestures were paid to Australia, one by the British Government and one by the United States Government in respect of the loss of H.M.A.S. Canberra. Later in the year the British Government offered-and Australia accepted-the gift of the cruiser H.M.S. Shropshire to replace H.M.A.S. Canberra, and the United States Government announced that one of its new cruisers then building was to be christened U.S.S. Canberra in memory of H.M.A. ship. The naming ceremony was carried out by Lady Dixon, wife of the Honourable Sir Owen Dixon, K.C.M.G., Australian Minister to Washington, when the ship was launched early in 1943

A first-hand description of the events of the 7th August, 1942, as seen by an observer in H.M.A.S. Australia, is given in the article "The First Day", later in this book.

While the enemy was suffering this reverse in the Solomons, he was prosecuting his advance overland in New Guinea, and continuing his air attacks on Port Moresby and Milne Bay, and on the Australian mainland, principally on Darwin. But his attempts to interfere with our shipping by attacking ports enjoyed very little success beyond that of his initial Darwin raid. He did, however, succeed in sinking SS. Macdhui in Port Moresby Harbour on the 18th June, as the result of two pattern bombing attacks delivered on consecutive days, on each occasion by eighteen heavy bombers.

In the first attack Macdhui sustained one hit and a number of near misses, suffering casualties in consequence. The following day the attackers again concentrated on Macdhui, which this time received four hits, resulting in a number of personnel being killed and the ship being set on fire. She burned fiercely, and, gradually taking a heavy list to port, drifted across the harbour until she grounded and capsized and burned herself out. Ten members of the crew, including the ship's doctor, were killed. The following month the enemy extended his air attacks on the Australian mainland by giving Port Hedland in the west and Townsville in the east their first experience of raids. These, however, were isolated attacks, and in neither case paid any dividends to the Japanese.

Both ourselves and the enemy continued to build up strength in New Guinea. Our control of the sea lines of communication between the Australian mainland and Port Moresby and Milne Bay enabled the continuous reinforcement of those areas, by ships carrying not only men but the heavy equipment and supplies-including ammunition and fuel-necessary for the upkeep of growing armies, the establishment and maintenance of airfields, and the building up of the air striking power which was to play such an important part in the New Guinea campaign. Artillery, tanks, thousands of tons of bombs and shells, thousands of tons of petrol, heavy road-making and airfield-making equipment, commissariat -a regular flow poured in by ship, providing the material for the blows that were to prevent the enemy from enjoying to the same extent similar facilities on the north side of the island.

The Battle of Communications and Supplies was developing, the battle that was to decide the New Guinea campaign as it was to decide the North African campaign, and to which the decision as to who controlled the sea was to provide the answer. From August 1942 onwards, with the building up of Allied air power at Port Moresby and Milne Bay, and the consequent extension of Allied air activity along the northern New Guinea coast, the enemy's difficulties increased.

This state of affairs did not immediately arise. For some time, working at night and under cover of low visibility weather conditions, the Japanese were able to reinforce by sea, using transports, supply ships, and destroyers. In many cases they suffered damage and losses from our air attacks, but for a while they were able to achieve their object. Their first reinforcement of Buna took place during the night of the 13th/ 14th August, when they landed troops and supplies from supply ships and transports under Allied attack from the air, and similar landings-though with decreasing success-took place in later weeks.

A fortnight after his first reinforcement of Buna, the enemy made an attempt to take Milne Bay. On Tuesday, the 25th August, a convoy of ships heading for Milne Bay was sighted and subjected to an attack by Allied bombers. The convoy got through, however, and at 0140 on Wednesday, the 26th August, landed troops and equipment-including tanks-on the northern shore of Milne Bay about four miles east of Gili Gili. The Japanese immediately marched westward along the tracks toward Gili Gili, but were intercepted by Australian troops, and fierce jungle fighting began. Throughout the day the battle continued and, later, Japanese naval units entered the bay, shelled Allied shore positions, and made new landings of troops.

The Japanese were, however, taken by surprise by the strength of our forces in the Milne Bay area, and furthermore were unable sufficiently to reinforce, or to consolidate their positions, in the face of the heavy and continuous Allied air attacks to which they were subjected, and against which they themselves were able to offer but little air opposition, and that ineffective. In the land fighting they were decisively beaten by the Australian troops, their farthest westward advance bringing them to the eastward edge of the landing strip where, as they emerged from the jungle, they were met with such a concentrated fire from Australian and American troops that their advance was stopped and survivors were chased back into the jungle by Australian patrols. On the night of Saturday, the 29th August, a Japanese fleet composed of one cruiser and eight destroyers entered Milne Bay, having made its approach under cover of a torrential rain storm. This force apparently evacuated as many as possible of the Japanese survivors.

From then on until the final elimination of the Japanese, the Australian land forces in Milne Bay were occupied in mopping up operations. The enemy apparently succeeded in evacuating some more of his troops, for during a period of some days Japanese naval units, including cruisers and destroyers, visited the bay under cover of darkness, presumably embarking such troops as managed to survive the Allied bombing and escape the Australian patrols. It was during one of these visits, on the night of 6th/7th September, that S.S. Anshun, lying alongside at Gili Gili, was sunk by shell fire from a cruiser. Such visits by enemy naval forces were, however, limited both in what they could achieve and the period during which they could continue.

This was the period, referred to earlier in this chapter, during which the bay was used simultaneously by both our own and enemy ships. But our own ships were bringing in the men and material that added continuously to the Allied strength ashore and in the air. Within a few days it became impracticable for the Japanese to venture by sea into the area even for short night visits. Their attempt to capture Milne Bay had failed. And soon no tangible evidence of the attempt remained but some broken tanks and landing craft, a few scraps of equipment, and a notice, fastened to a stump of a sawn-off palm tree on the eastern edge of the landing strip, recording:

"This marks the westernmost point of
The Japanese Advance
August 1942
85 Unknown Japanese
Marines lie buried here."

The attack on Milne Bay was part of a three-pronged thrust aimed at the securing by the Japanese of their position in the area north-east of Australia. Of the other two prongs, one was aimed at Nauru and Ocean islands, where landings were made, and the other at Guadalcanal, where the enemy counter-attacked. The Solomons battle which was another of the "carrier battles" fought at long range between carrier-borne and land-based aircraft, and surface vessels was the Battle of Ontong Java, taking its name from that of the island. 

It was fought on the 24th and 25th August, and resulted in a clear-cut victory for the United States forces, who destroyed ninety-two Japanese aircraft, damaged a number of Japanese vessels including battleships and cruisers, and damaged and probably sank the small Japanese carrier Ryujo, for the loss of only three American aircraft. This was the first of a number of Japanese attempts to recapture the Central Solomons, all 1)f which failed, and which cost the enemy dear, especially in both naval and merchant shipping which he could ill afford to lose.

Meanwhile, the Japanese forces which had in landed at Buna and Gona were progressing in their southward advance overland to Port Moresby, and on the 1st September they crossed the Gap in the Owen Stanley Range, the Australian forces withdrawing to Efogiseven miles south-west of the Gap-on the 5th of the month. The Japanese, however, were increasingly to feel the effects of the weakness of their lines of communication, not only their sea-borne lines to the coast itself, but the lengthening and vulnerable line from the coast overland. On the 16th September they reached Ioribawa Ridge, thirty miles from Port Moresby. It was as near to their goal as they were to reach. 

The Allied Air Force, operating from Port Moresby, had secured control of the air and had been hammering at the Japanese line of communication struggling up and over the precipitous mountain range and through the dense rain-sodden jungle. It was the inshore end of the Battle of Communications and Supplies, and the Allies won it. From Ioribawa Ridge the northward retreat of the Japanese began, and before the end of the month the Australians had recaptured the ridge and were following the retreating enemy back over the trail to Kokoda.

At about the time the Japanese in New Guinea were reaching the extent of their southward penetration, their comrades to the east were making another attempt to restore the position in the Solomons, but again without achieving their object. The Japanese did, however, succeed in torpedoing and sinking the U.S. aircraft carrier Wasp, which was the flagship of a task force carrying reinforcements to the U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal.

While this was going on in the Pacific, the tide of attack was flowing again in the Indian Ocean, where the British extended the occupation of Madagascar to the southern end of the island. Three H.M.A. ships took part in these operations, the destroyers Napier, Nizam, and Norman. Napier and Nizam were veterans of the Greece and Crete campaigns, where they took part in the evacuations. Later they had been in the Indian Ocean, when, with H.M.A.S. Norman, they had formed part of the fleet which tried to intercept the Japanese force in the Bay of Bengal in early 1942. The three ships had again been together-with H.M.A.S. Nestor in the Mediterranean in June 1942 as part of the destroyer screen in the outstanding Malta convoy battle. It was when returning to Alexandria on this occasion that Nestor was sunk as the result of an air attack.

The operations at Madagascar, which took place between the 10th and 18th September, included the capture of Majunga on the northwest coast, and of Tamatave on the east coast, and were carried out by a large and powerful naval force escorting and supporting troop transports and supply ships. Both operations were completely successful, and resulted in the whole of Madagascar coming under Allied control. This contributed to the security of the lines of communication to the Middle East, and consequently to the success of the attack which was shortly to be launched by the Eighth Army in Egypt.

By this time the Royal Australian Navy had been considerably strengthened in destroyers, mainly by those made available by Admiralty, but also by the addition of "Tribal" Class destroyers which had been built in Australia and were now coming into commission. Napier, Nizam, Norman and Nestor had been included in the Navy List as H.M.A. ships for some time and in May 1942 a fifth "N" Class ship was added to the number, H.M.A.S. Nepal. July and September 1942 saw two more additions in H.M.A.Ss Quiberon and Quickmatch. All these ships were leading very active and useful lives overseas, where also a number of R.A.N. "corvettes" was employed in various theatres, including the Persian Gulf.

The destroyers, sloops and "corvettes" working, nearer home were no less actively and usefully employed; nor were their "lawful occasions" devoid of excitement. A number of times all three classes of ships, and also smaller vessels operating under the White Ensign in waters north of Australia, were employed on special operations which took them well into enemy waters among enemy-occupied islands. Also, with the extension of regular naval activity around the northern coast of New Guinea which now developed, a most valuable service was performed by the R.A.N. survey ships which carried on their exacting work in most difficult waters under enemy eyes and often under enemy air attack.

August saw the turn of the tide in the Eastern theatre of the global war, a turn made possible by the growing sea power-sea power exercised by both surface forces and aircraft -of the United States in the Pacific Ocean. September saw the flood spreading to other theatres with the capitulation of the whole island of Madagascar. October was to see the tide of Allied attack rise higher in events in Egypt, while November was to present an illustration of the exercising of sea power in the transport of great numbers of men and vast quantities of materials across thousands of miles of sea to culminate in the widespread successful landings on hostile coasts in West and North Africa. In all of these operations the Royal Australian Navy was represented by ships and personnel.

October opened with the Japanese in New Guinea, their line of communication shattered by Allied bombing, retreating northwards from Ioribawa to Buna, with the Australian troops in pursuit. On the 11th and 12th of the month the Japanese Navy suffered a further defeat in the Solomon Islands area in the Battle of Russell Island. In this action the United States Navy, represented by a force of cruisers and destroyers, attacked a similar force of Japanese. The Americans sank a heavy cruiser and destroyer, severely damaged and probably sank two heavy and one light cruisers, and sank four destroyers. United States losses were one destroyer, the U.S.S. Duncan.

Following the retreating Japanese in New Guinea, the Australians re-crossed the Gap in the Owen Stanley Range on the i 6th October. A few days later, two R.A.N. ships one of which had previously enjoyed close association with Australian Army personnel carried out an operation in conjunction with the Army when they took troops from Milne Bay and effected a night landing on Goodenough Island, where the troops were to mop up Japanese who had landed there. The operation saw the co-operation of one of the oldest and one of the newest ships in the Royal Australian Navy, the old destroyer H.M.A.S. Stuart, which was built during the last war, and which in this war had spent the two years 1940 and 1941 in the Mediterranean, taking part in the battles of Calabria and Matapan, and the "Tobruk Ferry Service", and seeing action in plenty; and the new, Australian-built "Tribal" destroyer H.M.A.S. Arunta.

During the month the Japanese landed considerable reinforcements on Guadalcanal. including tanks, and carried out naval bombardments of the island on more than one occasion. United States reinforcements were also landed, and fierce land actions took place in which, as stated by Colonel Knox at the time, the American forces "did a superior job". The "superior job" was not confined to the land fighting. On the 25th and 26th of the month occurred the naval battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, in which the United States forces inflicted further severe punishment on the Japanese Navy. In this clash a United States carrier task force attacked a similar Japanese force. Two Japanese carriers-one of them of the Shokaku Class-were severely damaged. In addition the Americans damaged a Japanese battleship, and one heavy and one light cruiser, by bombs and torpedoes, and destroyed a hundred and fifteen enemy aircraft for certain and forty-six probably. The United States suffered the loss of two ships, the aircraft carrier Hornet and the destroyer Porter.

The forward movement was gaining in momentum and extending in area. Before October was out, the Eighth Army was on the move in Egypt, and by the end of the month the Germans and Italians were in full retreat westward across the Libyan Desert. On the day, the 25th November, that hostilities ceased in Madagascar with the signing of an armistice, the Cairo communiqué announced: "The Axis forces in the Western Desert, after twelve days and nights of ceaseless attacks by our land and air forces are now in full retreat. Their disordered columns are being relentlessly attacked by our land forces and Allied air forces by day and night. . . . The Eighth Army continues its advance." The Australian Ninth Division was there, and destroyers of the Royal Australian Navy were in the Mediterranean. The road lay along a coast with landmarks that A.I.F. and R.A.N. knew equally well -Alex., Mersa Matruh, Sidi Barram, Sollum, Bardia, Tobruk, Dema, Benghazi. But this time the road was going beyond Benghazi.

It was about this time, also, that we learned somewhat of affairs at sea, and the progress of the Battle of Communications and Supplies on the main oceans. The First Lord of the Admiralty announced that, since the outbreak of the war, five hundred and thirty Axis submarines had been sunk or damaged. And from Washington came the information that, while during June a hundred and eleven Allied merchant ships had been lost to enemy attack, the numbers had fallen to forty-eight in August and fourteen in September. Two more 35,000-ton battleships, said the Admiralty, H.M.S. Anson and H.M.S. Howe, had been commissioned, as also a number of new cruisers of the "Lightning" Class.

On the 2nd November the last Japanese remnants were mopped up in Milne Bay, and on the same day Australian troops entered Kokoda, the Japanese having been driven back to the sea at Buna and Gona. The position of the enemy in this area of New Guinea was now rapidly deteriorating. Bombed continuously by Allied aircraft from Port Moresby, they could no longer reinforce or supply their troops at Buna and Gona by sea in any degree approaching the necessary volume. 

During the advance of the Allied land forces over the Owen Stanley Range, the troops had been supplied by air, and air-borne troops had been flown in to strategic points. But now the important sea lines of communication were extending round the south-eastern tip of New Guinea, westward from Milne Bay and along the northern coast of the island. Merchant ships and the stout little A.M.S. vessels-the "corvettes" of the R.A.N.-were opening the sea road towards Buna, and carrying the supplies which were to play such a vital part in the defeat of the enemy.

Press messages from London dated Sunday, the 8th November, gave further evidence of the rising world offensive of the Allies, and of the importance of control of the sea. "While the Eighth Army is pursuing Rommel's fleeing forces in Egypt, a large American expeditionary force has landed at several points in Algeria and Morocco, in North Africa. It is being supported by the Royal Navy and the R.A.F." The Royal Australian Navy was represented in these operations by H.M.A.S. Quiberon, one of the new destroyers. She was one of a large armada of troop transports and supply ships, escort vessels, aircraft carriers and strong naval covering forces. 

In all, approximately one thousand vessels were engaged in the operations involved in the landings. Quiberon' s record of the 8th November paints an impression of that day off the North African coast: "From 0400 until daylight enemy aircraft searched for our force with flares, but flares were all to the north-eastward. Heavy gunfire was heard coming from Algiers during the forenoon. One Fulmar aircraft crashed after having been hit by flak over Algiers; crew were rescued by H.M.A.S. Quiberon. Intermittent gunfire was heard coming from the Algerian coast during the afternoon. Three of H.M. ships bombarded Fort Matibou during the evening. At dusk our force was attacked by a few aircraft, no damage was done."

Church bells, which had not rung since the threat of invasion first arose with the fall of France in June 1940, pealed throughout England on Sunday, the 5th November, 1942, in thanks  for the successes in North Africa. They pealed, also, in Australia, from which country the threat of Japanese invasion had been lifted by the victories of the United States Navy in the Pacific and by the Allied successes in New Guinea. While they rang out, another sea battle was being won in the Solomons, and one which finally dashed any hopes the Japanese may have held of restoring their situation in that area. This was the Second Battle of the Solomons, which was fought over

the three days, the 13th, 14th and 15th November. As were the operations off North Africa, this battle was the result of an invasion attempt. But the invasion of Africa was an outstanding success. The attempted Japanese invasion of Guadalcanal was an equally outstanding failure. They occurred within a week of one another, and, viewed together, strikingly illustrate the role played by sea power.

At North Africa the invaders enjoyed complete control of the sea. In the Solomons they did not. At North Africa, both sides had aircraft, but the invasion forces were not opposed by enemy surface vessels, the only naval opposition being from submarines. In the Solomons, the decisive actions were fought between surface vessels. At North Africa, enemy aircraft sought fruitlessly for nights in succession for the naval forces of the invasion fleets. In the Solomons the decisive actions were night actions fought at close range with guns and torpedoes. 

Numerically, the U.S. naval forces were inferior to the Japanese, but the battle was a sweeping victory for the U.S. Navy. The Japanese lost two battleships, six heavy and two light cruisers, six destroyers, eight transports, and four cargo ships - with several thousand troops and much equipment and supplies. A third battleship, a light cruiser, and seven destroyers were damaged. The Americans lost two light cruisers and six destroyers. Some of the troop transports were beached on Guadalcanal before they were destroyed, but comparatively few of their troops got ashore. 

In the words of a Press correspondent who was with the U.S. forces: "Shelled from sea and land, strafed from the air, the Japs just melted away. Those who did get inland contributed only more rifles and more empty stomachs to the Japanese forces. They had none of the food, artillery and other equipment the Japanese need to maintain their narrowing territory on Guadalcanal."

During the week previous to the Second Battle of the Solomons, a lesser, but also decisive, naval defeat had been suffered by the Japanese in the Indian Ocean. This was on the 11th November, when two heavily armed Japanese merchant cruisers attacked the Dutch tanker Ondina, which was escorted by the Australian-built Royal Indian Navy "corvette" H.M.I.S. Bengal. Although heavily outgunned, the Allied ships by resolute action won the day. Gunfire from Ondina caused a serious explosion in one of the raiders, resulting in her sinking, and both Allied ships, although suffering damage and casualties, reached port safely.

The need to prevent the Japanese force at Buna receiving reinforcements or supplies by sea-possibly by submarine-led to two H.M.A. "corvettes" having a busy afternoon off that port on the 28th November. They were H.M.A.Ss Katoomba and Ballarat, which were detailed to operate in the vicinity to circumvent any such attempt. The ships spent some time as the targets for ten enemy dive bombers, but, although near-missed on a number of occasions, came through without damage and with some enemy aircraft to their credit. A first-hand description of this incident is the subject of the story "Incident in the Life of a Corvette", which appears later in this book.

On the same day that Katoomba and Ballarat were in action blocking enemy sea lines of communication in New Guinea waters, another R.A.N. ship-H.M.A.S. Adelaide was, in co-operation with a ship of the Royal Netherlands Navy, taking similar and effective action in the Indian Ocean. On the 28th November, 1942, Adelaide and a Dutch warship intercepted a German blockade runner. In an effort to evade capture, the German used false signals when challenged, but the ruse did not succeed, whereupon the Germans stopped their ship and took to the boats. 

No sooner were the boats clear, than a series of explosions from scuttling charges occurred in the ship, whose end was hastened by gunfire from the Australian and Dutch warships. The enemy personnel-and Allied prisoners which the German ship was carrying-were picked up by the Allied ships, and later landed. As the Minister for the Navy, Mr. Makin, said: "This action cost neither casualties nor damage to the Australian and Dutch forces, but it cost the enemy a valuable ship and a valuable cargo." That the Germans realized the importance of this Battle of Communications was indicated by the fact that before the blockade runner had left port, a German naval officer had addressed her officers and crew, telling them that if they got their cargo to Germany it would be the equivalent of winning a big battle for Hitler.

H.M.A.S. Quickmatch, the latest of the destroyers made available to the R.A.N. by the Admiralty, was in conflict with the enemy in the Atlantic Ocean on the 3oth November, when she was one of a number of convoy escorts that intercepted an Italian ship which was trying to run the blockade. The crew having been removed, the ship was sunk. "The Italian prisoners of war," reported the commanding officer of Quickmatch, "seemed very pleased to be picked up." The following day H.M.A.S. Quiberon, sister to Quickmatch, was one of a British force in the Mediterranean which destroyed, in a sharp night action, an enemy convoy endeavouring to run reinforcements to Tunis.

The action lasted about an hour, and resulted, in the words of Quiberon' s report, in a "Total bag for the night of three destroyers and four merchant vessels, two of which were troopships". The following morning a British destroyer in company with Quiberon was torpedoed during a dawn torpedo-bomber attack. Quiberon went alongside her and removed her complement, herself narrowly escaping some direct hits during the process. "During the time alongside," Quiberon reported, "I was bombed and cannoned. H.M.A.S. Quiberon got clear just as a stick of bombs fell where she had been; the explosions were under my forecastle. 

Ship went on to full speed and was attacked six more times by low-level bombing, dive-bombing, and one abortive attempt by torpedo bombing aircraft. Sticks of bombs all fell fairly close, but thanks to good gunnery and high speed I was able to alter course as necessary after seeing the bombs begin to fall."

That was on the 1st December, 1942, and while H.M.A.S. Quiberon was successfully evading air attacks in the Mediterranean, another H.M.A. ship fell a victim to Japanese air attacks in the Arafura Sea. That was H.M.A.S. Armidale, which was sunk by torpedo bombers and bombers south of Timor. The first intimation that Armidale had been sunk was when aircraft reported sighting a lifeboat carrying survivors. An H.M.A. ship was sent to the rescue and, although herself subjected to enemy air attack, located the lifeboat in which were seventeen of Armidale's complement. Three days later a further twenty-six of the ship's personnel were picked up from another lifeboat. Of the total complement of eighty-three officers and men, forty-two officers and thirty-eight ratings-are missing. H.M.A.S. Armidale-which shot down one bomber and one fighter, with a probable second fighter, before she sank - was the first of the Australian "corvettes" to be lost in action.

This day, the 1st December, saw the end of yet another naval action between United States forces and Japanese in the Solomons. In this Second Savo Battle, the U.S. forces sank two Japanese light cruisers or heavy destroyers, two transports, and one cargo vessel. The American losses were a heavy cruiser sunk and a number of other ships damaged. And again the Japanese had failed in their efforts to relieve their troops on Guadalcanal.

On New Guinea, in the fight for Papua the enemy was now pinned in a narrowing area at Buna and Gona, denied the ability effectively to reinforce or supply his forces owing to his loss of control of the sea. And it was at this stage that the value to the Allies of their own extending sea control in this area became apparent. In the face of considerable difficulties, especially from enemy air opposition, this control had been pushed gradually forward along the northern coast of the island. Beach heads had been established, and beachmasters of the Royal Australian Navy installed, and essential materials for the final assault on the Japanese at Buna and Gona sent round by the only possible road-the sea. This material included tanks and artillery, which were taken to Oro Bay, largely in Dutch merchant ships ,under the escort of H.M.A. "corvettes".

Troops also were taken round by sea. On Sunday, the 13th December, 1942, H.M.A.Ss Colac, Broome and Ballarat, having embarked A.I.F. personnel, departed from Milne Bay, and shortly after midnight the following day landed them at Oro Bay. To many of the men on board, as the ships, under threat of air attack, crept into the harbour under cover of darkness with every light blacked out, and disembarked hurriedly so that the ships could be away again before dawn, the experience must have been reminiscent of those "Tobruk Ferry" nights of the Mediterranean, when R.A.N. ships, with their companions of the Royal Navy, maintained the lines of communication with the fortress garrison, and enabled it to hold out for so many months. 

But on this occasion the process was reversed, and the sea road was being used, not to enable ,m Allied garrison to hold out, but to reduce An enemy force. The result, however, success due to possessing the means and ability to use the sea communication, was the same, and as the use of sea communications enabled Tobruk to hold out in Libya, so it enabled the Allies to defeat the Japanese holding force at Buna and Gona. On Friday, the 18th December, the A.I.F. troops, with the tanks and artillery, which had been taken round by sea by and under the escort of the Royal Australian Navy, stormed Cape Endaiadere, the first step in the final defeat of the enemy in Papua.

From then on, the story in the South-west Pacific and South Pacific areas, as in the Mediterranean theatre, has been one of progressive attack and advance by the Allies, and of defence and retreat by the Axis Powers. By the 14th January, 1943, all organized Japanese resistance in Papua was ended, and soon afterwards the area was mopped up. The enemy retained his hold of Lae and Salamaua, Finschhafen and Wewak, as his main points in New Guinea, but the rise in Allied air striking power made it increasingly difficult for 'him to reinforce and supply by sea. In this connection he suffered a heavy blow during the first days of March, when a Japanese convoy of troopships and transports, escorted by destroyers, endeavoured to run reinforcements and supplies into Lae. 

During a two days' battle, carried out on the Allied side by aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force and the American Air Force, the convoy was completely destroyed, together with the naval escort. In the words of the G.H.Q. communiqué: 

"The Battle of the Bismarck Sea is now decided. We have achieved a victory of such completeness as to assume the proportions of a major disaster to the enemy. His entire force was practically destroyed. His naval component consisted of twenty-two vessels comprising twelve transports and ten warships - cruisers or destroyers. They represent a tonnage estimated at approximately 90,000 tons. All are sunk or sinking. His air coverage for this naval force has been shot out of combat and many others damaged. His ground forces, estimated at probably fifteen thousand, destined to attack in New Guinea, have been sunk or killed almost to a man."

A number - a small number - of Japanese survivors did get ashore from the convoy, and were picked up in various places by Allied troops. One group was captured by Australians on Goodenough Island. The story is told of the members of this particular party that, when captured, they "bowed to their guards and, in fair English, sang 'Auld Lang Syne'!" The report does not indicate whether the classification of "fair" English means that the Japanese sang in broad Scots, but it does say something for them that, after owing their capture to the attacks of an air-borne enemy, they could choose as their vehicle for Anglo-Saxon expression a poet who, also, was born in Ayr.

So far as Japanese attacks on Allied shipping in the South-west Pacific area were concerned, these were confined to submarine activity and assault from the air. Various raids were made on shipping around New Guinea, and on such bases as Oro Bay and Milne Bay. On the 11th April, 1943, H.M.A.S. Pirie suffered a direct bomb hit and heavy strafing during an attack by forty-five dive bombers and fighters, and lost some of her officers and ratings killed, while a Dutch merchant ship was sunk and also suffered casualties. Three' days later the enemy delivered a heavy air attack on Milne Bay, when a number of merchant ships was hit and casualties suffered. Good work was done on this occasion by the "corvettes" H.M.A.S. Kapunda and H.M.A.S. Wagga. Kapunda wound up this episode by towing one of the damaged merchant ships to the mainland after the attack. The story of this incident is told in "-Twirps, One, for the Use of", later in this book. The Japanese also carried out raids on Darwin, and on shipping in the Darwin area, but without achieving any results of value to them.

In February 1943 another example of Allied control of the sea was made apparent. Inability to exercise sea power had prevented the Japanese from reinforcing and holding Guadalcanal, had dashed for them any hopes they may have cherished of the conquest of Australia, had pinned them within the areas of the Western Pacific Archipelagos. Inability to exercise sea power-in spite of their initial overwhelming air power and the numerically superior Italian Fleet-was fast losing North Africa to the Axis, and was to lose them Sicily, Italy, and the whole of the Mediterranean. Now British sea power and its control of the Indian Ocean was to enable the return from the Middle East to Australia, in a voyage completely devoid of untoward incident or any possible interference by the enemy, of the Ninth Division of the A.I.F., presently again to be in action against the Japanese. Thus did British sea power, unobtrusively, silently, exercised thousands of miles distant, directly affect the campaign in New Guinea.

By the 9th February, 1943, the defeat of the Japanese in Guadalcanal was complete. In the Pacific war generally the Allied offensive gathered momentum and increased in geographical range. Attu Island, in the Aleutians, was occupied by United States forces on the 11th May, and on the last day of the following month two further Allied landings were made, at Nassau Bay in New Guinea and at Rendova in the Solomons. On the 2nd July the United States forces landed in New Georgia; Munda was captured on the 5th August; and by the 26th of the month all organized Japanese resistance in New Georgia ended. During this fighting in the Solomons there were two naval engagements in Kula Gulf, in both of which the Japanese were soundly defeated by the United States forces. The first battle of Kula Gulf was fought during the night of the 5th/ 6th July, between two fleets each composed of cruisers and destroyers. The Japanese lost nine ships including both categories, to American losses of one light cruiser, the U.S.S. Helena. In the second Kula Gulf battle, fought on the night of the 12th/13th July, a force of British and American ships scored a similar victory, the score being a Japanese cruiser and three destroyers sunk, two more ships possibly sunk, and four destroyers damaged. Allied losses consisted of one ship, the U.S. destroyer Gwin, which sank after being torpedoed.

On the 4th September, following bombardments by United States ships, Allied landings were made near Lae, New Guinea. On the 12th September, Salamaua was occupied, and Lae fell to our troops four days later. The naval forces engaged in these operations were almost entirely American. But the Royal Australian Navy was not unrepresented. On the day of the Lae landings, one small ship carried out the not unimportant duty of maintaining the continuous traffic survey that ensured the smooth running to programme of the ships engaged in the operation. 

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